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PREFACE 
The need for a study of labor institutions in Thailand became 
apparent to me in 1967 when I began a visiting professorship appoint­
ment to Thammasat University in Bangkoki. As a specialist in labor 
relations, I had looked forward to examining the industrial relations 
system of a developing countryi. Because literature on the Thai system
is sparse, I arrived at my post not knowing exactly what to expecti. 
I found that formal labor unions were totally absent; they had been 
suppressed since 1958i. Moreover, the business community was giving
little attention to industrial relations policy and procedures, and 
the universities offered no courses in labor relations. The lack of 
subject matter to teach in my major area of specialization made me 
intensely aware of how culture-centered the practice of labor relations . 
15. 
Strikes were rare, and those that did occur were regarded as aber­
rant behavior and were front-page news. My casual inquiries into labor 
matters were answered by assurances from Thai faculty colleagues, by
government officials, and industry representatives that the Thai worker 
had little or no interest in joining labor organizations, and that 
labor relations policies in industry were both unnecessary because of 
employer paternalism and unworkable because of the workers' complete
acceptance of employer authorityi. The individualism of the Thai, I 
was told, was such that if a worker objected to his employer's actions 
he would si�ply quit rather than confront his supervisor. Because of 
the relatively short duration of my appointment and because of the 
pressure of other research commitments, I did not at that time pursue 
my inquiry into the nature of Thai industrial relations at any great 
lengthi. 
Another visiting professorship during 1971-73 afforded a second 
chance to examine the Thai system. There was no increase in the amount 
of published literature, but interest was evident among transient 
scholars, who, hearing of my own interest in the subject, frequently
requested briefings . This interest was heightened by the rapid econom­
ic growth that occurred in the 1960s, by dramatic departures from Thai 
passivity, and ultimately by the legalization of worker associations 
in May 1972i. In attempting to answer our questions about the nature 
of these developments, it became obvious that an understanding of a 
broad spectrum of Thai culture was necessary. For example, in attempt­
ing to identify the circumstances. surrounding the rise and fall of 
embryonic labor organizations, I found myself learning more and more 
about Thai history. An analysis of the labor organization as an 
instrument of power required an examination of the Thai political
structure and the reaction of the power elite to the emergence of this 
institutioni. My efforts to understand the character of the Thai worker,
his attitudes and values as they relate to industrial, urban employ­
ment and to union affiliation, led me to examine the Kingdom's reli­
gious, ethnic, and spatial compositioni. No less important was an 
Vlll 
awareness of the Thai business community's perceptions of the master­
servant relationship, and the roots in Thai culture of its attitudes. 
An understanding of labor laws required an examination of the Thai 
legal structure and the system of public administration. Economic
development and demographic pressures were operating to transform 
traditional attitudes and roles, and these focused my attention on
the mechanics of the Thai labor market. 
Because of the dearth of serious.literature on industrial rela­
tions in Thailand, the emerging system had to be studied through a 
�eemingly endless search for bits and pieces of information which
could fit together into a mosaici. The anthropological character of 
this study, I think, was reflected in the initial drafts of this
manuscript, which attempted to present and interpret diverse sources
of information to novitiates among students of Thai labor relations. 
Successive drafts have condensed these interpretations and deleted 
material which, though providing an interesting background, is not 
directly relevant. Because this work is now addressed to more mature
students of Thai society, the novitiate is reminded that a deeper 
insight into the development of Thai labor institutions requires a
comprehension of the broad cultural context within which they are 
evolving.
I have accumulated many debts of gratitude in conducting this 
study. Professor Kundhol Srisermbhok of Thammasat University provided 
valuable liaison and research services, and coauthored Chapter IVi.
Dr. Puey Ungpakorn, former Dean of the Fatulty of Economics and Rector 
of Thammasat University, provided inspiration and encouragement, and 
two more recent deans, Drsiw Vinyu Vichit-Vadakan and Lily Kosiyanon 
assisted me in making contacts and in providing space facilities. 
Portions of the manuscript ha�e been discussed with Dr. William McCleary, 
formerly of the Rockefeller Foundation's Thailand staff and of Thammasat 
University; with Drs. Ammar Siamwalla and Narongchai Akrasanee of
Thammasat University; with Professor Seiji Naya of the University of
Hawaii; and with Professor Pasuk Phonpaichit of Chulalongkorn University, 
all of whom have provided helpful comments. 
I especially appreciate the encouragement, technical advice, pro­
gram scheduling, and moral support of Dr. Laurence Stifel of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, who was my chief of party during my two tenures 
at Thammasat University.
Appreciation is expressed to numerous labor, industry, and govern­
ment officials in Thailand for their generous assistance in the conduct 
of this study. I am grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation for provid­
ing a Visiting Professor Grant to Thammasat University in 1967-68, 
again in 1971-73, during which this study was initiated, and a research 
grant for Summer 1976 to permit its completion. A Faculty Research 
Grant from Bowling Green State University also supplemented the summer 
grant. The responsibility for the study and for all errors or omis�
sions rest, however, with the author. 
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CHAPTER I 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
LABOR FORCE 
Introduction 
The Thai worker, just as one from any other country, is a product
of his or her environment and culture. The values which he brings to 
the work site, which motivate him to perform, and which influence his 
responses to the myriad job stimuli, all are rooted in and grow out 
of the experiences to which he ha·s been exposed in his immediate 
society. Insight into Thai work behavior, therefore, requires some 
knowledge of this milieu of common experiences which comprise his 
culture. As Thailand develops, of course, the set of experiences and 
patterns of relationships which compose the daily life of the Thai 
is enlarged and changed, and behavior is modified as new responses are 
conditioned to new stimuli. Over time, perhaps slowly, values are 
modified to meet the realities of new life styles. Hence, it is 
imperative to remember that the model of the Thai worker of the 1970s 
is not quite the same as that of the worker of the 1930s or of the 
1990s. 
Until World War II, with ohly limited exceptions, the overwhelming
majority of the economically active population was engaged in rural 
occupations, essentially agricultural. Ethnic Thais were almost 
exclusively rice farmers. The picture has changed but little., for in 
1975 about 85 percent of the population was rural. · The average Thai 
worker, even today, resides in a village and is a farmer. Before 
World War II, ethnic Thais found urban employment principally in govern­
ment civil service, state enterprises, the military·, or domestic 
service. Commercial, financial, and industrial activities remained 
the province of aliens, predominantly urban Chinese, who supplied the 
leaders and personnel for enterpiises in these sectors. The prewar
"labor force" of the private sector in Thailand was therefore basically
Sino:Thai, with distinctive cultural characteristics. 
The �on-Thai character of the nonagricultural labor force, how­
ever, is changing for a variety 0£ reasons. By government decree, 
Chinese immigration virtually ceased in 1955, and entry-level jobs no 
longer can be filled with unskilled aliens. Moreover, through a series 
of legislative enactments, aliens have periodically and persistently
been excluded from employment in a growing number of occupations. 
Again by conscious government policy, assimilation of the Chinese 
community into the Thai social and national fabric has proceeded. at 
an increasing rate, so that only about 200,000 residents of Chinese 
heritage in 1973 were noncitizens. Most of the Sino-Thai under age
forty have been educated in Thai schools, are Buddhists, use Thai as 
their primary language, and identify themselves nationally as Thai. 
Hence, the distinction by national origin and cultural heritage is no 
longer as sharp as it once was. The size of the urban labor force 
1 
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then increased with the entry of indigenous Thai and Thai-Chinese, 
whose differences are more of the kind found between urban and rural 
sectors of the population, between educated and uneducated, or between 
skilled and unskilled than among nationalities and diverse culturesi. 
Although the urban labor force is becoming "Thai-fied,i" to the 
extent that rural migrants are absorbed into nonagricultural employ­
ment and provide an increasing proportion of it, the values they bring 
with them will influence the process of their adaptation to the demands 
of that labor force and will modify its characteri. Their values will 
impose corresponding demands upon entrepreneurs and management if they 
are effectively to deal with and efficiently to utilize the services 
of the rural Thai . Failure to recognize and accommodate the require­
ments of adaptation posed by diverse values can generate industrial 
relations problems -- labor disputes, turnover, absenteeism, training
and skill development, etci. Indeed, the process by which a labor 
force is disciplined to the requirements of modern technology involves 
the transformation of the value system of its constituents . Hence,
in terms of ethnic and occupational composition and in terms of degree
of modernization, the Thai labor force has continued to changei. 
Institutions both reflect and influence the characteristics of a 
society and persist as long as they are functional in serving its endsi. 
To the extent that the society is stable and subject to few exogenous
disturbances, the structure, goals, and the patterns of beliefs that 
form, support, and are served by its institutions may be slow to changei. 
It is this "slow to change" feature of a society that characterizes it 
as traditional, and it is that sector of the society which is exposed 
to exogenous disturbances and is undergoing sometimes rapid change 
which is described as modern, particularly if the source of disturbance 
is an accelerating process of urbanization, commercialization, and 
industrialization .  On balance, whether a country is traditional or 
modern depends upon the degree of mix of the two sectors and on the 
degree in which the modern sector is or is not transforming, through
interaction, the traditional .i1 Thailand, in terms of the mix of its 
population and the dominance of its cultural orientation, is still 
traditional, although the process of modernization is expandingi. 
The focus of this study is on the emergence of Thai labor insti­
tutionsi. Labor institutions in any country are a product of that 
nation's culture and stage of economic developmenti. Development oper­
ates on these institutions by influencing the size, composition, and 
location of the labor force and the processes by which human activity
is allocated in the labor marketi. The institutions of the labor 
market ---worker organizations, labor laws and agencies, and employer 
organizations and personnel practices -- facilitate the distribution 
of the labor force by region, industry, and occupation .  Within the 
market context, labor force adjustments respond to the push and pull 
of changing compensation patternsi. 
The culture of the people can also influence their occupational 
preferences and the extent of their work commitmenti. Moreover, that 
culture can influence the nature of institutions through the manifesta­
tions of the basic values and attitudes that condition people's behaviori. 
1Norman Jacobs has argued that Thai modernization is only a veneer;
that in fact traditional Thai culture dominates the goals and orienta­
tion of its leadersi. See his Modernization Without Development, 
Thailand As An Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1971)i. 
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As a prelude to examining the development of Thai labor institutions, 
it is thus appropriate in this initial chapter to examine the dimen­
sions of Thailand's labor force, her compensation patterns, and the 
work behavior of her citizensi. 
I .  Dimensions of the Economy 
Introduction 
Thailand is an underdeveloped country, whose annual per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1976 was only about US $300 (6,000
baht)i. Greater Bangkok, the capital, enjoys a degree of prosperity 
that is
.i
not typical of this tropical Southeast Asian kingdomi. This 
center of vibrant economic activity, rich in c�pital and modern techno­
logy, comprises less than 4 percent of the Kingdom's 200,000 square
miles and almost 20 percent of her 43 million peoplei. The central 
region's income is heavily weighted by the greater economic develop­
ment of the Greater Bangkok area, and it far exceeds the income of the 
other three, less developed regionsi. Except for small cities, the top 
twenty varying in population from 40, 000 to 100,i000, the country is 
predominantly agrarian, primarily using traditional farming techniquesi. 
Although economic growth since World War II has centered dramati­
cally in the Bangkok area, planned expansion of the infrastructure has 
permitted the fruits of this development to filter through to other 
regions of the countryi. Roads, educational facilities, public health 
services, public utilities, and communication media have reached remote 
rural villages and brought new levels of awareness and aspirations to 
their inhabitantsi. Control of disease and improved health care has 
extended life expectancy from 35 years at birth in 1945 to over 58 
years in 1973, and the resulting population explosion has increased the 
number of inhabitants of Thailand in the same period by 235 percenti. 
This natural rate of population growth of about 3 . 1 percent annually, 
if continued, obligates Thailand to maintain her unusually high postwar
rate of real economic growth of almost 8 percent if the Malthusian 
spectre is to be avoided. 
The higher growth of per capita income in urban and rural areas 
has motivated only a slight redistribution of population through migra­
tion to urban areasi. Rather, much migration has been interrural, to 
unoccupied lands, and much of the expansion in agricultural output has 
resulted from the cultivation of new acreage rather than from the use 
of improved technologyi. Since the amount of unused arable land is 
finite, the continued growth of rural population will increasingly be 
difficult to accommodate; the rural-urban income differential will 
widen and· rural to urban migration will acceleratei. The urban economy
then will be under increasing pressure to generate jobs in order to 
absorb the rural immigrants . 
The Labor Force 
In Thailand the measure of the economically active population ages
11 �r above is used to represent the labor force .i2 Those who were 
classified in 1960 either as employers, self-employed or unpaid family 
workers totaled almost 88 percent of the economically active population, 
2M.L. Gupta, in "Patterns of Economic A�tivity in the Philippines 
and Some Methodological Issues Involved,'' Inter�ational Labor Review,
4 (April 1970), pp . 384-87, argues that persons under age 15 should be 
excludedi. 
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but in 1974 the corresponding figure had declined to about 78 percenti. 
The proportions of employers and self-employed workers increased, so 
that the major decline has been in the percentage of unpaid family 
workersi. On the other hand, over the same period, the proportion of 
paid employees has increased from about 12 to about 22 percent, and 
this indicates the degree of expansion of the conventional labor 
market (see Table 1)i. 
The pace of development can in part be revealed by examining 
changing patterns of labor use in an economy . Because urbanization, 
industrialization, and growth in per capita income all are positively
related and because these variables are negatively associated with 
labor force participation rates, Thailand has in the 1970s used rela­
tively fewer youths and females in economic pursuits than she did in 
the 1960si. This decline has resulted in a slower rate of growth of 
the labor force and of employment than in the rate of population growth. 
The most striking change in the industrial distribution of the 
employed is found in the primary sector, here identified as the A 
sector since it is dominated by agricultural employment (see Table 2) . 
This decline appears to be accelerating. From 82 . 4  percent of the 
employed in 1960, the A sector employment had declined to slightly 
less than 80 percent in 1970, but in the succeeding four years the 
decline accelerated, so that by 1974 only 65 percent were employedi. 
Almost two million fewer workers were in the A sector in 1974 than in 
1970, and total employment here in 1974 was even less than that record­
ed in 1960i. The numerical decline in primary sector employment in 
1974 was more than offset by numerical gains in the goods-producing 
(M) and service-producing (S) sectors, and the greater percentage of 
those employed in these two sectors is inflated by that numerical 
decline in the A sectori. Although some movement from the A to the M 
and S sectors undoubtedly occurred, they would have grown even if the 
participation rates in agricultu�e had not declinedi. The expansion of 
employment in the Miand S sectors, while numerically significant between 
1960 and 1970, were not matched by correspondingly large percentage
gains during the same period. This suggests that employment expansion 
in all sectors was relatively uniform, with only slightly more growth
in the Miand S sectors. Between 1970 and 1974, however, the pace of 
employment growth in the Miand S sectors quickened, with relatively 
greater growth occurring in the goods-producing sector, where employ­
ment more than doubledi. Significant but less spectacular employment 
growth occurred in the S sector, both in the commercial and service 
industriesi. 
The quality of the labor force is influenced by the educational 
attainments of the populationi. In terms of educational development,
Thailand has been classified as a semiadvanced country along with 
such nations as Norway, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and Mexico.i3 
Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of population classified as 
literate increased from about 71 to 82 percenti. Literacy is high among 
both young male and female adults, but rates decline rapidly for those 
of age forty and over, and this is especially true for femalesi. A 
3F . H .  Harbinson and C . A .  Meyers, Education, Manpower and Economic 
Growth, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964) ,  pp . 23-48.  This classification 
was derived by giving heavy weight to the proportion of the population 
having secondary and postsecondary educationi. 
.57 
3.55 
TABLE 1 
Work Status of the 
Economically Active Population, 11  Years of Age and Over 
1960, 1970, 1974 
1960 1970 1974 
Work .Status . ·· Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Total 13, 722, 104 100. 00 16,652,267 100. 00 17, 159, 140 100.00 
Employer 43,600 . 32 60,758 . 36 98,910 
Self-Employed 4, 084, 792 29.66 4,935,205 29. 64 5,805, 750 33·. 83 
Employee 1,632, 686 11. 85 2,597, 870 15.60 3, 817,450 22.25 
Government 489,452 777,984 4.n67 992,780 5.n79 
Private 1, 143,234 8. 30 1,819, -886 10. 93 2,824,670 16. 46 
7,982, 836 57.96 8, 934,983 53.66 7, 437,030 -43. 34 Unpaid family '
- - - - . 00 Unknown 28,n190 . 20 123,451 . 74 
. . 
. Source: National Statistical Office, Labor Forae Survey, Census of Population, 1960, 1970 
(July-September, 1974). 
V, 
5.4 7.5 
3.4 9.9 
TABLE 2 
Industry
and
Sector 
A 
Economically Active Population 11 Years of Age and Over, By Industry
1960, 1970, 1974 
(000) 
1960 1970 1974* Mean Years of 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Education, 1974 
11,332.2 82.4 13,201.i9 79.3 11,226.3 65.4 4.94 
M 749.3 1,244.4 2,546.7 14.8 6.22 
Mining 29.5 0.2 86.6 0.5 49.4 . 3 5.72 
Mfg. 470.1 682.6 4.1 1,693.6 6.12 
Construction 68.6 0.5 181.5 1.1 276.8 1.6 5.96 
Utilities 15�5 0.1 25. 3 0.2 61.5 .4 9.83 
Transport & Comm. 165.1 ·1. 2 268.4 1.6 465. 1 2.7 6.52 
S 1,433.6 10. 4 2,085.3 12.6 3,386.2 19. 7 7.16 
Commerce 779.3 5. 7 875.8 5.3 1,628.6 9.5 6.01 
Services 654.2 4 . 8  1,209.5 7.  3 1,757.6 10.2 8.23 
Unknown 233.7 1.7 145.9 0.9 - - - -
Total 13,748.7 100.0 16,652,267 100.0 17,159,140 100.0 5.56 
*Number includes only the category Employed Persons, which constitutes 99.58 percent of the 
economically active population. 
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proxy for the quality of the labor force is the mean years of school­
ing completed by participants. In Thailand in ,1974, the average
number of years of schooling was 5. 56, little more than a lower 
primary education (see Table 2). In most industries, only a small 
percentage of the labor force has acquired more than a primary
education. 
Recent labor force surveys reveal that between 1969 and 1974, the 
growth of the Thai labor force has almost stagnated, increasing at an 
unusual rate over the five-year period of less than· one-half of onen. 
percent. Although the urban labor force has grown at about 1. 5 per­
cent annually, the rural labor force has had a negative rate of 
growth, produced by the absolute decline in the number of participat­
ing females. Even the annual rate of growth of the rural male labor 
force has been less than one percent. Since the natural rate 0£ 
growth of the population entering the working age has been about 3 
percent, the data suggest a strong possibility of the withdrawal of 
both males and females of working age from active participation 1n 
economic pursuits. 
Labor Force Participation and Unemployment 
Between the mid 1960s and 1974, and particularly since 1970, 
dramatic declines in labor force participation rates (LFPR) have 
occurredn· for those age groups between twenty and.fifty, especially 
for females in rural areas (see Table 3). The decline in participa-. 
tion rates since 1969 may be either real or illusory. Certairily,
increasing educational opportunities, increasing urbanization, and 
increasing fami·ly income levels are real forces which produce declines 
in such _rates, and to the extent that these influences are present
in the Thai economy, decreases are to be expected.n4 Nevertheless, 
real economic growth in the 1970s has been less than that of the 1960s, 
and the labor-absorption capacity has been correspondingly reduced. 
Hence, given the earlier high birth iate, the labor force ought to 
grow proportionately after an appropriate time lag, if real labor 
participation rates are only marginally reduced by marginal increments 
in urbanization, family income, and school attendance. In fact, the 
first two of these influences have indeed been marginal, and the great­
est increases in school attendance has been experienced · by males in 
the 11-19 age group. Yet, it is female participation in all age groups .
that has shown the greater declines. If influences reducing labor 
force participation ratesn·nhave not been strong, a consequence of this 
mix of forces, reflecting a lower rate of real economic growth and a 
marginally reduced rate of labor force growth should have been reflect­
ed in significantly higher unemployment rates. Yet, measured unemploy­
ment rates remain only a fraction of one percent, and total measured 
·unemployment increased less than 20,0ob between 1969 and 1974. 
4Four recent studies on Thai LFPR are: (1) Sidney Goldstein, Alice 
Goldstein, Penporn Tiraservat, The Influence of Labor Force Participa­
tion and Education on Fertility in Thailand, Institute of Population 
Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Report No. 9 (Bangkok, December 1972);
(2) Nibhon Debavalya, A Study of _aFemale Labor Force Participation and 
Fertility in Thailand (paper presented at the Seminar on Labor Supply,
sponsored by the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, Makati, Rizal, 
Philippines, June 21-25, 1976) ; (3) Suvanee Chitranukroh, The Female 
Labor Force Participation Rate in Thailand •(idem.n); and (4) Srawooth 
Paitoonpong, The Labor Supply of Thailand: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Determinants of Participation Rates, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Hawaii, 1976). 
00 
7. 5 4. 7 
73. 9 55. 4 
54. 7 
74.5 54. 7 
TABLE 3 (a) 
Urban Labor Force Participation Rates 
197419691964 
BothBothAge Both 
Sexes Male FemaleFemaleMaleSexesFemaleMaleSexes 
13. 2 10. 6 11.n4 11-14 5. 5 5. 8 9.n5 7.n0 
35. 5 33. 8  38. 0 34. 6 35. 0 36. 5 39. 9 42. 6 41.n3 15-19 
55.n4 72. 8 63.n9 54. 9 74.n4 63. 5  81. 7 57.n6 20-24 68.n5 
25-29 95.2 94.5 58. 3 73.n1 95.n1 55.n1 76. 2 
97.n4 73. 0 52. 8 76.n1 97. 5 75.n1 30-34 96. 9 54. 9 
59.n9 35-39 79. 3  97. 9 97.n1 97. 5 52.5 76.n1 
75. 4 95.n7 96.n3 54.652. 0 60.6 74.n1 96. 7 78�840-49 
26. 2 44. 3 65. 0 48. 9 29.n5 80. 4 67.n1 35.6so + 51. 7 
52.n1 40.n3 64. 2 40. 2  68. 6 53.n1 65. 8 56. 2 Total 44. 7 
TABLE 3 (b) 
Rural Labor Force Participation Rates 
1966 1969 1974 
Age Both 
Sexes Male Female 
Both 
Sexes Male Female 
Both. 
·Sexes Malen. Female 
11-14 53.n1 54.n4 51. 7  34.n7 33.n5 36.n0 22. 2  21.n4 23.n1 
15-19 85.n8 87.n5 84.n2 82.n2 84.n9 79. 7 70. 8  70. 9  70. 7 
20-24 86.n8 88.n2 8'5. 5 88.n6 95.n6 82.n1 83.n1 90. 8  75.n7 
25-29 90. 8  97.n3 83.n9 88.n1 96.n2 81. 0  83.n7 95.n4 72.n6 
30-34 90. 2  96.n5 85.n0 91.n1 98.n2 85.n3 87.0 97.n8 76.n6 
35-39 89.n7 96.n3 82.n8 92.n0 97.n4 86.n8 87.1 98.8 75. 5 
40-49 90.n5 96.n5 85.n3 92. o. 98.n3 85.n8 87.n5 9 8. 2 76.n9 
+so 63. 3  80. 4  56.n1 68.n5 79.n1 56.n4 58.n4 74.4 44.n0 
71.n3 68.n7 76.n3 61.n3 Total 79.n8 87.n6 73.n7 76.n3 81.n5 
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This slow growth in measured unemployment suggests that the defi­
nition of the labor force may have been constructed to conceal the 
number of unemployed. Persons excluded from the labor force definition 
since 1969 included those who (a) are voluntarily idle (b) work unpaid
in nonfamily enterprises or in other households, or (c) work unpaid in 
one's own household for less than twenty hours per weeki. Definitions 
(a) and (c) in particular can contain the hidden unemployed and can 
explain the decline in urban and rural female participation rates that 
have dominated the aggregate LFPR. Perhaps females are participating
relatively less not through choice but because opportunities for employ­
ment are feweri. An important question now facing Thailand is whether 
she will be able to generate enough new jobs fully to employ her grow­
ing labor forcei. 
The existence of much disguised unemployment in the Thai economy 
has been recognized by the Labor Department, which in 1976 estimated 
that actual unemployment exceeded one millioni. Open unemployment,
however, as revealed by preliminary results from the 1976 Labor Force 
Survey, remained of the same dimensions as existed in the 1974 Labor 
Force Survey; namely, 31,000 or 1�5 percent of the urban labor force 
and 41,000 or 0 . 3  percent of the rural labor forcei. The impact on 
social welfare is, of course, related to total unemployment, both open 
and disguised, and to its future trendi. 
Thailand's future labor su.pply will depend essentially upon her 
rate of population growth, and changes in her labor force participation 
rates. With given estimates of population, by age and sex, and with 
given labor force participation rates, by-age and sex, future estimates 
of the_size of the labor force can be madei. Both high (LFH) and low (LF
L
) estimates are presented in Table 4 .  
The aggregate demand for labor can also be estimated with a given 
set of assumptionsi. The conventional technique used to estimate future 
labor demand has been to calculate output - labor ratios, then to 
estimate rates of growth in these ratios and in real output, and 
finally to divide estimated real output by estimated output - labor 
ratios to get estimated labor demandi. Both high (A) and low (B)
estimates are presented in Table 5 .  
Estimates of future unemployment follow from combining labor force 
projections with those for labor demandi. The low estimate of the labor 
force is admittedly an extreme lower limit and is not likely to exist 
when either estimate A or B of labor demand holdsi. With either esti­
mate of labor demand, the· demand exceeds the supply of labor· by- substan­
tial amountsi. Obviously, such a situation would cause wage rates to 
rise, and this would tend to increase female labor force participation 
rates and shift labor force participation rates in a direction towards 
the high labor force estimatei. Table 6 presents the estimated unemploy­
·ment when high (A) and low (B) estimates of labor demand are compared
with the high, and the low estimates of the labor forcei. Projected
unemployment is, of course, highest when low labor demand (estimate B)
is combined with high projections of the labor forcei. Unemployment is 
also substantial when the more realistic high estimate (A) of labor 
demand is combined with the high estimate of the labor forcei. 
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TABLE 4 
Labor Force Projections,
1980-1995 
Year LF a LF b H L 
1980 20,841 16,792 
1985 24,455 19,710 
1990 28, 730 23,i183 
1995 33,i381 .27, 044 
aCalculated b y applying age specific Labor Force Participation 
Rates in September 1974 for the entire Kingdom by sex, to the project­
ed population age distributioni. 
b Calculated by applying age specific Labor Force Participation 
Rates in September 1974 for municipalities by sex, to the projected 
population age distributioni. 
TABLE 5 
Higha and Low Estimatesb of 
Projected Labor Demand, 1980-1985 
( In Thousands) 
Sector 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
A B A B A B A B 
A 14,i579 13, 100 16,283 13,i874 18,i185 14,i693 20,313 15:, 558 
M 1, 691 2,186 2,039 3, 115 2, 477 4,581  3, 026 6, 938 
s 3, 557 2,900 4, 748 3,610 6, 335 4, 573 8,454 5, 879 
Total 19,827 18,186 23,070 20, 599 26,997 23,847 31,793 28,375 
aCalculated from 7 percent average annual growth rate in GDP, using
Third Five Year Plan Estimiated Sector Growth Ratesi. Output per worker 
growth rate is low rate by sector as estimiated by Saburo Yamada, The 
Measurement and Promotion of Produativity (Bangkok: National Economic 
Development Board, Manpower Plan�ing Division, 1971), Table 11, p .  21b . 
b Calculated from 7 . 84 percent average annual growth rate of GDP 
experienced in 1960-1970 period, and sector output labor ratio growth 
rates experienced in the 1960�1970 period. Except for mining, construc­
tion and transportation, sector growth rates of output-labor ratios 
exceeded Yamada's estimatesi. 
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TABLE 6 
Estimated Unemployment., 1980-1995 
( In Thousands) 
Labor Force 
Estimates 
Labor Demand Estimates 
1980 1985 1990 1995 
A B A B A B A B 
High 
Low* 
1,014 2,655 
( 3 , 03 S) ( 1 , 394 ) 
1,385 3, 855 
(3, 360) (888) 
1,733 4, 883 1,580 5, 006 
(3,n814) (664: (4,749) (1, 33 1)· 
*Overemployment is indicated by parentheses. 
II. Compensation in Thailand 
Money Wages and Salaries in the Private Sector 
The money wage labor market in Thailand is essentially a free 
market. The existence of . an open immigration policy until 1948 and 
since then the movement of agricultural labor into the urban labor 
market has provided Thailand with a highly elastic supply of unskilled 
labor. As a consequence, theory suggests that real income should have 
been fairly stable over time, and· the evidence tends to confirm this 
hypothesis.n5 Wages for semi-skilled labor in the private sector have 
tended to equal or exceed wages paid by the government, and wages have 
unilaterally and initially been set by employers and revised according 
to market conditions. Sincen·n1932 labor organizations have intermittent­
ly exerted some influence on wages, although they have not possessed
much consistent bargaining power. Since 1973, the labor movement has 
revived and has been able to achieve widely publicizedn.nwage gains
through strikes for its members. However, the primary influence of 
the unions may have been more in the timing of the wage increments 
than in their magnitude, considering the degree of inflationary pressure
in the 1973-75 period. These pressure? would have necessitated monetary 
wage increases even in the absence of unions. The military coup of 
October 1976 undermined the bargaining strength of organiz�d labor, 
because strikes and other outbreaks of public disorder have been for­
bidden by the military leaders who have ruled since then. 
5James Ingram notes that real per capita income, approximating the 
subsistence real wage, remained relatively constant during the 1870-
1950 period. See his Economic Change in Thaitand Since t850 (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 214. Pasuk Pongpaichit 
states that ihe real wages of unskilled labor remained stable during
the first half of the 1960s. The cost of living between 1961 and 
1966 rose 11.n2 percent while wages in nonagricultural employment rose 
by 10. 6  percent. Pasuk Pongpaichit, Wages and Economic Devetopment in 
Thaitand (M.A. Thesis, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 1971), 
pp. 57-87. 
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Minimum wage edicts have been imposed since 1973, and these 
represent a departure in principle from the free labor marketi. A 
wage board first established the minimum wage in February 1973 at 
12 baht for the six provinces in the Greater Bangkok area, and this 
was increased at intervals to reach 30 baht in late 1977 . In October 
1974, a minimum wage of from 16 to 18 baht was extended to the remain­
ing sixty-five Changwadsi. 
A 1975 study of seventy- seven Greater Bangkok employers conduct­
ed by the Bank of Thailand Business Conditions Section revealed that 
about 36 . 3  percent of their 37,483 employees were receiving wages
less than 25 baht per day before the January 1, 1975 increase . 6  
Although the study did not reveal whether these seventy-seven employers
complied with the new minimum, it did estimate that as a direct result 
of the increased wage, average production costs rose only 1 . 9 percent . 
Given the ease with which it is possible to evade the minimum wage,
especially in the provinces, it is questionable whether the edicts have 
had much effect in raising the real wages of workersi. The exception 
to this appears to be in the textile industry in the Greater Bangkok 
area, where a large proportion of female employees experienced wage
gainsi. 
Wage Payment Patterns 
Wages are normally paid on a daily, weekly , or monthly basis .i7 
The law requires that wages must be dispensed at least once a month, 
although in practice firms pay their employees more frequentlyi. In 
611Effects of New Minimum Wage on Industry" •  1nvestora, 7, 9 
(September 1975), p .  41 . By industry, the percentage of employees who, 
prior to January 1, 1975, received daily wages below the new minimum 
wage, was as follows :  
Percentage of 
Industry 
Workers Receiving
Under 25 Baht 
Number of 
Firms 
Average Number 
of Workers Per Firm 
Agriculture Products 
Metals, Ceramics 
Chemicals 
19 . 45 
2 . 49 
1 4 . 08 
10 
7 
16 
109 
167 
1 23 
Mechanical & Electrical 
Construction 
32 . 37 
16 . 09 
9 
8 
223 
95 
Textiles 
Hotels 
Misc. 
43 . 93 
14i. 98 
46 . 68 
16 
7 
4 
1,642
54 8 
94 
Employees of industries fabricating metal and ceramic products were 
affected the least by the minimum wage; textiles and mechanical and 
electrical fabricators were affected the mosti. The large size of the 
textile industry, comprising over 70 percent of the employers in the 
sample, weighted the impact of the 1975 minimum wage on the high side. 
Most of those affected in the textile industry were female employees .  
7The occupational wage survey of 1971 revealed that in firms with 
fifty or more employees, 47 percent of employees were paid on a monthly
basis, 43 percent on a daily basis, 7 percent received wages based on 
an hourly rate, and only 3 percent received wages determined on a 
piece-rate basis . 
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most cases, rates are based upon daily or monthly time intervals, 
although in some instances hourly rates and piece rates are used. 
Piece rates are more common in smaller establishments, in construction, 
and in rice warehousing, and they are frequently associated with labor 
supplied by a labor contractor. In addition to the base wage , other 
components of pay include overtime premiums, annual bonuses, maternity
and/or sick pay, savings contributions, and pensions. Severence pay
constitutes a form of deferred compensation. 
The Wage Structure 
The Bangkok metropolitan area, of course, has the most active 
labor market, and in 1974 the Greater Bangkok area comprised over 22  
percent of the K ingdom ' s  approximately 6 million workers employed in 
nonagricultural pursuits. H�nce, the wage strucnture in Bangkok is of 
more than passing importance. Unfortunately, wage data in Thailand is 
not collected on a systemati c  basis, and knowledge of the wage struc­
ture must be inferred from surveys taken intermittently, with samples
of varying sizes. Moreover, average wage data can vary, depending 
upon the weighting effect of firms and occupations that have been 
sampled, and without measures of dispersion, it is almost impossible 
to assess the reliability of the data. Nevertheless, on the premise
that some information is better than none, wage data by sector for 
selected industries are presented in Table 7. 
The 1975 manufacturing wage survey also permits regional compari­
sons of industry wage structures in the Kingdom. Several interesting
points are revealed by the data in Table 8. F irst, it is obvious that 
employees paid on a daily basis earn less than those paid by the month. 
Second, the average daily wage in each industry exceeds tl1e specified 
minimum wage appli cable to each region. Moreover, Bangkok manufactur­
ing wages exceed the average of the Kingdom on a daily basis by less 
than two baht, and they exceed the average of the Central region by
less than one baht. On a monthly basis, Bangkok wages are actually
below those for the Central region and for the K ingdom as a whole. 
Consequently, insofar as manufacturing employment is concerned, jobs 
in Bangkok carry little or no urban premium over those in the contigu­
·ous Central region. This appears to contradi ct a frequent assertion 
that wages in Bangkok exceed those in the rest of the K ingdom.n8 Also 
of interest is the standing of the North relative to the Northeast. 
Daily wages in six of the seven industries for whi ch comparable data 
exist are higher in the Northeast than in the North, and monthly wages 
are. higher in the Northeast than in the North in five out of seven 
industries. The Northeast is by.nmost economic measures the poorest
region in the country, and the ranking of manufacturing wages in the 
Northeast over those in the North is unexpected. 
Average salaries do not tend to increase quickly in Thailand, 
except during periods of rapid inflation, suggesting that trained man­
power is being generated at a rate consistent with the growth needs 
of the Thai economy. The wide variations in salaries within occupa­
tional classifications are caused by a number of characteristics in 
8For example, "As noted, pay in Bangkok-Thonburi generally is 
higher than in other parts of Thailand.n" Harriet ·Mi cocci, Labor Law 
and Praatiae in Thailand ,  Bureau of Lab6r Statistics, No. 405, 
(Washington, 1972), p. 45. 
Industry 
Mfg. 
Construction 
Utilities 
Commerce 
Transport, Comm. 
Services 
TABLnE 7 
Monthly and Hourly Earningsn, 
by Industry Sec tor 
Bangkokn� Thonburi 
(In Bah t) .
1966 
Monthly Hourly 
718.n14 3.27 
1, 331.n19 6.n16 
1 , 079.n25 5.n48 
1,398.85 7.n26 
942.n98 4.n00 
676.n37 2.n82 
1969 
Monthly Hourly 
759n. 58 3.n72 
1, 187.n16 6 . 03 
982.n96 5. 55 
1, 281.70 6. 52 
904n. 48 4.n29 
836.25 3.n68 
1970 
Monthly Hourly 
781n. 96 3.n66 
1 , n199.n12 5 . 76 
1,324.n00 6.n43 
1 , 364.n65 6. 62 
1 , 166.n82 5 . 98 
913.n13 4.25 
1975 
Monthly Hourly 
1, 050.n24 4.57 
Source: Department of Labor, Wage Surveys, 1966n, 1969n, 1970, 1975. (Bangkok : Ministry of 
Interior). 
933 
TABLE 8 
Daily and Monthly Wages for Selected Manufacturing
Industries, By Region, 1975 (In Baht) 
DAILY MONTHLY 
SouthIndustry 
Food, Beverage, 
King-
dom 
Bang-
kok Central North N.E. 
Tobacco 
Textiles, 
24.n27 26 .43 25.37 20.n13 26.35 
Wearing Apparel 
Wood and 
26.n51 2 7. 52 26.n79 18.99 26 .2 5 
Wood Products 
Paper and 
25.n47n.30. 84 28. 93 20.26 19 .67 
Paper Products . .  
Chemicals and 
27.n03 2 7 .4 7 ' 2 7.n18 22.10 37. 50 
Petroleum Products 
Non-metallnic 
26.53 27. 08 2 7 .19 16.61 18. 73 
Mineral Products 24.n17 28.19 2 6. 32 18.18 19. 34 
Basic Metals 34.53 35. 85 34. 63 25 .10 -
Fabricated Metals 
Other 
31.6 5 31.n34 31. 38 30. 94 35 . 24 
Manufacturing 27. 93 28. 08 27. 93 2·0. 64 -
Total 27. 66 29. 54 28.n77 20. 64 22 . 64 
King-
dom 
910 
880 
1, 038 
1,075 
1, 296 
1, 189 
1,282 
1, 349 
Bang-
kok 
1, 025 
826 
1, 114 
1,n101 
1,n114 
1,282 
1, 096 
1, 149 
Central 
994·
892 
1,n123 
1,120 
1,302 
1, 167 
1, 282 
1, 395n. 
North 
801 
447 
1,003 
704 
823 
1,332 
-
788 
N.E. 
898 
614 
844 
572 
1,074 
752 
-
829 
South 
790 
271 
1,n042 
658 
1,403 
3, 518 ·
2, 000 
1,030 
21.n68 
-. 
24.79 
18.00 
24.35 
23. 82 
33. 00 
36. 49 
-
26.n25 
Source :n· Ministry of Interior, Department of Labor, Bangkok, 1976 
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t: TABLE 9 
(')
CD Salary Patterns for Selected Occupations in Eighty Member Firms of the 
American Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 1971, 1973 
(In Baht) 
Cl) CD 
Job Titles 
Executives: 
Personnel Manager
Purchasing Manager 
Financial: 
Auditor 
Accountant 
Cashier 
Office: 
Executive Secretary
Senior Secretaryi· 
Senior Stenographer
Typist
Clerk 
Receptionist 
Messenger
Janitor 
Accounting Machine Operator 
Professionals: 
Engineer, Mechanical 
Engineer, Systems
Lawyer
Nurse 
Engineer, Plant 
Technical: 
Draftsman 
Laboratory Technician 
EDP Programmer 
Plant Production: 
Maintenance Mechanic 
Machine Operator
Laborer 
Miscellaneous: 
Driver 
Sales Clerk 
Average Range
Salary Minimum Maximum 
197 1  1973 197 1 1973 1971 1973 
8 ,  3 0 0  10,000 2,000 4, 000 18,i000 20,200
5, 200 5, 700 1,200 2, 600 1 1,900 8, 700 
3,800 5, 500 1,900 2,000 16,000 13,200
6, 000 8,900 2,300 3,000 18,000 22,500
2, 600 3, 700 500 1, 100 7,900 8,400 
5,400 5,900 1,300 600 9, 000 12,i100 
5, 200 4, 700 1,900 300 8, 900 8, 100 
4, 100 3,i700 1, 700 3, 000 7, 400 4, 000 
1,300 1,800 700 1, 000 4,600 2,500
2,000 3,500 400 1,i700 8, 900 6,i700 
1,800 2,000 700 800 5, 500 3, 200 
900 1,300 500 200 3,800 3,000 
600 1,000 200 600 2,000 1,800
2, 000 2,400 700 1, 000 2, 700 3,300 
5,400 8,400 2, 100 2,000 1 1,900 15, 100 
9 , 0 0 0  9,400 6 , 5 0 0  3,200 1 1, 500 30,300
4, 000 7, 400 3, 100 1,500 4, 800 15, 100 
2, 700 2,900 2,500 1 ,200 3, 000 8, 600 
4, 800 8,500 1,200 3, 500 16, 000 13, 200 
3,200 3,600 1, 100 1,000 20, 000 5,600 
4 , 8 0 0  4,200 1, 700 1, 400 7,900 7, 000 
4, 800 10, 100 2,500 3,500 7,900 20,200 
1, 600 2,000 400 400 6,400 3, 500 
1, 200 2, 100 400 1,000 3,300 4 , 000  
1, 000 1, 10.0 300 700 5,000 1,900 
1, 000 1,500 500 300 3,900 2 , 7 0 0  
2,500 2,500 800. 1, 000 6, 000 4, 000 
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Thai labor marke ts . i
9 Alien owned or operated firms tend to pay higher 
compensation because of the nature of demands placed upon Thai employees , 
who are subject to cross -cultural stress when supervised by alien 
managers and to higher standards of performance than in domestic estab­
lishments. In certain types of firms with an interna tional clientele , 
supplemental language skills are required and are paid a premium. In
addition ,  those employees who have acquired an education in Wes tern 
countries typically earn a premium for their foreign degree on the
premise that their training has been more rigorous and that they are 
be tter able to adapt to superior norms of performancei. As in any 
country , salary variations also reflect the variety of social skills 
and a ttributes which employees possess. On-the-job training and learn­
ing , of coursei, occuri, and salary increments which accompany tenure 
accumulate and produce a spectrum of earnings in each occupaition. The
degree to which these various influences explain salary variations has 
not yet been studied ,  and indeed such a s tu dy will require more complete
wage data than have ye t been collec ted in Thailand. 
Compensa tion in Public Employment 
Government service in Thailand has enjoyed exceptionally high
prestige and staitus during and since the reign of the absolute monarch­
ies. The Thai name for civil servantsi, karaJakarn, is translated as
"servants of the King , "  and , historically , proximity to the I<ing con­
veyed power and honor. Public servants were since the 15th century 
assigned s ta tusi· rankings termed sak di na . 
Beginning with the organi zation of the court and extending into 
and through the provincial. officials to the lowliest villager , a hier­
archy was established with territorial implications where each rank 
was quantitatively measured by sta tus units in terms of land ,  so that 
an official of very high status might have had a sakdina au thority over 
10 ,000 acres , whereas a lowly official might have sakdina authori ty 
over only one hundred acresi. The higher the sakdina rankingi, the high­
er the power and privilege , and hence sta tus of the official. 
Person Sakdina Rank 
King Infinite 
Prince 10 ,000-50 ,000 
Noble 400 -10 ,000 
Commoner (phrai) 10 -400 
Slaves 5-10 
Destitutes , beggars 5 
Although �n practice the sakdina measure of an official's position was 
in terms of control over a quantity of land , it  also in essence bestow­
ed on the official control over the labor that used the land. In
Thailand, men were scarce rela tive to land. Designed to mobili ze 
manpower rapidly the sakdina system· assigned men (phrai ) to leaders 
(nai )  in a .clierit-pa tron relationship .  Some phrai were assigned to 
the king , o thers to pr inces. 
9The American Chamber of Commerce surveyed biennially member firms 
loca ted in Bangkok coveringi. Thai employees . (Recent surveys were made
in 196 8 ,  1971 , and 1973)i. Da ta were also collected on  expatriate 
employees , but these data were not reportedi. 
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Local princes or governorsi, although unpaid, were permitted to 
extract remuneration from their subjectsi, kin muanga, through corvee 
and through a network of fees charged for every conceivable servicei. 
In turn, the official, as a patron, was obligated to secure favors 
and benefits (prebends) for his subjects, or clientsi, and to attend to 
their needs. All Thais stood in a nested set of patron-client relation­
ships , one to the other; the relationships were personal and direct ; and 
at the top , holding supreme power, was the king . l o  Thus , the Thai view 
of the social order is one of vertical ranking in which a person's 
status is precisely determined by his position . 
The patron-client relationshipi, although personali, was nevertheless 
a loose onei. If, for example, the client felt his interests could 
better be served by another patroni, he was able to change, even though
edicts sought to restrict such changes . A client owed the patron 
deference and respect but was free to pursue his own self-interest, an 
individualistic trait of great importance in the Thai set of valuesi. 
The patron-client relationship, then, was ideally one of a pattern of 
reciprocal obligations and rights which was preserved as long as the 
principle of reciprocity was honoredi. Each official presided over an 
enclave which functioned in a self-contained manner so far as economy
and government were concerned . Although pleasing a superior was more 
important than doing a good job in terms of maintaining one's position, 
''functional skills were not lacking in the traditional bureaucracy . 
Records were kept and reports were madei. There were patrols and inves­
tigationsi. Carve� labor was mobilized and put to work. Buildings were 
built; canals were dug . Taxes were collected and commodities were 
stored and transported.i1 1 1 1 This was all done, however, at a leisurely 
pace . Later , in the seventeenth century , annual bonuses at the King ' s  
pleasurei, bia wata, were supplementally bestowed on officials . These 
traditional forms of compensation ,  mostly in kind, persisted well into 
the twentieth century, and land rights associated with govern�ent 
service were not abolished until 1932 when a constitutional monarchy
replaced the absolute onei. The civil service system, formally establish­
ed in 1929, was revised at the time of the revolutioni, and a salary 
structure was then formulated . Although revised in 1954i, 1959i, 1968,
and 1975, the basic structure has remained the samei. The ranks of 
civil servants are ordered by classes, with steps within each class, 
and the pay scale follows this system of ordering . 
Hence, the hierarchal structure has been preserved, although
transformed , and the traditional Thai perception of status as a verti­
cal ordering continued . However , officials were no longer legally 
permitted to live off the land (to practice kin muang)a, but instead a 
lOThis nested relationship of patron-client relationships persistsi. 
For example, even today the peasant social structure of Northern Thailand 
has been described as a hierarchical linkage of overlapping patron­
client relationships called entourages, in which one man's patron is 
another man's client . See Edward Van Roy , "An Interpretation on 
Northern Thai Peasant Economy ,'' Journal of Asian Studie6a, 25, 3 (1967)i, 
pp . 421-32i. 
11william Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracya: Institutional Change and 
Development (Honolulu: The East�iWest Center Press, 1966)i, p .  35 . 
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salary structure was developed to provide remuneration and to correspond 
to ranki. Status is now conferred by rank and by salary,· and in addition 
titlesi, decorations, and awards are used as supplemental symbols to 
motivate advancement in the bureaucracyi. Germane to this hierarchy and 
to the self-enforcing nature of its authority is the persistent Thai 
belief that the power and privileges associated with a position have 
been earned by the person occupying that position ; that power , conferred 
by morality, is self-legitimatizing ; and it is right and proper for 
subordinates to deferi, and to show respect to those in superior postsi. 
Because position is a reward for virtuei, it is the Thai belief that 
anyone through an act of wil l ,  is capable of rising in the hierarchy 
and advancing his statusi. 
Government employmenti, although principally structured by the civil 
service system, exists also in such other areas as the military
i 
the 
2police system, and in over one hundred state-owned enterprisesi. 
Numerically, government employment has expanded rapidly since 1960, from 
about 490,000 at that time to almost one million employees in 1974, and 
the government remains the largest single employer in the Kingdomi. 
Until 1970 , the public component of paid employees (as distinct from 
employers , family workers , or the self-employed) increased proportion­
ately with the private sector , but by 1974 , the percentage of such 
public employment had declined . (Table 10) . A striking feature of the 
change in composition of government employment is the increased female 
participationi. Although public service is still predominantly masculine, 
the percentage of female employees has more. than doubled since 1960i, and 
the data reveal that females have tended to enter the public labor 
market more rapidly than the privatei. 
Until 1975, the civil service was divided into five classesi, begin­
ning at the bottom with the fourth class and rising to the special grade . 
The 1975 revisions not only increased the level of salaries, but also 
introduced two new innovations (see Table 11)i. First, the number of 
grades or classes was increased from five to eleveni, and the total 
number of salary steps were reduced from fifty-seven to forty-seveni. 
Hence, under normal one-step annual increments , the time of progression 
through the salary scale was reduced by about ten yearsi, and this was 
designed to improve moralei. Second, the scale was structured to accom­
modate future increases in cost of living and/or labor market changes 
by establishing six patterns of remunerationi. Pattern one was imple­
mented in 1975, and the range of the forty-seven steps varied from a 
low monthly salary of 750. baht to a maximum of 10 , 900 baht . When 
market conditions merit, successive patterns can be implemented by the 
government , and, in effect , each successive pattern moves the hierarchy 
of steps within each grade up one notch or stepi. For· example, when 
pattern two is implemented, grade one will vary in monthly salary from 
800 to 2 , 230 baht ; grade eleven will vary from 8 , 505 to 11, 445 baht. 
The private sector pays higher compensation than does government 
service , and the differential appears to _widen with the order of the 
position in the occupational hierarchy. At lower levels, the ratio of 
private to public sector wages is about two to one, and at higher pro­
fessional or administrative levels, the ratio is four or five to one. 
12H . F .  McCusker, The Role of Incenti ves in· Human Resource Develop­
ment : A Case Study of the Civil Service in Tha1land, (Ph.D. Disserta­
tioni, Stanford University, 1973)i, p .  55. 
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TABLE 10 
Wage and Salary Employment in the Public and Private Sectors, 
1960, 1970, 1974 
TotalSector 
., 
489,i452 Government 
Private 1,143,234 
Total 1, 632,i686 
Percent Government 
29 . 98 
Percent in Government 
By Sex 
of Total 
100 . 00 
1960 
Male 
423,i384 
775,028 
1, 198,i412 
35 . 33 
86. 50 
Female 
66, 068 
368,206 
434,274 
15 . 2 1  
1 3 . 50 
1970 1974 
Total Total Male Female 
777, 984 992,i780 722,i950 269,830 
1,819, 886 2 , 824, 670 1, 803,000 1 , 021,670 
2,597, 870 3, 817,i450 2,525,950 1 , 291, 500 
29 . 95 26 . 0  28 . 62 20 . 89 
Not 
Available 100 . 00 72 . 82 27. 18 
Source: National Statistical Office , (a) Statistical Yearbook of Thailand, l969-l9 72 ; (b) 
Labor Force Survey, July-September, l9 7 4 , Bangkoki. 
VIIi. XI 
4,335 
13 
4,335 
17 
TABLE 11 
Royal Thai Govenunent Civil Service Monthly Salary Scale 
By Grade and Pattern, 1975 (In Ba.ht) 
STEPS IN P .A:l"l'ERN GRADES 
VIII IX XVIVI II IIIFour Five-Three SixOne Two VI 
5,810 7,260 8,0756,5055,175 
6,875 7,660 8,505 
1 750 1,375 1,750 2,230 
2,370 
3,030
3,220
3,420 
3,630 
4,085 
4,600 
4,880 
5,175 
6,150 5,485
5,810 6,505 8,9507,260 8,075
7,6606,150 6,875 9,410 
1 1,460 1,860
1,975 2,520850 1,550 2 . .1 
2,680 2,100 
8002 
3 
4 1 1,645 
. 25 955 1,750 14 3 
900.3 2 · 
2,850 3,850 
8,505
7,260 8,075 8,9502,230 6,505 9,885
4,085 6,875 7,660 8,505 9,410 10,3802,370 3,0301,015 1,860 
4,335 7,260 8,9507 3,220 S,810 8.,075 9,885 10,9001,080 1,9753 2,520456 2 
4,600 11,44510,3807,660 8,505 9,410 6,150 2,680 3,4201,150 2,100 8 37 56 4 
8,950 4,880 12,015 9,8856,505 10,9009 3,630 8,0752,850 1,220 2,230 7 56 48 
3,850 9,410 10,380 12,6155, 175 11,4456,8753,030 8,5051,295 2,370 10 67 589 
9,8855,485 7,260 10,900 12,015 13,245 4,0857 3,220 8,9501,375 2,520 911 10 8 6 
5,810 10,380 4,335 7,660 11,445 12,6153,420 9,410 13,9058 1,460 2,68010 9 712 11 
10,900 12,0154,600 6,150 9,88510 8,075 13,245 1,550 2,850 3,63013 1112 9 8 
11,445 12,6156,505 10,3803,850 4,880 8,50511 10 1,645 3,03014 12 
5 '485 . '6 3 24 15 
13 9 
14 
12,015 5,175 6,875 8,950 10,900
9,4107,260 11,445 
12 . 11 1,750 3,220
3,420 
10 4,085 
4,600 
15 
16
17 
14
15
16 
13 
' 
.i12 1,860
14 1,97513 12 
11 5,485 
9,885 5,810 7,6603,630 15 
15 14 2,100
16 2,23015 14 
18 16 
18 
1317 . 
18 
17 . 16 2,370 
1718 2 , szo·16 
'18 2,68017 
18 2,850 
15 
Source: Civil Service Conmtlssion of Thailand, 1976. 
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Wage Supplements in the Thai Economy 
Wage supplements, or fringe benefits,· are an important component 
of the Thai employee's compensation both in the public sector and in 
the modern segment of the private sector. The proportion of fringes 
to salaries tends to be higher for upper level occupations than for 
lower in the private sector, while the reverse is true in the civil 
servicei. Blaug found that wage supplements in the private sector 
accounted for 35 percent of the average salary of college graduates,i1 3  
while another private sector survey revealed that such supplements for 
all employees comprised about 19 percent .i1 4  In the public sector, 
fringe benefits as a percentage of base salary for each grade were 
estimated in 1970 to be:i1 5 
Grade Percentage Fringes to Salary 
Fourth 2 8  
Third 27 
Second 2 6  
First 
Special 
25 
Because private sector direct wages and salaries are substantially
higher than those in the civil service, a nominal fringe benefit dif­
ferential also exists that favors the private sectori. 
In the United States, fringe benefits have become an increasing
proportion of compensation .  This trend has been attributed to a number 
of causes: the growing influence of labor unions; the existence of a 
progressive income tax structure which exempts fringe benefits from 
the tax base; the desire of employers to reduce turnover by making the 
receipt of such fringes conditional upon the length of service; and 
the desire of employees for assured forms of protection against the 
insecurities of fluctuating industrial employment . These motives do 
not explain the fringe benefit phenomena in Thailand. Labor unions 
have either been nonexistent or weak; the income tax structure is 
easily evaded and only mildly progressive; turnover among employees 1n 
the modern sector has been unusually low by Western standards;i- and 
fluctuations in unemployment have not been severe in view of the pre­
dominant agricultural base of the economy and the relatively small 
industrial labor marketi. Rather, fringe benefits in Thailand probably 
can be ascribed to a latent paternalism, blended with the traditional 
set of obligations in the patron-client relationship found in Thailandi. 
In the modern sector, legislation, or its threat, has had a large_ role 
1n inducing employers to provide wage supplementsi. Moreover, the 
13 • . .k Blaug, h Rate o Return to Investment Educat�on 
Thailand. (Bangkok: National Education Council, 1971) ,  p .  11-24i. 
Mar T e  f �n �n 
·i
14Bus�ness International .a. Survey of Local Compensation Policies 
and Practicae s :  Thailand, l9a7 5 .  (Hong Kong; 1975), pp . 144-45 . 
15Pongpaichit, Wages and Economic Development, p .  143i. Another 
estimate, on the low side, gave the following percentages: Special -
30%; First - 12% ; Second - 10%; Third - 9%; Fourth - 10% .  In view of 
Blaug ' s  findings that public sector college graduates receive about 25 
percent of their salaries in supplements, the higher estimate here is 
probably more accuratei. 
23 
pattern established by the Civil Service has also induced many firms to 
emulate the governmenti. Nevertheless, by American standards, both wages 
and wage supplements remain relatively lowi. 
I I I .  Characteristics of Thai Work Behavior 
Attitudes of Thais towards work have been formed in the milieu of 
their experiences .  Moral va1ues, as transmitted by religion , condition 
attitudes and are reflected in behaviori. Current attitudes towards 
paid employment have been conditioned by historical patterns of servi­
tude, and these attitudes have been reflected in occupational choicesi. 
Motivation, or the will to work, is a response to a set of values 
transmitted more specifically by the family's ethnic heritage, so that 
the ethnic composition of the labor force can be expected to influence .behavior patterns at worki. This section examines someiof the deteri­
minants and manifestations of work behaviori. 
Buddhism and Thai Work Values 
Theravada Buddhism is the official religion of Thailand, with over 
93 percent of the population identified as adherents to the faithi. The 
identification of Thais with their religion is well-documented, and 
there appears no question but that Thais are comfortable with their 
faith -- i . e . ,  it is stable and enduring . Although some scholars 
question whether a quantitative relationship can be established between 
Buddhism and the behavior of Thais, there does appear to be a remark­
able consistency between Buddhist teachings and Thai social values .i1 6  
To what extent does Buddhism permeate the working lives of the 
Thai people, and at the practical level of day-to-day living how much 
of Thai character-personality is ini• accord with the elements of their 
religion? All societies have hierarchies and status rankings, but the 
Thais have a highly developed awareness of these rankingsi. ·iIs this 
due to the world-view of the Thai as interpreted for him by the Buddhist 
cosmology? In all societies, subordinates defer and pay homage to 
superiors, but in Thailand is the attention given to the forms of show­
ing respe�t influenced by the Buddhist belief that merit is inherent 
16Buddhism accommodates a spiritual world by acknowledging a super­
natural world in which a hierarchy of spirits, ranked by Kamma, existsi. 
Brahmic rituals operate at the Royal Court and village levels and com­
plement and support Thai Buddhist beliefs .  See A . T .  Kirsch, "Complex­
ity in Thai Religious System : An I�terpretation . "  Journal of Asian 
Studies, 36, 2 (February 1977) , pp . ·24 1-66. Angela Burr notes that it 
is in part the commonality of the spirit world that binds Thai Muslims 
and Buddhists together in southern fishing villages, despite the differ­
ences in their formal religionsi. In fact, Muslim doctrine repudiates 
a spirit world, but in practice even Mosque officials attribute illness 
and misfortune to spi ritsi. Hence, villagers of both faiths believe 
that spirits have influence over human affairs . See her "Islam and 
Buddhism in a Southern Thai Coastal Village,i" Journal of the Siam 
Societya, 60, 2 (July 1972) ,  pp . 190-95 . See also Jean Barry, Thai 
Students in the United States: A Study in Attitude Change, Southeast 
Asia Program Data Paper: No. 66 (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1967) ;  
Jane Bunnag, "Loose Structures : Fact or Fancy? Thai Society Reexamin­
ed,i" Journal of the Siam Soaietya, 59, 1 (January 1971) , p .  9, or 
R . L .  Mole, Thai Values and Behavior Patterns (Portland, Vt . :  C . E .  
Textile Co . ,  1973),  p .  27 . 
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in position ?1 7  Is Thai individualism unique, and if so is this due 
to the belief that the individual Buddhist alone bears the consequences 
through the law of Kamma for all of his acts, and hence determines his 
own fate? Does this unique sense of the burden of responsibility for 
acts lead to intensive self-awareness or self-concern, and is this the 
essence of the narcissism which has been attributed to the Thai? Or , 
in a different veini, does self-concern lead to self-acceptancei, another 
trait that has been associated with Thai individualism·? Finally , does 
the Thai trait of individualism, reinforced by the Buddhist virtue of 
non-involvement as a vehicle of renouncing desirei, inhibit the develop­
ment of effective social organizations ,  or, alternatively , explain the 
paucity of such organizations? 1 8 
It  has been observed that the Thai moves easily among roles and 
that this movement is facilitated by the lack of structure in Thai 
society .i1 9 Interpersonal relationships are typically superficial and 
deference is expected only in face-to-face confrontations between 
subordinate and superiori. I f  Buddhism encourages a detachment from 
the concerns of othersi, an avoidance of emotional involvement -­
especially face-to-face conflict -- theni, when combined with the ideal 
of speaking no ill, does this lead to an appearance of superficiality,
certainly an appearance of pleasantne·ss, in interpersonal relations? 
The pursuit of happiness or fun in all forms of interpersonal 
actioni, including work, can be related to the Buddhist perception of 
the impermanence of all things mortal and the folly of making binding
commitments; to live each day to the fullesti. Does this explain the 
Thai preoccupation with having fun -- sanuk ?  But does not "sanuk" 
imply a capitulation to desire and is this not contradictory to the 
attainment of Nibbana? Perhaps soi, but the Buddhist admonition to 
face reality, to be pragmatic may also explain the typical Thai 
acknowledgementi, excepting among the priesthood , that Nibbana is not 
achievable for himi. Given that realization and taken with the tran­
sient nature of lifei, is it not rational for the Thai to live for the 
17one observer of the Thai labor scene has described the Buddhist 
concept of master-servant relations as follows: A master shall: ( 1 )
assign work according to the ability of his subordinate; (2) provide 
food and reward for him; (3) provide care when he is sick or injured;
(4 ) share with him what is good to eat; (5) provide rest for him as 
needed . A subordinate shall : ( 1 )  get up first in the morning; (2)
leave work after the master; (3)  take only what is given to him; (4)
improve his work skill; l5) be loyal, speaking no ill of his master . "  
Glenn Halm,· Report of the Labor Administration Project to the U . S .  
Operating Mission (Bangkok, October 1970)i, p .  1 .  
18Jane Bunnag has observed that Thais do not form effective social 
organizations because historically they have not needed themi. "Loose 
Structures , "  pp . 11-12 . 
1 9J . F .  Embree, "Thailand - A Loosely Structured Social System,i" 
American Anthropologist, 52 (1950)i, p .  182i. Embree seems td argue
that indeed Buddhism is at the heart of this loose structure that 
permits individuals to assume a variety of rolesi. Jane Bunnag argues 
that it is not so much the Buddhist element , but rather it is the 
simplistic, unspecialized nature of the roles in· the Thai economy. 
Given the state of development of the society, howeveri, it may well be 
that the Buddhist ethic conditions the unique behavior found in Thai­
landi. Bunnagi, "Loose Structures,i" pp . 9-11i. 
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moment ?i2 0 If  practical , the id eal of "cool heart , cool mind " in the 
face of adv ersity , consistent w ith the principles of noninvolvem ent 
and sel f-perception , would imbue the Thai with equanimity. Therefore , 
is it because the Thai is Buddhist that he is pleasant , fun loving , 
and composed ? 
The Legacy o f  Bondage 
From 1238 until 1932 Thailand was · rul ed by a succiession of 
monarchs whose absolute authority typically was ·tempered by a tradi­
tion o f  benevolence towards their subj ects .i2 1  The king in theory own ­
ed all the land in the country , and each king mad e his own laws through 
edicts , although in practice custom and tradition constrained these 
edictsi. The people as subjects existed to serve without question the 
king and/or his d esignated representative , for the king was the sou rce 
of  all authority. In practice th e power of the king extended as far 
as his effect ive administrative control , and geographic d istance tend­
ed to weaken it.i2 2  As a part o f  this obligation to serve , free Thais 
had to provide the king and/or his representativ e with labor services 
(carve�) for up to six months a yea r ,  but over time this obl igation was 
reduced to three months. Land was abundanti, and labor was the scairce 
resource. The powe r structure or hi erarchy of the social system was 
based on control of labor. Two types of commoners exist ed : phPai som
and phPai iuang. The former owed carve € duties only to a prince; the 
latter ow ed carve� duties to the king's representat ive. The latt er 
were more lik ely to be called for military service ; hence , phPai iuang 
sought to become phPai som. This process tended to alt er the power 
relations b etween the k ing and the princesi. Addiitionally , this carve� 
labor service was used in constructing various public works , or to
till the land assigned to the king's representativ es--the princes or
nobles of the provinces. Three cat egories of slav es exist edi. Thos e 
slaves who could not rede em their independence were ex empt from carve �, 
and many young g irls from this class we re sold into prostitut ion . 
There was a second ,i· more num erous , class o f  slaves who could red eem 
thei r  freedom , and we re also subject to _ corv e � .  i'hese could buy 
20This is the conclus ion o f  Barry , "Thai . Stud ents , "  p. 60. 
Herbe rt R. Phillips notes that play is an. end in itself and that a
motivator to engage in an activity is th e amount of sanuk contained 
in it. Thai Peasant PePsonality , (Be rkeley : Univ ersity o f  Cali fornia 
Press, 1966) , p .  6 0 .  
2 1Three major  kingdoms hav e existed in Thai history. In the 
Sukhothai period (1238-1378) the k ing's relation to his people was 
paternalistic; an autocratic structure was dev eloped early in the 
Ayudhya period (1351-1767 ); th e third reign is the Bangkok period
(1782 - ) and the present monarch , King Bumipol , continues in the 
Chak ri dynasty established at the b eginning o f  this period . Und er the 
tradition o f  benevol ence , the ideal k ing is viewed by his subjects as
a kindly fathe r who strictly practices the vi rtues o f  charity , mercy, 
gentl eness , sel f-restraint , non-anger ,  and non-enmity, devotion , pity, 
patience , and rectitude. Howeve r ,  his image was jointly that o f  a 
warrior king , able to p rotect and defend his realm from hostile out­
s ide rsi. The history of  Thailand is rich in wars with n eighboring 
Cambodia , Laos , and especially Burma. 
22Provinces were o f  four classes o f  varying degrees o f  ind epen­
dence whose chie fs acknowledged the a. uthori ty of th e king. Many were 
vassal states with their own rul ers ,  and in most provinces the govern­
orships were inhe rited. Ministries in the Royal Cou rt administered 
the provinces by geographical divisions. 
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release on an annual basis from their corve� duty, w i t h  their masters 
making paymenti. Redeemable slaves, then, often voluntar i l y sold them­
selves into bondage to escape corve� . This category of redeemable 
slaves also included war prisoners, slaves purchased from Chinese 
slave traders , and chi ldren or even w ives who had been sold into 
slavery . Even today one occasionally reads about young prostit utes 
from rural areas who were "sold" by thei r impover ished parents and 
taken to Bangkok for service in brothels . A third class of slaves 
were "proiforma,i" where a w i fe or child was pledged as security on a 
loan . The "collateral "  person would con t inue to reside in his or her 
own household; only the labor of the collateral was pledged . In the 
middle of the nineteenth century, i t  has been estiimated that up to 
one-thi rd of the populat ion were class i fied as redeemable or "pro 
forma" slavesi. 2 3  
I t  must be noted, though, that redeemable slavery in Thailand 
was more akin to the indentured servant system used in Colonial 
Amer i ca .  Slavery was one method of repaying debt, and by the ninei­
teenth century the condi t ion did not involve a loss of personal rights . 
Many slaves prefer red bondage, probably because of the secur ity i t  
provided . A slave could transfer serv itude from one master to another 
by using a loan from a second master to repay the debt to the original ; 
he could redeem his l iberty by ret iring his debt, all at the opt ion 
of the slave . Slaves were c l ients of their  pat ron masters, and they
could own and transfer property, maintain a family l i fe ,  and children 
of redeemable slaves were born free whi le the others were permitted to 
purchase their  freedomi. Cruikshank has developed a plausible thesis 
that slavery was but another form of commoner status, involv ing only a 
minor var iation in the scope of reciprocal rights and dut ies possessed 
by c l i ent phrai . Slaves and phrai had approximately the same rank,
their  dut ies and tasks were intermixed, both cou ld be punished and sold, 
and both had protected r ights . Tl1e maj or difference was in the margin­
ally greater amount of work the pat ron or master could demand of the 
slave over the phrai . llow slaves were actually treated in ear l ier 
t imes is not well understood, and what is known about the prac t i ce has 
been d iscerned from analys is  pr imarily of histor i cal legal documents.  
No one born after 1868 was permi t ted to establ ish a new master-slave 
relationship after reaching age 2 1 ;  in 1897 al l sell ing of slaves was 
prohibi ted, and in 1905 the system was completely abol ished, primar i ly 
after old relat ionships had largely_ exp i red . 2 4  
The use of paid Chinese immigrant labor in such publ i c  work pro­
jects as canal and rail road construct ion had proven by 1899 to be a 
more effic ient source of labor than corveei. Hence the system of 
corve� in the cent ral plains contiguous to Bangkok was formally abo l ish­
ed in  1899 and replaced by a head taxi. Earliier, carve� obligations 
23 s i f fin, Thai Bureaucracy , pp . 9-10 . For excellent summaries of 
the system of slavery and corvee see James Ingram, Economic Change in 
Thai l and, Z 8 50- l 9 ? 0  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970) , pp . 58-
63, and R . B .  Cruikshank, "Slavery in Nineteenth Century Siam," Journal 
of the Siam Society, 63, 2 (July 197 5 ) ,  pp.  315-33 . 
24The process of making basic  soc ial changes gradual ly has been a 
feature of Thai officialdom . Exist ing debt slaves in 1905 had four 
baht per month cred i ted to thei r account until all debts were paid,
and the slave was then automat i cal ly freedi. 
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had been transformed into payment in kind of produce from outlying 
regions. This subsequently involved the payment of a head tax in l ieu 
of carve� obligations. Nevertheless , carve� persisted in outlying 
provinces into the twentieth century, and a rudimentary sense of obli ­
gation among rural Thai still provides labor services for those pro­
j ects beneficial to the village and instituted by public officials. 
An extension of the principle of the obligation to serve the king , 
upon which the system of  corve� is based, was the king ' s  or lord ' s  
right to requisition artisans of high skill for service in the court, 
positions whi ch were of low status, demanding, arduous, and which 
could involve an extended separation from family and village friends. 
Moreover, children of artisans were frequently bonded into the service 
of the lords. This negative reward for craftmanship may account for 
the low regard which artisans encountered and may have inhibited the 
development in Thailand of the quality handincraft found in other 
Southeast Asian countries. 25 The carve� bondage may also have been 
responsible for the low esteem in which ethnic Thais hold employment
in commerce and industry.n2 6  · 
The Changing Ethnic Mix 
As a result of increasingly restrictive immigration policies,2 7  
there has been a de·cline in the number of ali en Chinese residing in 
Thailand who were born in China. Among the generations of Chinese 
born in Thailand, there are those who are a product of traditional 
Chinese families and Chinese schools and who identify themselves 
primarily as Chinese, although they possess Thai nationality. These 
numbers too are declining with the passage of time. Ail intermediate 
group are those who are partially assimilated -- at home and in 
Chinese society, they function as Chinese, but they are equally com­
fortable in Thai society and function as Thai in their business and 
professional relationships. They share many Thai values and are likely 
to be practicing Buddhists. This group remains large, but their pre ­
cise numbers are difficult to estimate, for they are identified ethni­
cally as Thai in recent :·censuses. F inally,· there are those of Chinese 
ancestry who have been completely assimilated and fully regard them­
selves as Thai. Yet, undoubtedly they retain some residual influence 
of their Chinese heritage, but how much is an uhknown factor. It isn· 
extremely difficult to quanti fy this group, whi ch includes most Chinese 
descendents under age 35. There is pre j udice among the Thais against
the Chinese, and for those who think of themselves as Thai, there is 
no advantage in displaying their Chinese heritage. 
Chinese in Thailand are primarily urban dwellers. Skinner est i ­
mated the proportion of Bangkokn' s  population in 1954 who were e ither 
Chinese nationals or of Chinese descent to be about 46 percent.n2 8 
25siffin, Thai Bureaucracy , p. 56. Also Jacobs, Modernization 
without Deve l opment , p .  177. 
2 6Ibid . ,  p .  181. 
27Total Chinese immigration of both sexes in the 1946-55 period 
was only one-half of that in the 1932n-45 period ; and that in the 1932-
45 period was only thirty-five percent of that in the 1918-31 period.
Since 1955 only a few hundred Chinese are .legally permitted to immigrate
annually. See G. W. Skin11er, Chinese Society in Thai l and , (Ithacan: • 
Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 191. 
2 8 Ibid .  , p. 2 0 6 • 
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This number of identifiable Chinese had declined to about 33 percent 
in 1970, 2 9 partly because of increasing assimilation of Thai-born 
Chinese and partly because of ethnic Thai migration to the metropoli­
tan areai. 
Hence, urban Thailand has a different ethnic mix from rural 
Thailand, and until two decades ago, the urban labor force was pre­
dominantly of Chinese origin . To the extent that more diverse char­
acteris tics are present in the urban setting, the work ethic and 
behavior of the labor force may be influenced thereby . Assimilation 
moves members of an ethnic group into the mainstream of the larger 
society so that the distinctiveness of the group is no longer patently 
evident, yet it does not require affiliates of that group to sacrifice 
traits that do not compete with the values of the larger society .  
Latent influences can remain and will be present in some degree as 
characteristics of the integrated society and its labor force . These 
latent influences, however, will ordinarily not be captured by a 
census, by a labor force survey, or by attitudinal surveys .i3 0  Today,
the labor force is increasingly composed of indigenous Thais, and the 
younger generation of Chinese now think of themselves as Thai and so 
identify themselvesi. 
Work Behavior in the Modern Sector 
Occupations in business have historically been held in low esteem, 
while those in government and agriculture were of high s tatusi. Yet,
these were attitudes for the most part of a rural, indigenous popula­
tion towards the set of activities engaged in by a group of alien 
Chinese who occasionally, if not frequently, were not opposed to ex­
ploiting those same native rural inhabitants .  If aliens were of low 
s tatus, then what they did would also be of low s tatusi. However,
urban occupations to urban inhabitants are not s trange, distant en­
deavorsi. Exposure to their function, purpose, and importance generates 
a knowledge and appreciation of themi. If a hierarchy of remunerations 
can also be associated with their s tructure, then the relative set of 
disadvantages and advantages becomes clear, and attitudes towards them 
can be expected to undergo change through expoisurei. The degree of 
knowledge about a set of occupations, then, can be expected to influ­
ence the s tatus ranking of those occupations, and the changing set of 
attitudes of the public towards a variety of occupations presumably 
will influence their willingnes s  to seek training for and employment 
in them. 
29iv .  Prachnabmok and J .  Knodel, et al . The Rural and Urban Popula­
tion of Thailand: Comparative Profiles.  Ins titute of Population 
Studies, No . 8, (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1972), pp . 4 3-47 .  
This survey found that about one-sixth of provincial urban communities 
were Chinese . 
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Mezey and Barry both failed to dis tinguish the ethnic origin 
of their surveyed population of Thai studentsi, the former at Thammasat 
University and the latter in the United Statesi. In both cases, a large 
majority have Chinese parents .  The assumption that these populations 
have been influenced by traditionali- ethnic Thai values through their 
family s tructure may be fallacious and may invalidate their conclu­
sions . S . G .  Mezey, "Political Socialization and Participation among
University Students  in Thailand,i" Asian Surveya, 15, 6, (June 1975), 
pp . 502-509 ; Barry, "Thai Students . "  
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The hierarchical structure of Thai society is present in private 
enterprise as it is in government servicei. As in the bureaucracy , 
status is conferred by rank and especially by salaryi. Authority
relations between superior and subordinate extend only to fa�e-to-face 
relationships and usually only through one link at a time in the chain 
of command ; a subordinate is answerable only to one superior . Horizon­
tal relations are only mildly cooperativei, since an official need not 
concern himself with one who merely is his equali. Respect for author­
ity requires that subordinates not correct or advise superiorsi. This 
hierarchical relationship and relationships between superior and sub­
ordinates and between equals also is found in the Thai factory .i3 1  In 
this setting , education bestows status and is a condition of occupa­
tional ranki, and the wage-sal�ry structure reflects bothi. 
The importance that Thai employees attach to leadership can better 
be understoodi.iin the context that a good leader is one who can show 
these workers how modifications in their behavior can benefit them 
through helping the firm .i3 2  The style he uses in educating them and 
motivating them is most important . He must be himself a moral person 
and worthy of respect ; he must be concerned with their welfare and 
be benevolent; he must be tolerant of their weaknesses but supportive 
in helping them overcome them; and he must be able to communicate all 
this in a manner that does not offend ·the sense of dignity of the. 
individual . In return , workers are obligated to follow his directives , 
and failure to do so deprives them of meriti. The leaderi, thereforei, 
is an agent in the implementation of the informal set of rules by
which the firm operatesi. It is his personal relationship with his 
subordinates which enables them to fulfill their duties in a manner 
pleasing to the leaderi. In turn, the supervisor is able to please 
his superior , and the firm can function through a nested set of person­
al superior-subordinate relationships . In many ways , then , there is 
much in the traditional patron-client relationship that is found in t.he 
labor force of the urban firmi. Yeti, the traditions have been modified 
to meet the requirements of a modern technologyi, while preserving the 
values of the Thai culturei. 
Although a system of informally specified occupational duties and 
responsibilities works well enough in Thai firms with Thai personnel
who understand the social codei, it has not been followed by alien 
employers . These firms have relied upon conventional western techni­
ques of motivation and disciplinei, although reproving an errant employee
has , of necessity , had to accommodate itself to traditional Thai methods 
so that sanctions do not deprive the worker of "facei. "  Formal rulesi· 
are iss�ed and Thais attempt to comply with them within the limits of 
their understanding of themi. Unfortunatelyi, because of the reluctance 
of Thai subordinates to challenge or contest directives of superiorsi, 
31Koj i Taira, "Work Force. Management and Labor Markets in Thai ·
Industry" (Paper presented at the Midwest Japan· Seminar , University of 
Kansas , Lawrence , November 2 2 ,  197 5),  pp . 8-11 .  
32 sanit Snuckarn has observed , "To be promoted rapidly , you have 
to have a big boss supporting you . Otherwise , you will never be in a 
top position even though you may have worked really hard and you are 
as intelligent as your colleagues. Hard work is therefore secondary
to good relationships with the boss , "  Bangkok Post,  April 8 ,  1973,  
p .  13·. 
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inappropriate or capricious rules and directives are either ignored 
or, in cases where they are inescapable and have become an increasing 
source of frustration or burden, the Thai workers may simply walk out 
in mass protest against the rulesi. In order to make more explicit
to alien employers some of the more important mores about the employer­
employee relationship, various labor laws have been enacted pertaining 
to the set of obligations which Thai society requires of these employ­
ersi. Hence, separation pay is made a function of the length of employ­
ment, various holidays are specified, and health and educational fringe 
benefits are legisl.ated to protect employeesi. 
The superior wages that Western firms pay, then, reflect this de­
veloping orientation of workers to the market economy, for it is this 
higher wage which attracts them and compensates them for the tradition­
al guarantees that they forego. Increasingly, civil servants are leav­
ing secure jobs for the higher paying ones in private industryi. 
Mccusker has noted that many former civil servants experience consider­
able stress in their new jobs, in which they are now held accountable 
for their decisions . In the Civil Service, the committee system per­
mits anonymity in decision making and allows the sharing of responsi ­
bility, a condition not possible in private industry . The painful
transition has caused some transferees to refuse promotions in order 
to escape the burden of more responsibility .i3 3  
Work Values 
Work values in Thailand vary between rural and urban people, among
levels of education and occupations, and between ethnic groupsi. As the 
mix of these components of the labor force is changed by economic 
development, work values themselves undergo change .i3 4  The changes 
proceed from a base rooted in traditional culture which, in turn,
reflects a mixture of historicai political organization, religious and 
moral orientations, and an agrarian economic mode of livelihoodi. This 
culture has been functional and sufficiently homogenous among the 
population to give the ethnic Thai people a sense of identity, an 
awareness of nationil personality . They, therefor�, value the culture, 
its premises and its corollaries, and accept modifications in it only 
to the extent that the modifications themselves are more functional . 
In this sense, Thais are neither more nor less conservative than are 
any other people . Scholars frequently have critically examined Thai 
society, not so much in terms of the goals of the Thai people, as 
enunciated by their spokesmen, but rather in terms of their own personal 
3 3western firms find it advantageous to employ upper grade civil 
servants, for it provides them some entr� to influential persons in 
the government who can assist them in short-circuiting the red tapei. 
These civil servants are a recruitment source for managers in private 
industryi. Mccusker estimated in 1969 that those who had left the 
civil service had an average annual salary in their new jobs of 5,070 
baht, an increase of 280 percent . One or two years later after the 
transfer, this salary averaged 7,420 bahti. "Role of Incentives,i" 
pp. 145, 253i. 
34A distinguished Thai professor of administration, Sri Prinya 
Ramakomud once noted to me that "it is difficult to generalize that 
this or that behavior is Thai culture . Urban culture is different 
from rural culture, and changes are occurring rapidlyi. In the urban 
setting, rural traditional values are not as binding . "  Interview, 
March 8, 197 3 .  
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set of valuesi. Hence, we are told that Thai society is "loosely 
structured" because the set of institutions and formal patterns of 
interaction of other traditional societies are not discernibly 
paralleled by Thai society.i3 5 We are reminded that the leaders of the 
government are responsible to only a limited group of bureaucrats, 
partly by design and partly by the isolation or non- infranchisement of 
the polity, and that this lack of responsivenes s  permits the government
to be self-serving, as though somehow governments all over the ·iworld, 
even in democracies, have not pos sessed in some degree this character­
istic .i3 6 Finally, we are cautioned to discount the development 
accomplishments of the economy bec�use the traditional patron-client
network of social relationships still persists in muted form in organi­
zations of recent vintage, composed of personnel experienced in no
other form of social interaction;i3 7  as though the Thais somehow ought
to adapt in a few short years to new forms of organizational behavior 
developed over decades in Western countries .  
Whereas, anthropologists characterize the Thai society as being
"loosely structured", other social scientists are impres sed with the 
element of hierarchy or status rankings in all forms of Thai political 
and social lifei. That Thai society is structured seems undeniable .i3 8 
What are still not widely understood are the principles of social 
organization that hold this fabric together and permit it to functioni. 
Essential elements appear to be these f a hierarchy of roles exist;
the roles are functional and each has a specified and hence a con­
strained set of duties and obligations; role confers status; status 
is earned by moral merit; each pe-son must earn l1is own store of 
merit; merit is gained or lost as one's accepted role is fulfilled or 
evaded : The hierarchy of roles define� a system, and the system is 
functional because morality prevails through the accumulation of meriti. 
It is the acceptance by the system's members of the validity of the 
premise of morality and the sense of self-responsibility that it 
implies that permits the system to work . The morality premi se is re­
enforced in major areas of almost every Thai ' s  lifei�- the family,
the schools, the Buddhist religion . 
The morality premise conditions Thais to accept authorityi. A 
leader is not to be disobeyed within the limits which his role confers .  
One must respect the position even if the holder of it appears to be 
undeserving of it. A true leader, of course � deserves his position, 
and he leads because he is able to show his subordinates that it is 
in their interests for him to do soi. A challenge to the position is 
35Philips, Thai Peasant Personalitya, pp . 77-78 . 
1 1n , . 3 6 s · ff "  Tha_i, Bureaucracya, p .  1 3 0  . -
37Jacobs, Modernization Without bevelopment ; pp . 85, 168 . 
38J . M .  Potter identifies eleven functional elements of rural Thai 
village social structure: ( 1 )  the extended stem family �ycle and 
compound ; ("2) the bilateral kindred; (3) neighborhoods; (4 ) cooperative
labor exchange groups ; ( 5 )  class divisions based on land ownership; 
( 6 )  junior- senior relationships; ( 7 )  the entourage; (8) factions; (9)
and ( 1 0 )  "natural" vsi. "administrative" village identities ; and ( 1 1 )
the local wat or temple. These functional elements, he believes, re­
fute the loose structure thesis of Thai village society. Thai Peasant 
Soaial Struature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 976), pp . 147-
223 . Organizations exist and function effectively in villages bonded 
by kinship and interdependent economic tie s .  
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a challenge to the morality premise and is not condoned . It is the 
leader's function to lead, and the subordinates' function to follow . 
Hence, Thais do not seek to surpass their superiors, although this 
does not imply that they have no initiativei. They may not exercise 
initiative in areas where doing so would reveal disrespect towards a 
superiori. In  addition, to show disrespect is to invite reprisal and,
hence, to incur unneces sary risk.  By adhering to the restrictions of 
one's role, one complies with the holder of authority, who from the 
benevolence principle must not impose ill upon a loyal subordinatei. 
Thai individualism also derives from the morality principlei. The 
inescapable fact to a Thai is that he alone is responsible for his own 
store of meriti. Everything he does or does not do has moral implica­
tionsi. He is a person with a tremendous burden -- his own salvation . 
He wishes to fulfill his role, but he must know what that role isi. He 
may be expected to do those things he is capable of doing, but he can­
not be required to do those things which he cannot do or which are 
against his conception of right . He must "to his own self be true . "  
In this sense, a Thai is a law unto himself, as indeed we all arei. 
This sense of responsibility imposes on the Thai, as a practical matter, 
an awareness of reality -- to see things as they arei. He must per­
ceive that which is or is not in his own self-interesti. He is taught
the reality principle as a child by being permitted to bear the con­
sequences of his actions .  If he wants to break his toy, he may, but 
the consiequence is a broken toyi. The reality principle has made Thais 
pragmatic . If something works or is pleasurable or useful, they accept
it, for it is in their self-interest to do soi. If  it doesn't work,
then they do not concern themselves with it . Since each person has 
his own role, his own status, from which he earns his merit, he must 
be permitted wide latitude in performing that role . Another must not 
interfere, and by implication from the reciprocity principle, one 
should not concern himself with the affairs of others .  He must be 
non-involvedi. To be non-involved ideally requires control of one's 
emotions, for emotional involvement causes one to forget the reality 
principle . Hence, a "cool heart" means self-control . Yet, man, being
the type of combative creature that he is, cannot be completely self­
controlled . How then must he deal with ·emotion -laden or threatening
situations ?  Simply put, he must avoid themi. Grievances cannot be 
presented in face-to-face confrontations .  Withdrawal from relation­
ships that are potentially hostile is requiredi. Acquiescence to 
superior power is expedienti. Only when no other course is available 
may aggres sion be used. 
Thai individualism does not exclude the formation of voluntary 
social organizations, but it does explain the paucity of them . Al­
though Thai individualism leads to tolerance of the behavior of others, 
it also generates a healthy skepticism of the motives of others . i3 9 If 
self-interest is everyone's valid pursuit, and if relationships are 
contingent and revocable at will, then reciprocity that occurs over 
time gives the advantage to the one who gets the service first. Unless 
a continuing organization can assure the fulfillment of reciprocal 
obligations, then it will find it difficult to recruit or hold membersi. 
Roles must be specified and risks must be delineatedi. Moreover, the 
manner by which the organization can serve the interests of each as 
well as the interests of all members must be clearly perceived . Thais 
are not joiners because they do not perceive it to be in their inter­
ests to affiliate with organizationsi. But this does not imply that 
39This is because, to the Thai, the world is composed of arbitrary 
people ; there are no impersonal rulesi. 
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they cannot learn to recogni ze how their interests can be served by 
formal associations, and that in so learning they will not develop ani· 
organiizational technology . 
Given the morality premise and the pragmatism wh ich is associated
with its individualistic implementation, a motivational system under­
lying Thai behavior can be discernedi. First of all, it assures that
Thais will be at least as materialistic as persons in any Western 
society, if by materialism is meant an attitude which values the means 
to make this life more pleasanti. Although Thais believe that their 
life force will be reincarnated, their pragmatism and sense of reality 
requires them to focus on their current conditioni. Moreover, it tends 
to give them a short time preference; current gratifications are 
greatly preferred over future onesi. It also requires a knowledgeable 
employer to structure the work environment so that Thais can find 
meaning and satisfaction in their job . Contrary to the literature, 
sanuk is a positive Thai value, and it depends greatly upon the oppor-
t unity for pleasant social interplay .i4 0  If such an ingredient is 
present in a job, the Thais will discover virtue in the jobi. Moreover,
systems of control can be developed which are formali. Thais do not 
feel bound to abide by abstract rules or procedures,. but they will 
accept comprehensible rules and they will follow relevant directives 
if they can be shown that .compliance is truly in their own self-interi­
estsi. Similarly, performance can be obtained if care is taken to 
prescribe the duties and tasks associated with a job .  The trick is 
to enlarge the Thai.worker's sense of responsibility to himself to 
include the interests of the firmi. Thais value their relationship 
with their employer; they understand patron-client relationshipsi.
They typically approve of themselves and they appreciiate the approval 
of othersi. In this sense, basic motivational principles that support 
the development of morale in any organi zation are appl icable to the 
Thai environmenti. Implementation of the principles, however, must 
occur in the context of Thai valuesi. 
40An activity which is satisfying is called sanuk. Many alien
social scientists have observed that Thais look for sanuk in every­
thing they do and concluded that Thais are characteristically fun­
loving to the exclusion of other interestsi. But a sanuk activity is 
one which is non-boring, and ideally it is pleasurablei. Essentially,
as a work attitude it is like the Mary Poppi n 's prescription " just a 
little bit of sugar helps the medicine go down." If a job contains 
elements that are meaningful and selfi-satisfying and is a source of
companionship, it is sanuk . 
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CHAPTER 2 
THAI LABOR HISTORY 
Introduction 
Tha Thai system o f  labor relations corresponds remarkably to the 
dynastic - feudal pattern o f  development. Its evolution has been ini­
fluenced by distinctive attributes o f  the Thai labor market , particular­
ly the almost complete Chinese composition o f  the private sector work
force in earlier times and the later ethnic divisions remaining in its 
labor force. In order to appreciate the unique nature o f  the labor 
movement in Thailandi, it is necessary to understand why Chinese have 
composed the bulk of  the labor force until recent timesi. 
I. The Chinese in the Thai Labor Force 
f
Thais have long pre ferred rice cultivation andi'communal village 
·life. With the elimination o f  slavery , beginning in 1874 and completed 
in 190 5 ,  and the conversion in 1899 of compulsory male corvee to a 
male head tax ,i1 Thai labor in effect becam e free. This freedom permit­
ted Thais to open up new lands and expand rice cultivationi, and few 
chose the opportunity to enter the wage labor marketi, except iri agri­
culture. Thailand , then , since 190 5  has had a free labor market during 
a period when the demand for labor was growing. In 1900 Thailand had 
a population estimated at 7.3 million , distributed throughout the 
country so that almost every region had a surplus of  land.2 Any Thai 
who was willing to clear land could become an independent farmeri, could 
grow rice and sell his surplus at favorable prices to a worldi·market 
which was rapidly expanding. Trade and commerce develop·edi, and canal 
and railroad construction expandedi� The ·reluctance o f  indigenous Thais 
to offer their labor seivices for paf in such _ projects resulted in 
labor shortages and a h igh wage market , whichi· increasingly attracted
poverty-stricken but opportunistic immigrant Chinesei, _mostly from five
provinces in southern China. 
·1Theiannual - head tax of from 1.5 to 6 baht , depending upon the 
region o f  the country , replaced the labor obligation to the king or 
prince. King Mongkut had in 1851 in the Bangkok area permitted a money
payment in lieu of the labor obligation. Labor servi�es continued to
be required into the 192 0s , mostly in the provinces , if the money tax 
could not be paid , but such services were completelf abolished in 1938i� 
2Jamesi· Ingrami, Eaonomia Change in Thai"land, . 1, 8 5 0 - 1, 9 7 0  (Stanfordi: 
Stanford University Press ,. 1971) , p. 5 5. 
·,. 
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Until the twentieth c entury all but 2 or 3 percent of the annual 
Chinese immigrants w ere  mal e, and their "coolie" labor was used exten­
sively in canal and railroad building, tin mining,i3 stevedoring and 
other port work, rice milling, sawmilling, and on Chinese commiercial 
plantations. Oth ers mov ed into construction and into mercantiling. 
Because of the Buddhist prohibition against the taking of life, animal 
slaughtering was l eft to th e Chinese. The immigrants w ere  hard work­
ing, thrifty, and w ere  culturally motivated to improve their economic 
lot. Entrepreneurial activity thriv ed among them whenever sufficient 
capital was raised to go into business.4 Coolie labor was arduous and 
on up-country proj ects disease and accidents took a h eavy toll -- som e ­
times up to 60 percent of the newly employed. Moreover, it is estimat­
ed that for every five Chinese entering Thailand, four eventually 
returned to China . In th e first half of the tw entieth century the 
proportion of r eturnees fell to about one-half. Thus, the Chinese popu­
lation increased. 
Chinese immigration was encourag ed by the Thai authorities. In
addition to trading concessions granted to Chinese entrepreneurs on
favorable terms, Chinese laborers w ere  exempt initially from corvee and
later subj ect to a low er h ead tax than indigenous Thai . Immigrant fees 
w er e  minimal . Mor eov er, th e predominantly male immigrant population 
w er e  a source of rev enu e to th e Crown, since such vice monopolies as
the lottery, other forms of gambling, alcoholic bev erages, and of most 
importance -- opium -- w er e  sold to operators, and these monopolies 
provided up to one-half the state rev enues until 1900.i5 Native Thais 
w er e  forbidden to indulge in th ese activities, especially opium. 
In addition to a few Thai artisans and small shopkeepers, most 
native Thai laborers in th e capital were employedi- by th e government or 
as domestic servants. Thais w er e  also later employed in municipal 
transit, the state railroads, as mill laborers, and as seam en. Thais
r emained a minority el ement in the wage labor market, however, until 
the 1950s, and as late as 1940, it was estimated that th e Chinese con­
stituted as much as 75 percent of all labor .i6 
3som e tin mines employed 900 men or more. Although wages w ere  high, 
working conditions w er e  abysmal. In the late 1920s about 95 percent of 
the more than 700,000 laborers in mining w er e  Chinese. Virginia 
Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam (New York: Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 604. 
4G.W. Skinner r eports that in 1873 even day laborers could sav e upi· 
to two-thirds of their wages. Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca : 
Cornell University Press, 1957) ,  p. 116. 
5Ibid., p. 120. Thompson r eports on a Leagu e of Nationsi' survey 
made in the 1920s which found in  Siam thati. "th e average Chinese cooli e 
spent S O  p ercent of his earnings on opium, but not one out of fifty 
among them was an opium smoker" b efore his arrival in Thailand. 
Thompson, Thailand: The New Siam , p. 609. In mining, over 70 percent 
w er e  smokers. 
6Ibid. , p . 217 . 
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Chinese Organiizations 
The Chinese immigrants brought with them two types of  organi zations 
that have subsequently influenced the development o f  the Thai labor 
movement--the guilds and the secret societiesi. The gu ilds, imported in 
the second hal f of the nineteenth century, were tightly organi zed along 
·speech lines to include both masters and j ou rneymen, and the masters 
trained thei r apprentices in thei r own shops . Not only did they attempt 
to restrict thei r trade to their own speech group, but they also sought 
to exclude the Thai from the cra ft . It was the guild's tight o rganiza­
tion and exclusionary policies, together with their supe rior workmari­
ship, that led to the demise of  the Thai artisani. The guilds, then, 
were vertical organi zations--a feature o f  Chinese society in Siam - - de­
signed to further control over their respective cra fts, and by the 
twentieth century such cra fts were clearly delineated .by speech groupsi. 
The �econd type o f  organization of  which guilds. we re in fact a 
part, were more.pervasive and also more fearsomei. These we re the secret 
societies--the Chinese mafia --, also or-gani zed by speech groups and 
introduced originally into Thailand in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries , but whose powe r r�ached its zenith ·at the close of  the nine­
teenth century. The influence of  a society was pervasivei. One function 
was for it to gain control over certain occupations and to enlarge its 
·sphere o f  influence into .others, as well as to p revent the encroachment 
of  othe r secret societies into its domain . Thugs were used to· enforce 
its rules, and each speech g roup exeircised control over its respective 
vice monopolyi. Membership in a speech group was a prerequisite for 
employment, as work gangs were controlled by society headmen--not un­
like the pier boss system that once existed on the New York wate rfronti. 
Skinne r reports that in 1902 "-all Chinese belonged to one o r  othe r o f
the numerous secret societies.i"i7 Many societies existe d in Bangkok, 
and at least one was found in every large provincial town with a si zei­
able Chinese populationi. 
The societies at first were permitted to exist by Thai authorities 
for the purpose of  maintaining order within the Chinese community . 
Periodically, internecine conflicts erupted among the secret ·societies 
as they struggle d for powe r and advantage within the Chinese community; 
thus, the Chinese fell prey to thei r own organi zations .i8 Chinese lead­
ers were powerless to control these rival factionsi. Moreover, the sense 
of  power which these societies exercised ove r the occupations that they 
controlled led to labor distu rbances, as secure coolies struck over 
real o r  imagined g rievances . Strikes by port labor were not uncommon, 
and �ne in 1889 for highe r wages lasted several daysi. In the tight 
labor market existing a round the turn of  the century, strikes and boy­
cotts were o ften use d to extract highe r wages from employ�rs . Although
the secreti·societies we re not true labor organi zations, their powe r 
enable d them to provide freedom from scab labor to striking members and, 
7skinner, Chinese Soaiety, p .  14 0 .  
8outbreaks occurred in 1869, 1883, 1889, and 1895, and the Thai 
·military were required at times to control the Street battlesi. Ibid., 
p .  144 . 
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hence, to win their disputes.n9 A tradition of collective action in 
various occupations dominated by Chinese was thus established, and 
vestiges of this tradition remain today. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, rising Thai nationalism 
led to a series of acts designed to bring the Chinese under control. 
In 1897 the Secret Societies Act was passed, requiring registration of 
all alien organizations and subjecting them to numerous controls. 
Heavy penalties were provided for violations, and the police establish­
ed a Chinese bureau. However, the societies became even more secretive, 
and the act was not successfully enforced. In 1910 a confrontation 
between the leadership of the secret societies and the Thai authorities 
occurred when the Chinese were made subjnect to the same head tax as 
native Thais, signaling an end to the period of Chinese favoritismn. 
Even though the societies called for and sought to enforce a general
strike in all establishments owned by Chinese or using Chinese labor, 
the government was able to prevent majnor disorders outside the Chinese 
community, and in five days the strike had run itsn·ncou. rse. Not only 
was the strike unsuccessfuln, but it enhanced anti-Chinese sentiments 
among the Thai populace. The societies were revealed to be powerless 
when placed against the reorganized and modernized Thai army. This 
confrontation marked the beginning of the decline of these organiza­
tions. The societies gradually disappeared, although a resurgence
occurred in the 1920s in some provincial towns. In 1976, remnants of 
the secret societies reappeared, and there is some evidence that 
Chinese employers have made use of them to intimidate leaders of emerg­
ing labor organizations.n10  
The 1910-1930 period was one in which Chinese organizations adopt­
ed a low profile. On an informal basis worker organizations did exist, 
which provided social and recreational, as well as various welfare 
services to the participants. Such informal organizations had long
existed within the secret societies and were found even among Thai 
employees in such government establishments as the railroad and the 
tobacco monopolies. One of the earliest such organizations was the 
Tramway Workers Association formed in the Sirun Electric Company in ·nl897 
which consisted of 300 Thai members. These workers even went on strike 
in 1900 in response to rising prices and wages, which were then a 
severe problem in Bangkok.n11 
9Thompson regards these activities as those of secret societies 
and not as labor problems. However, the fact is that collective action 
backed by organizational power was used to achieve workersn' objectives.
Virginia Thompson, Labor Problems in Southeast Asia. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1947), p. 238. 
. .l0The secret soc1et1es appear to be most active in the underworld 
of Bangkok and other Southeast Asian cities with larg.e Chinese popula­
tionsn. See "Sinister Chinese Secret Societies Flourish,n" Bangkok 
World, July 3, 1976, p. 3 .  
11Thompson attributes the wage cr1s1s to a severe labor shortage
brought on by the Kingn' s  requisitioning of workers at twice the wages
paid by the Public Works Department in order to speed up the completion
of his new Dusit Palacen. Thailand: The New Siam, p. 610. 
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During this predepression period , the government 's regulation of 
labor affairs was limitedi. For example, rickshaw pullers were largely
composed of Chinese immigrant labor who rented their carts on a daily 
basis .i1 2  The numbers of such pullers was extreme ly large relative to
the demand. for their services, and competition was vigorousi. Pedesi­
trian traffic was repeatedly threatened by the momentum o f  these 
vehi clesi. To try to bring some order into this traffic ,  the govern­
ment imposed in 1913 licensing requirements on the pullersi, with a 
registration fee of three satangsi. Under these requirements, a puller 
had to know enough Thai to follow directionsi, to be physiically fit, and 
to be betweien the ages of eighteen and forty . 
The government 's  role in labor matters increased only slowly . In
1917 it provided relief publi c employment to unemployed migrant Laotian 
farm workers in the Central Plains. The government also dealt on an 
emergency, ad hoc basis with a few strikes whi ch mostly occurred on the 
grounds of alleged unfair treatmenti. One of these. was a 1921 strike 
in the Bangkok dockyard of the Royal Thai Navy by an informal Chinese 
·association of workersi. Control over strike a ctivities of informal
organiizations was imposed in 1927 when the Penal Code was extended to
apply to strikes, and the police were made responsible for dealing with 
them ijnd resolving ·such disputes. Two years later an unsuccessful 
efforti· was made to establish a Labor Bureau to deal with rising labor 
problems, and it was not until 193 2 that an Employment Service Se ction 
was established to register the ·many private employment agencies that
had developed in Bangkok.  
II . The Great Depression and the Revolution 
The basi cally agricultural character of the Thai economy insulated 
it from the most severe repericussions 0£ thei.worldwide depression be­
ginning in 1930 , but in relative terms sev-ere unemployment was experienc­
ed in Bangko k .  A 1931 survey revealed that over 4000 unskilled workers 
werei- unemployedi.i1 3 This was sufficient to generate a movement for re­
form, and when the revolutionary government established a constitution­
al monarchy, the lack of attention given to the unemployment problem 
was one of the major criticisms leveled against the former regimei. In
addition to establishing a number of government enterprises in paper, · 
textiles , sugar mills, distilleries, tobacco, ele ctricity generation , 
shipping , railways and other industries ; steps were taken to expand
employment to native Thais in a variety of occupations. Many of these 
efforts were  designed to replace alien labor and to reserve selected 
occup ations exclusively for Thai s ., and the stimulus for these actions 
was generat ed bi p series of strikes beginning in 1932 , involving 
primarily Chinese workersi. 
By European ori-American standards.the incidence of strikes after
the 1932 Revolution was not frequent nor violen�. 14 Yet , by Thai 
standards they were unusual .- Either so cial or political change or 
1 2The same procedure, in _whi ch taxi drivers rent their automobiles 
on a 12 -hour basis, is still used today . Much of the wild driving 
assoiciated with taxis has been attribut�d to their helter-skelter 
competition for passengers whereby care for the condition of the rent­
ed vehiicle is ignoredi. Earlier rental of pedicabs is discussed in 
ibid .  , p .  611 . 
13Ibid.  , p .i. 613 . 
14Ibid.  , p .  614 . 
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economic distress alone has not been sufficient to cause spontaneous
worker protests in Thailand , but combinations of these events do seem 
to precipitate such action . Because so many o-f the strikes involved 
alien employees , the disorders ultimately proved to be counterproduci­
tivei. 
The series of strikes began in August 1932  when two disputes
occurred .i1 5  The first involved the rickshaw pullers who had been caught 
in an income squee zei. On the one hand, competition from motori zed
.
taxis
and buses had cuti-into the demand for their services, and on the other, 
the high rental rates charged by Chinese owners . made it difficult for 
the pullers to earn enough even to feed themselves. Hence , 6 , 000  of 
them strucki. Both the Chinese _iChamber of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Interior mediated the dispute-, and rental rates were lowered from 75 
to 5 0  satangs per day . In the same month , Chinese women dyer factory 
workers also struck successfully, protesting a cut in their daily wages 
from 40 to 30  satangs, and again the government mediated the disputei. 
Later, in November of the same year, the Tramway Workers Association , 
recogni zed by the government only the previous month as a meritorious 
welfare society, struck against the Siam Electric Company over the
discharge of fellow workersi. The company had refused to recogniize the 
association 's  grievance and the government entered the dispute in rei­
sponse to a petition by the Tramway Workers Associationi. Although the 
government took no formal action, its promise to monitor the future 
conduct of the company appeared to appease the workers. 
In 1934 three strikes of significance were noted .i16  Chinese rice
mill workers walked out in protest of the disconiinuation of their 
customary year end bonus , which in Chinese employer-employee relations 
was an implicit deferred form of regular compensation. The workers 
petitioned the Tramway Workers Association for assistance and asked 
the governmenti· to take over the mills . The government did intercedei, 
but in support of the mill ownersi' contention that the decline in the 
world rice price had rendered them unable to pay the bonusi. The few 
Thai workers in the mill , kept in place by the informal and secret 
organi zations of the Chinese workers , separately petitioned the govern­
ment to guarantee a percentage of· the jobs in rice mills for Thai 
woril<ersi. Moreoveri, the violeince accompanying the strike angered the 
government , and it subsequently deported seven Chinese workers who 
were alleged to be the strike organiizers .i Concurrent with the rice .
mill strike was a short interruption in rail service in Bangkok , brought 
about by demands from both Thai and Chinese workers for better working
conditions and for more responsible managementi. The true issue was
reported to be the discontinuance by the railroad of the service providi­
ing free worker transportation to and from their homes to the job site 
at the Makasan Repair Factory . The governm.ent , again in response to
the workersi' petition, intervened, and it promised to let army officers
manage the railroad and to establish ai·permanent grievance committee 
under the chairmanship of the Governor of Bangkok. Later , Thai workers 
replaced many Chinese workers and those thought to be leaders of the 
strike . In  the same year, a strike by Chinese taxi drivers for higher 
.15is � � ., p .  "b " d  d d di1scuss 1on .  ee 615 for an expan e . 
•· Ch " �nese Soa�ety , pp. - .16skinner , 218 219 
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wages resulted later in a statute restrict ing taxi driv ing to Tha i 
nat ionals. Strikes in 1935 involved bus drivers in Ch iengma i ,  who 
demanded and receiived h igher wages , and in 1936 , 30 0 m iners in Yala 
struck unsuccessfully in p rotest over a 10 pe rcent wage cut. 
These ser ies of strikes led eventually to the 1939 Tha i Workers 
Act which requ ired at least 50 percent of Thai nationals to be e�ploy­
ed in rice mill ing , 7 5  percent in m ining , and empl oyment , for  example , 
as tax i drivers and seamen was restr icted exclus ively to Tha i nat ionals. 
Although the law init ially was unenforceable because of a shortage of 
Tha is w ill ing to enter such employment , especially in· m ining , it d id 
represent a f i rst step in end ing the control exercised by the Chinese 
over many occupations , . and it prov ided one more inducement for the 
Chinese to adopt Thai c it izenshipi. Because · of the adverse government 
react ion to str ike s initiated by Chinese workers , for iome years after 
1935 Chinese workers abandoned the us� of the strike as a form of labor 
protest. 1 7  
Lack of concern for  the welfare of al ien labor has been the reason
often g iven for the fa ilu re of the Thai government to enact protect ive 
labor leg islat ion.1 8 Yet , although only a small m inor ity of wage 
workers were Tha i ,. the ir numbers were still large. Indeed , in 1937 
some th irteen labor candiidates ran for off ice in the Nat ional Assembly. 
Early in the f ollow ing year a b ill was introduced in the Nat ional 
Assembly to regulate wages , hou rs , and child labor. Although it was 
defeated , a committee was establ ished to s.tudy the . ·problem. A maj o r  
argument aga inst such leg islat ion was that its .iimpact could not be 
determ ined until the d imensions of the labor f orce itself we re survey­
ed .i · Another more plaus ible explanat ion of the reluctance of the gov ­
ernment t o  enact such leg islat ion was that it was itself a principal 
employe r ,  and as such it was unwill ing to impose upon the managers of 
state enterprises any more onerous regulat ions than were absolutely
necessary. Nbt w ithstand ing this reluctance , the government d id 
enact in 1939 the Factory Act , wh ich requ ired owners to obtain a pe rmit 
to open or extend a factory , and also requ ired the ir premises t o  be 
kept clean and safety dev ices and p rac·t ices to be in effect t o  p .rotect 
workers from injury. The law was largely ignored , however ,  because no 
ptov is ion was made f o r  factory . inspectors and the workers themselves 
we re ignorant of the law 's prov isions.19 
World War II 
Thaiiland became an ally of Japan du ring World War II , partly 
because to do othe rw ise would have deprived her of her nat ional inde­
pendence. Japanese troops d id part icipate de faeto in the occupat ion 
of Thailand , land ing in Janu�ry. 1942 , although Thail and cont inued t o  
adm inister her own internal affairs. Labor organ i zat ions and labor 
d isputes were , of cou rse , muted du ring _i the cou rse of the war ,  but 
Chinese dockworkers d id on occas ions refuse to l oad Japanese vessels. 
Chinese were d rafted into mil itary labor battal ions f or work on pro­
jects planned by the Japanese. The Chinese were further excluded in 
l 7 Ibid.  , p. 2 2 0 • 
18 see ibid. ,  p �  220; Thompson ,i- Thai l.and:  The New Siam, p. 618 . 
19 11 Industr ial Peace Through Law , "  Investor ( September ,  1969 ) , 
p. 719. 
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1942  from twenty-seven occupations and professions , including hair­
dressing , toy manufacturing , and the law, and they were expelled from 
selected military strategic provinces. Many lost homes and businessesi. 
In addition , the Free Thai Movement under British-American sponsorship
carried on sporadic resistance against and surveillance of the Japanesei, 
and out of this movement in late 1944 developed the Bangkok Federation 
of Trade Unions. This federation formed the nucleus of the postwar 
labor movementi. Other resistance movements were found among the Chinese , 
both the Kuomintang loyal to General Chiang _iKai-Shek and the ·Chinese
Communists. In July 1944 , while the Japanese looked on , the Free Thai 
Movement ousted the incumbent government in a parliamentary election , 
and thereafter the Free Thai Government increasingly cooperated with 
the resistance movements and lessened the wartimei, restrictive controls·
on Chinesei. The change of government was said to be in anticipation of 
the ultimate Japanese defeati, and the Thais wished to have a government 
in office sympathetic to the Allied causei. 
Nevertheless , postwar relations between the alien Chinese in Thai­
land and the Thais did not remain harmonious.i2 0  A pitched sixi-day 
battle occurred in late September 1945 between the Thai army and the 
Chinese Kuomintang in their sector of Bangkok , as anti-Sinetic senti­
ments erupted. This complicated the official attitude of China , which 
at the time was resisting internal pressure to consider Thailand a
defeated enemy because of the latter's alliance with Japan during the 
war. To appease China , Thailand agreed to permit unrestricted immigra­
tion of Chinese , and to reopen schools of Chinese nationals , and in
late 1945 she formaliized diplomatic relations with China for the first 
time in forty years. Thailand incurred only brief Allied occupationi, 
she was able to preserve her sovereignty and freedom of action , and in 
1946 she was admitted to the United Nations. Sino-Thai relations there­
after continued to improve until 1948i. 
IIIi. Postwar Labor Relations 
A Ten-Year Period of Flux 
The immediate postwar period in Thailand was one of social change 
as she sought acceptance as a responsible democratic nation by the 
victorious Allies. Together with this process of liberaliization and 
relaxed tensions with her Chinese residents came economic exigency in 
terms of rising inflation and domestic shortages. In this contexti, a 
new wave of strikes occurred. Immediately after V-J day , over 4 , 000  
Chinese stevedores and rice mill workers in Bangkok struck for higher
pay. Subsequent strikes in 1946 by Sino-Thai laborers occurred over
political issues in China and over the handling of relief supplies to 
China , but initially these 1945 strikes were economic in origin. In
the next two years there were 173 strikes , of which twenty-eight were 
maj or ones , and most involved wage issues during an inflationary period. 
Even civil service workers demonstrated in January 1947 for a higher 
salary scale. During this time , the most disruptive labor disputes 
occurred in rice milling , lumber yards , state railways , naval dockyards , 
and tobacco factories. 
The diplomatic relations established with China in 1945 gave the 
Chinese in Thailand a form of representation that restricted the Thai 
government 's repressive measures and resulted in a relaxation of ethnic 
20 skinner , Chinese Soaiety, pp. 278 -89. 
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tensions. Thi s  feeling of coopieration was evident on the strike scene 
in Bangkok when Chinese worker s were able to maintain their walkouts 
without fear of "scab" Thai labor. Efforts were made to bring Chinese 
and Thai worker s together into a labor movement, and on May 1, 1946,i .
the di stinguished Prince Sakon Vorawan, advi sor to a liberal political 
party, cautioned a conference of Thai-· c•hine se union delegate s to a ct 
with restraint so as  not to harm efforts being made to legali ze colle c­
tive bargaining.i21  No provisions for colle ctiv� barga ining had been 
included in t he po stwar Thai constitution, and for purpo ses other t han 
benevolent a ctivitie s labor unions �ere still illegal. Ai thi s  confer­
ence, the General Trade Union As sociation (GTUA) was formed. It wa s a 
de scendent of the Bangkok Federation of Trade Unions earlier establish­
·ed by Prime Mini ster Pridi Panomyong.· During t he remainder of 1946 t he 
GTUA coordinated labor di spute s involving Thai and Chinese workers. 
Concurrently, membership drive s occurred in associations of laborers in 
·printing, among tri cycle driver s, transport wor�ers, and bus drivers. 
Agents of the Communist faction in China, loyal to Mao Tse-tung 
and operating in Thailand, had in 1946 infilt·rated a number of Sino­
Thai unions and gained control of them. These repreisentative s were 
content to work behind the scene s  in order to encourage the development 
of a formal labor movement in Thailand. The succe s s  of GTUA led in 
January 1947 to its successor organi zation, t he Saha Achiwa Kamakon, 
known by its Engli sh name as  the Central Labor :union (CLU). Thi s  
organi zation nominally. was led by Thai politi cal figures of a liberal
bent and contained both Thai and Chine se member unions. Thais were 
strong in railway, tramway andi· bus driver unions, and Chinese dominat­
ed the port, rice mill and sawmill unions. Initially, Chinese member­
ship was reportedly a minority, but during· t he next year Chinese labor 
organi zations joined the C LU and by 1948 they comprised a majority ofi · 
the memberiship. Estimateis of the total membership varied from 12,000 
to 100,000, and eventually some sixty-four unions were affiliated with
it.2 2  The stated purpose s of the. CLU were: (1) to cooperate with .
progre ssive social force s and to promote labor a s sociations; ( 2 )  to
improve worker education and welfare; ( 3 )  to promote the settlement of
labor disputes; (4) to promote mutual aid and cooperation among member 
organiizations; and (5) to function a s  a nonpolitical repreisentative of 
worker s.i2 3  These objective s served in part a s  window dr�ssing, partic�  
ularly the fifth one, sine� labor associations for political purpo ses 
were clearly illegali. The CLU had good relations with the government 
until the November 1947 coup. The Communist leader s were able to 
strengthen their control of
.
labor unions a s  their pre stige and power 
in Thailand increased in t he 1948-1950 period· after t he defeat of 
Chiang Kai-Shek. By 1948 t hey had captured control of t he Central 
Labor Union, and in February 1949 t he CLU affiliated with t he communist­
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. In November 1949 the CLU 
·.21Thompson, Labor Problemsa, p. 248 . 
. 
22Ibid.,  p .  261 . · vijit Sangthong reported t hat t he organi zation 
had 75,000 member s andi· that member unions paid onei-fourth of their 
dues  to t he Central Labor Union. "Industrialization and the Labor
Movement in Thailand" (Paper presented at the International Symposium 
in Industrialiization in East A sia, Kyoto, Japan, September 1971), pp . 7-8. 
23Ibid .,  p .  8 .  
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sent a delegation to the World Federation Conference held in Peking.n24  
In 1952, the CLU was deemed to be subversive, and it was disbanded and 
its leaders arrested under the Anti-Communist Act. 
On November 8, 1947, a coup restored to power Pibun Songkram, the 
author of the severely restrictive anti-Chinese wartime controls. Be­
cause the communists had increasingly infiltrated Thai-Chinese schools 
and worker associations, Pibun responded by tightening his control of 
the Chinese. Subsequently, both Chinese schools and worker associa­
tions in Bangkok were raided and some of their leaders were arrested.n2 5  
A rival labor federation to the CLU, the Thai L abor Union was establishn­
ed exclusively for Thai workers in May 1948, and Marshal Pibun sought 
to use this organization as a political base of support. The member­
ship consisted primarily of government railroad and harbor workers,
although shop clerks, tricycle rickshaw operators and some agricultur­
al workers were also members. Many were self-employed. In 1950 the 
Thai Labor Union affiliated with the International Conference of Free 
Trade Unions, and in 1951 it was reorganized and renamed the Thai 
National Trade Union Confederation (TNTUC). At this time, it claimed 
sixty affiliated associations and up to 50,000 members, all of Thai 
citizenship. The associations were weak, their members paid little or 
no dues, and as government employees or selfn-employed farmers, hawkers, 
or pedicab drivers they had little interest in labor relations. The 
offices of the labor associations were supplied by the government and 
their chief activity was to administer subsidized government welfare 
programs.n2 6  Few, if any, strikes were promoted by member associations. 
Since labor associations provided a political base of support, 
rival political factions found it in their interest to establish a 
second federation. In February 1954 the Free Workmenn' s  Association of 
Thailand (FWAT) was established under the sponsorship of General Phao,
the head of the Police Department and an ally of ·Prime Minister Pibunn. 
The FWAT was designed to represent Chinese workers. who no longer were 
allied with the defunct CLU. It was composed primarily of rice mill 
and dock workers, although many members were self-employed, and about· 
60 percent of its 14, 000 members were Chinese. Its nominal leadership 
also jointly held high office in the TNTUC. Affiliated with FWAT was 
the Overseas Chinese Labor Union of Thailandn, originally established 
in 1907 as the Association of Industry and Commerce, which had operat­
ed since its formation as a beneficial society. 2 7 
24skinner, Chinese Socie ty , pp. 322-23. He estimated a member­
ship of 50, 000 in CLU in 1950. In the postwar period, the Thai­
Chinese have tended to support whichever Chinese government has been 
most effective in containing restrictive Thai policy against alien 
Chinese. Since the end of the Viet-Nam war in 1975, Mainland Chinan' s  
influence in Thailand has increased as Taiwann' s  has diminished. 
25These arrests were followed by later ones in August and the 
closing of schools friendly to Chiang Kai-Shek. Hence, these actions 
were as much anti-Chinese as anti-Communist, Ibid. ,i· p. 325 . 
26Alice Shurcliff, Labor in Thailand (Washington: U.nS. Depart­
ment of Labor, Foreign Labor Information, June 1959), p. 20. 
27Ibid.i, p. 24. In World War II it was active in the Thai under­
ground against the Japanesen. 
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In 1955 pol itical partie s  became legal and pre s s  censorsh ip was
abol ished , which made influence in the labor movement even more im­
portant. A power struggle between two new sp_ape r publ ishers , Champol
Kornpa sem and Prayoon Chunswadee deve loped over the leadership of the
TNTUC ; hence , it is  que stionable whether either the TNTUC or FWAT were 
truly workingmen ' s  organizations. Later in 1955 , the Labor Party wa s
formed from three large affil iate s -o f  TNTU c :· (1) The Tricycle Drivers
Union; ( 2 )  Transport Workers  Union ; and the (3) Federation o f  \Vomen
Workers. By la te 1956 the Labor Party had gained control bf TNTUC ,
and thereafter the o rgani zation moved pol itically to the le ft. 
The pe riod between 1948 and 1958 constituted an important era
during wh ich the support of the Tha i worker was solic ited by Th-a i
leade rs. Not only was it a pe riod in which renewed pre s su re was exert­
ed upon the Ch ine se to as sim ilate , but it  was a time in which e fforts 
we re made to p romote the interests  o f  Thai labor. In add ition to the 
establiishment o f  an all-Tha i labor federa tion , attempts  were made to 
expand employment oppo rtunitie s  for Tha i workers. The 1949 Thai
Occupat ional Act reserved ten occupations exclu sively for Tha is ,  in­
clud ing bus driv ing , barbering , salt manu factu re , p �d icabs ,  and metal
inlaying , al though al iens already hold ing pos i t ions in these occupat ions 
were perm itted to continue to.do so. However ,  in 1952 the al ien  reg i s ­
tration fee was ra ised from 2 0  to 4 0 0  baht annually , de sp ite a ser ie s
o f  v iolent p ro tests  by Chinese mobs. Hence , the carrot and the stick 
was u sed to force a � iens to apply for Tha i citi zensh ip in order to 
acqu ire jobs and to avoid paying the registration fee. Becau se commu­
nist leade rsh ip was active in inc iting the mobs p rote sting the fee
·increase , the government was able to enact qu ickly an Anti-Communist
B ill appl icable to ind iv iduals  or organizations supporting communist 
cause s ,  a law directed princ ipally at Chine se institu tions friendly
to Peking. Under its authorization , numerou s Chinese we re arrested ,
imp risoned or deported over the next several years , and .factions in
the Chinese community favoring the Taiwan government acqu ired new 
pre s t ige and gove rnment support . Beca�se o f  the suppre s s ion of Ch inese
interests. , the labor force in rice and s·aw m i ll ing became inc reasingly
Tha i , and more Thai s  were repre sented in the . labor force of the m ining
and rubbe r indu strie s .  Vocational school s were established to train
Tha is  for skilled occupat ions. In 1951 and 195 2 ,  add itional.occupa ­
tions were closed to al iens , includ ing manufacture o f  charcoal and
umbrellas ,  operation of wharve s ,  fish marketing , commercial fish ing ,
ha irdress ing and dressmaking.28  Government ·enterp rise s  we re expanded
in 1953 and 1954 to force out or offer competit ion to al ien firms  and 
to prov ide more jobs for Tha is.  F inally , - in 1956 the Tha i Employment
Assistance Act requ ired that 50  percent o f  all new vacanc ies in firm s
w i th ten or more employee s must  be f illed w i th Thai employees. To
assist in the adm inistrat ion o·f the se p rov i s ions , a Labor Div i s ion was 
established in 1955 in the Ministry of the Interio r .  
The Golden Era o f  Thai Relations 
Until 1956 labor unions per se  had no p ro tected legali· statu s .
Those worker organizations that d id ex ist justified themse lve s on the
bas is o f  the ir welfare functions an4 were essentially Chinese in com ­
position. Associationsi. compris ing Thai workers were typ ically organiz­
ed by pol iticians ,. newspaper ed itors , or employers , and the ir membe r ..: 
ship consisted o f  unskilled , subserv ient Thai workers . The pol i t ical 
28Skinne r ,  Chinese So-aiety , pp. 355-56. 
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base which such organi zations. provided aspiring politicians in this 
era of experimentation with democracy generated a climate gene rally 
favorable to labor 's interests . As the associations were without 
legal protection, however, employers or the police weire free to deal 
with them as they pleased, to ignore them, recogni ze them, or suppress 
them . Labor disputes did occur f rom time to time, but they we re not 
numerousi. Yet, indicative of the favorable climate of this time was
the government declaration of May 1 as Labor Day . 
The most important fruit of this favorable labor climate was the 
Labor Law enacted in November 1956 to become effective on January 1,
1957, and to a��ly to firms with ten or more employeesi. The law was 
comprehensivei. It regulated wages and hours ; established work 
standards for women and children ; made mandatory such benefits as sick 
lea.ve, separation pay, and vacations; and it established comprehensive 
labor relations regulations .i3 0  Worker associations were given the 
right to organiize and to bargain collectively with employersi. However,
the government could deny a union 's certification if its activities 
were deemed to be against the public interest or were non-peacefuli. 
Government employers or supervisors of firms were excluded from member­
ship, and no aliens were permitted to form a union, although the status 
of their rights of membership was not cleari. Unions were re quired to 
register and to submit annual reports of their activities ; they were 
enjoined from engaging in political activities; they could be sued and 
their leaders were subject to criminal penalties for illegal coercion 
or extortion . However, the right to strike was recognized only afte r 
a dispute settlement procedure had been utili zed .  The law listed a 
number of employer labor practices that were declared unfair, not un­
like those in the National Labor Relations Act of the Unite d States . 31 
Both the closed shop and union shop were prohibited .  
29sangthong, "Industriali zation, " p .  l O .  
30The law has been summari zed as follows: "It provided a normal 
working week of 48  hours, a daily rest period and a full one-day 
holiday every week, annual vacations of six days for those employe d 
continuously for not less than a full year, and thirty days sick leave 
per yeari. Women were to work a maximum eight-hour day, were not to 
undertake nightwork, and if under. eighteen years of age, were not to 
be employe d in hotels, places where liquor was sold, or in nig ht clubs 
or dance halls . For expectant mothers, a two-month leave of absence 
was prescribed .  Children were not to be employed under twelve years 
of age, and between twelve and fourteen were to be employed only on 
light work in family establishmentsi. For all workers, overtime pay at 
time-and-a-half for work over the normal forty-eight-hour working week 
was prescribe d, and double pay where the worker was employed on a full 
holiday. Wages were to be paid in Thai currency, and payments in kind 
were forbiddeni. After six months' service, an employee was entitled 
to thirty daysi' pay if he were dismissed without due notice, except 
in the case of· gross misconduct . For injuries, diseases or death dur­
ing and arising out of the course of employment, the employer was
liable, and had to pay compensation and treatment expenses . Registers 
of employees were to be kept and to be made available to the Labour
Inspectors,i" "Industrial Peace Through Law,i" Invesator (September 1969), 
p .  719i. It is apparent that the provisions conformed to the recommend­
ed code of the International Labor Organiizationi. 
31In fact, an American a dviser assisted in the drafting of this 
legislation. 
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A seven member , tripartite Labor Relations Committee was estab­
lished to receive unfair labor practice complaints and to mediate 
labor disputes. It could also recommend arbitrationi. Before a strike 
or lockout was permitted , a dispute first had to be submitted to the 
Labor Relations Committeei, which had twenty days to intervenei. Only
after the twenty-day period had expired, and then with another seven 
day's notice were strikes or lockouts authorized. Hence, a twenty­
seven day cooling-off period was required. Strikes or lockouts were 
completely prohibited in public utilities or during national emergen­
ciesi. The government obviously believed that these dispute settle­
ment provisions were adequate to deal with the relatively few strikes 
that characterized Thai industrial relations . For example , in 1956 
only twelve strikes had been reported . The major flaw, however, in 
these and subsequent dispute settlement procedures was that they plac­
ed restrictions on the scheduling of strikes, without providing any
alternative procedure whereby workers' dissatisfactions could be ex :­
pressed or resolved . Workable grievance procedures are uncommon, and 
although companies were required by law to establish formal grievance 
·procedures, little or no use was made of them. The consequence hasi
been that these and later formal dispute settlement procedures have 
been ignored , partly because the Labor Relations Committee developed
the reputation of being promanagement in the cases with which it dealt. 
In terms of promoting the formation of labor unions, the act was 
a successi. Some 116 uri ons were formed in 1957 with a membership• of 
about 25 , 000i, and the number increased to 154 by November 1958i. Most 
of the unions (70 percent) varied in size from 4 0  to 400 membersi. 
Many unions were sponsored by politicians, and their leadership was 
limited in each case to a few individuals inexperienced in collective 
bargaining or grievance administrationi. Their political orientation 
and the general elections early in 1957 led to an increase in the 
number of strikes; twenty-one were recorded in that year and they 
involved more workers and averaged almost twice the duration of strikes 
in earlier yearsi. The number of strikes declined in the second half 
of 1957 and into 1958i, and only four strikes were recorded in the 
latter yeari. Although strikes were nominally called to protest wage
and worker grievances, their obvious political relationship did not 
go unnoticed . 
Because control of the TNTUC had passed to political rivals of 
the incumbent leaders of the government, a new federation was estab­
lished in 1957 under government sponsorship as the Thai National 
Federation of Trade Unions (TNFTU) . The new federation claimed seven­
teen affiliates and depicted itself to workers as an alternative to 
the "leftist" TNTUC . Early in 1958 a new name for the Free Workmen ' s  
Association •was adopted, the Federation of Free Workers Union of 
Thailand, with the hope of revitalizing the political fortunes of the 
organization. Hence, three federations., all politically oriented , 
existed to which the fledgling labor associations were attached . All 
three federations provided for an annual general assembly composed of 
delegates from the member unions , and an executive council with a 
president and secretary general implemented policy between conventionsi. 
In October 1958 , Marshal Sarit seized control of the governmenti. 
He· proclaimed that the nation was imperiled by organizations such as 
unions which threatened the peace and stability of Thai society . The 
Labor Code of 1957 was repeal�d on October ·31 , 1958 on the grounds 
that it was unsuitable for existing labor conditions in Thailand , and 
that it generated labor dissension which nullified the normal coopera­
tive spirit that exists between workers and their employers. Moreoveri, 
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it was alleged that workers were being made pawns of politicians, some 
of whom were communisti. Hence, unions were made illegal, and twenty­
four of their leaders, fifteen of whom were affiliated with TNFTU, 
were arrested and imprisoned as subversives for t he duration of Marshal 
Sarit ' s  rule. Most were released after his death in 1963, although 
some spent up to eight years in j ail . The effect of the repeal of the 
Labor Code was to reinstitute the provisions of the Penal Code which 
prohibited strikes and -lockouts . However, most of the labor protec­
tion provisions were reinstituted in the next year t hrough Ministry 
of Interior regulations . 
The abolishment of labor organizations in 1958 caused hardly a 
ripple on the Thai socio-economic scenei. The organizations possessed 
little bargaining power and had little influence on the practice of 
industrial relationsi. Employee commitment to the organizations was 
not great for a variety of reasonsi. Many members were self-employed . 
The Chinese still comprised between 60 and 70 percent of the la·bor 
force, and most were believed to have aspirations eventually to go
into business for themselvesi. Workers of peasant origin could always 
return to the farm.  Those members who were Thai as Buddhists were 
culturally preconditioned to be noni-involved in t he affairs of others. 
Hence, the American unionist. rallying cry of "an injury to one is an 
injury to all" had no corollary among the Thais � and there was almost 
no recognition of the principle, "in .iunion there is strength . "  Ethnic 
hostilities divided the ranks . Most employers had small establish­
ments, and they were able to  maintain personal relationships with 
their few employeesi. The reluctance of Thais to challenge authority
made collective bargaining an alien procedure, and the inexperience 
of union leaders made grievance administration unlikely ; hence, there 
were few union victories or accomplishments to bind t he workers to a 
continuing organization and for which they were willing to  make un­
usual sacrificesi. 
Why then did a union movement arise in the 1946-58 period? There 
is some question as to whether one really did developi. Leaders did 
form labor organizations for various purposes, and they c Z aimed a body 
of members ; yet, membership affiliation may at best have been a cour­
tesy on the membersi' part to appease some patron with whom a client 
relationship was soughti. A political figure, for example, could 
protect hawkers or pedicab operators from police harassmenti. On the 
other hand, a good many labor organizations had already existed in­
formally as welfare or beneficial societies, and t hey simply took ad­
vantage of the opportunity to obtain formal status under the registra­
tion provisions of the Labor Codei. Labor relations functions remained 
a hazardous pursuit for a union leaderi. He was subjiect· to employer 
retribution, against which the Labor Code in practice provided him 
little protectioni. The need for unions was not always obviousi. 
Thailand was industrializing but slowly; the government remained 
paternalistic and provided minimum labor protective standards ; and 
the course of political change was such that a government friendly
today to organizations with political potential could be hostile tomor­
rowi. Moreover, because the organizations' membership was largely alien 
and they were chronically being infiltrated by subversive elements,
the government was cautious about their development .  
A labor leader of that era acknowledged that the government had 
been alarmed by Chinese leaders ' influence in unions . i32 However, he 
32Interview, May 1973 . The union leader has asked to remain 
anonymousi. 
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did emphasi ze that in hi s cipinion, the union leader ship o f  that period 
was not communist. Some of the lesser leader s had attended a trade 
union conference in Peking in the mid-1 9 50s, but they had been advised 
to make the trip by national po litical figure s who -had been.instrumen­
ta l in organi zing the unions. These le s ser leader s were naive and 
went primari ly because they wanted a chance to travei. Later, · when
union leaders were jai led, only some were accu sed o f  being communi st ;  
the others were po litica l opponents of Mar sha l Sarit . 
A lthough the size of the union movement of that period was gross­
ly over stated, at its peak it did enlist about 3 0, 0 00  true worker s. 
When unions were aboli shed in 1958, some unions re sumed their ear lier 
informal stru cturei- -much like re creational or social clubsi. Although
the rai lway worker s had been wel l  organi zed, their rank s became divid­
ed and their informal organiization did not function we ll. The tobacco 
monopo ly workers de serted the movement · comp lete ly, primari ly because 
their term s of emp loyment were sufficient ly good for them not to 
jeopardiize their job position by continuing an unregistered, informa l 
organi zation. However, informal organi zations continued among port
and transport employees.i· 
The Dark Age s  
The fourteen-year period between 1958 and 1972 was one in which 
formal labor organi zationi did noti. exist . The Labor Code had repealed 
di spute sett lement procedure s on the fa l se premise ·that ,if unions did
not exist, labor dispute s wou ld not occur. Yet, disputes did not 
disappear and, in fact, in· 1959  their number increased to e leven, a l­
though in subsequent year s, there were fewer re corded strike s .  
After the Labor Code of 1 9 57 was aboli shed, labor di spute s were 
mediated by a variety o f  government .officesi. Dispute s were re ferred 
to provincia l governors, to provincia l  we l fare offi cers, to district 
officers, out most frequent ly to the po li ce. These officia ls  had 
little under s.tanding o f  and no expertise in matters pertaining to 
labor relations. In 1962 the Diviision o f  Labor in the Mini stry of 
Interior was upgraded to bureau statu s, and in¢reasingily thereafter 
dispute s were re ferred to this office. Offi cers  o f  the Labor Bureau 
sought to obtain settilements among the parties, but often they mere ly 
rendered a deciision .i. This could be appealed to the Director-General 
o f  the Pub lic We l fare Department, whose decision was final. During 
the 1958-65  period, there were thiity-eight strikes, most o f  which 
occurred, as is  th e Thai custom, prior to the pre sentation o f  worker 
de�ands. Most of the strikes.were over wage i s sues, poor workingi.
conditions, management d iscip line of worker s, or f�ilure o f  a firm 
to fol low the labor laws. In the fir st half ·o f  1.965, e leven strike s 
occurred invo lving 3,400  workers ; and it be came obviou s that existing 
dispute settlement provisions were inadequate. The government re spond­
ed by taking two actions. In February 196 5  the Generail A s semb ly pass­
ed the Labor Di spute Settlement Act, and in October the Bureau of 
Labor was raised to department statu s. The Lab�r Dispute Settilement 
Act provide cl for the imp licit organi zation ofian e le cted group of. · 
worker repre sentativ es to pre sent grievance s  and negotiate terms o f  
emp loyment--a type o f  ad hoa labor union. Moreover, it outlined a 
comp li cated pro cedure that had to be fo l lowed before a strike was 
legaliizedi. 
. .
The procedure e s sential ly invo lved three steps.i First, employees · 
or emp loyers wishing to �h.ange conditions o f  the emp loyment contract 
had t o  formu late written demands,i· . which were then to be presented to 
so 
the opposing party for negotiiations, e ither through their chosen rep­
resentatiives, or alternatively for employers through the Labor Mediia­
tion Officeri. In Bangkok, this off icer was aff il iated w ith the 
Department of Labor and in the prov inces the d istr ict off icer of the 
M inistry of Inter ior performed this funct ion .  Negot iat ions were to
be scheduled w ithin seven days after presentation of demands . In
the second stage negotiatiions were to proceed for up to thirty days, 
after which the d ispute was referred to the med iat ion off iceri. Again, 
if no settlement had been reached through his efforts after a period 
of f ifteen ·to thirty days of med iat ion, the parties as a third step
were advised to accept b ind ing arb itrat ion .  Arb itrat ion was non­
compulsory, but only after it had been rejected was a strike legally 
permitted . Even then, strikes were prohib ited in ra ilways, harbours, 
ut il it ies, among public employees, or dur ing t imes when martial law 
was in effect. In all, up to s ixty days of delay couldi. occur before
a striike could legally be calledi. 
Employees ne ither understood nor followed the prov isions of the 
Labor Disputes Acti. First, the procedure was sufficiently complex 
that workers could not have followed it even if they w ished to do soi. 
It is reported that many Labor Department offic ials did not understand 
the procedure . 3 3 In the next s ix years there were 113 recorded 
strikes, all of which were illegal, in that none had made use of the 
d ispute settlement procedurei. A d irector-general of the Department 
of Labor reported in 1969 that "under the exist ing system, workers 
elect representatives half-heartedly, have l ittle conf idence in them, 
and prefer to resort to striikes as a method of making demands known 
to employers . " i3 4  Later in 1971, the d irector-general remarked that 
"employers had a tendency to prolong the consideratiion of employees' 
demands and gr ievances instead of tak ing immed iate action, and this 
provokes employees into tak ing d irect act ion .  Ne ither party bothers 
to consult w ith the Department of Labor in the early stages of the 
disputei. " 3 5 
Two features of Thai society inhib it the presentat ion of griev­
ances and the negotiat ion of settlements . F irst, Tha is have an
intense cultural reluctance to engage in face-toi-face conflictsi. As
a result, workers are reluctant to compla in to any off ic ial, e ither 
from the company or the government, in an interpersonal confrontat ion .  
Typ ically, as it was once explained to me, even two partiies in a 
symbiotic relat ionship w ho have a compla int aga inst each other w ill 
normally use the serviices of a third party intermed iary to present 
the complaint and to med iate the d ispute .i3 6 Hence, if a Thai worker 
33 Interv iew, March 8, 1973, w ith former Department of Labor 
inspector . In  v iew of the var ied and confl ict ing reports of its 
prov is ions in printed media, it is readily apparent that the Labor 
Dispute Settlement Act was generally not understoodi. 
34Reported in " Industr ial Peace Through Law,"  p .  723i. 
. .. .35Th Management b of Z 9 7 Z .
t ion 
a 1  Assoc 1at 1on, La or D�sputes ( Informa-
Ser ies, 2, 2), p .  6 .  
36Interv iew w ith Sr i Pr inya Ramakomud, National Institute of
Development Adm inistrat ion, March 8, 1973 . 
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has a grievance with his employer, he normallyi. either accepts it or.
quits, and then he goes to the Labor Department toirequest its services 
in obtaining the mandatory separation pay . Only if the grievance is 
general and severe will he engage with others in collective actioni. 
Moreover, most strikes are spontaneous, and the Thai worker does not 
expect any reprisal or social disapproval from suchi- actioni. He believes 
that other Thais, like himself, -will not make a moral judgment concern­
ing the people's disputes, because of the Buddhist precept of non­
involvement in the affairs of others. · 
Seconq, the strike offers a dramatic but impersonal method of 
demonstrating worker dissatisfaction, and it protects the individual 
worker from employer reprisal, against which he has no recoursei. : The 
strike action brings a benevolent government official quickly into the 
dispute, who can deal with the employer at. an equal or superior status 
at little risk to the employee . A Labor Department official has explain­
ed that no legal action is taken against either employers or employees
because both parties are usually at faulti. Moreover, the department.
has recognized that "workers and employees are uneducated, are ignorant
of the law and see the strike as the only weapon possible to enforce 
their claims . " i3 7 In such a situation, there is no motivation to go 
through the lengthy process required by · t he Labor Dispute Act .  The 
strike remained as the only reasonable way for aggrieved workers to get
quick redressi. 
· Until 1974, strikes in -Thailand were typically of short duration . 
No strikes in 1969 and 1970 lasted more than one day, and in 1971, less 
than one-third of the strikes lasted more than three daysi. Workers 
have few resources to sustain a long walkout and use the strike primar­
ily as a device to call at tention to their grievancei. Labor Department 
officials recognized that the weakness of the Labor Dispute Settlement 
Act lay in the communications barrier that exists between worker and 
management, and asi·istrikes have increased over the years, they have 
faced the necessity of ultimately developing a labor movement with 
organizations that can effectively negotiate with employers about mat­
ters of concern to employeesi. In 1969, a draft labor telations bill,
similar to the 1957 statute, had been prepared and awaited the approval 
of th.e Prime •f,1inister and cabineti. 3 8  However, opposition among the 
ruling gerierals delayed enactment of such legislation until 1972 . 
IV . The Renaissance of the Labor Movement 
As past events in Thailand had clearly demonstrated, labor organ­
izations were potential centers of political poweri. Although there was 
some legitimate concern that communist influence might reemerge through 
labor unions if they were legally pet�itted, this was overshadowed by 
a more general fear of the political opposition they might engender . 
Thai leaders naturally preferred to continue to block formation of 
labor unions, but both domestic and international pressures combined 
to force a ch�nge in their ·policyi. Labor unrest a! home was increasing
because of inappropriate and inadequate measures -for alleviating worker 
j ob dissatisfactions, while abroad the ILO was under pressure to censure 
37
Hans J .  Krueger, "Strikes,i" Business in Thai land ( November 1971) , 
p .  33 . 
_
38"0rganized Labor Ahead?" Investor (Januar-y 1969) , p .  113 . 
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Thailand as a member for suppressing labor organisations .  Thailand has 
long been sensitive to her international image, and the increasing
criticisms leveled against her by world organizations in positions to 
influence her access to developmental funds, forced her to reconsider 
her opposition to labor organiz ations and to develop a positive labor 
union policy. 
In encouraging the development of weak labor as sociations, Thai 
leaders were motivated not only by policital, but also by economic con­
siderationsi. Influential governmental and military leaders frequently
held directorships in large and profitable enterprisesi) and a business­
man ' s  natural fear of the economic power of organized labor was present
among themi. Among the technocrats in government, economic development 
was a dominant national objective, and this could be achieved through
high foreign investment and a high level of national savings � Strong
labor organizations could reduce profits either by raising wages or 
through expensive labor disputes, and high wages could lead to a con­
sumption-oriented society that would reduce savingsi. Hence, if labor 
organizations were to exist, they would have to be structured so as to 
remain weak . Their role essentially would be limited to processing 
member grievances,i· administering limited employee benefits and assist­
ing in the enforcement of the labor lawsi. The latter activity would 
also ally these organizations with the Department of Labor, and this 
could keep the unions under the department' s  control, while at the same 
time the spread of such organizations would enhance its power and in­
fluence in the bureaucracy. 
TABLE 12  
Strikes in Thailand, 1956-1974 
Number of Number of �1an-days Lost 
Year Strikes Workers Involved From Strikes 
1956 12  66 3,673
1957 21 203 1 2 ,947 
1958 4 458 4, 202 
1959 846 8, 160 11 
68 93 
1960 2 
1961 2 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
3 
4 
6 
17 
17 
2 
14 
18 
81 
118 
300 
3,753
5, 413 
470 
1,867
5, 345 
2, 888 
63 
159 
539 
6,566
18, 764 
470 
3,i216 
2 3, 593 
6,004 
341972 
5,153
7,803 
12,646 
19,i903 
1973 501 177, 887 296,887
1974 358 105,i883 507,i607 
Source: Yearbook of labor statistias, Z 9 7 4 .  Bulletin No . LB/98/75 
(Bangkok: Department of Labori. Ministry of Interiori. May
1975), p .  118i. 
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In this context , then , worker associations again became legal in 
April 1972 .i3 9  Since martial law had been in effect since the November 
1971 coup , and because labor associations had been suppressed for so 
long , those organi zations that de faato functioned as worke r associa­
tions we re at first reluctant to declaire themselves openly and to seek
registration. Similarly the government moved cautiously in processing 
applications for worker associations. The Criminal Investigation Divi­
sion checked the leadersi' records as well as rosters of members , to 
asce rtain their Thai nationality , loyalty , and good citiizenship .  Dur ­
ing the first year ,  only fifteen labor associations we re.establishe d. 
Other factors have hindered the formation of associations .i. Some
companies have discharged workers for association activity , although 
the new labor law makes such company activity an unfair labor practicei. 
Some worke rs have been blacklisted for showing inte rest in associations
and others have found company prope rty hidden in their clothing , awaiti­
ing discovery at the plant gate and the charge of theft filed against 
them. Bribes have been offered worke r representatives to follow the 
company line. Recalcitrant wo rke �s are t ransferred.4 0  
Many obseirveirs of the Thai industrial scene believed that Thai 
workers would not be anxious to j"oin unions unless they cou ld see how
such organi zations could benefit themi. Thais are not "joine rsi" by
nature , they argue d ,  and some association organi ze rs have indicated they 
we re having difficulty in signing up members .i4 1  On the othe r han d ,  s6me 
leaders in the new union movement as well as Labor Depa rtment officials
believed the evidence demonstrated that Thai worke rs woul d join such 
associations .i42  Labor Department officials in 1973 we re of the opinion 
that workers needed to be e ducate d to the a dvantages of association-s 
and that this would take _ a  number of years. In the meantime ,. the dei­
partment operated .training courses in labor relations pra�tices at 
night and on weekends for inexperience d leaders of new associations. 
The ethnic division in the labor force that inhibited the develop­
ment of a unified labor movement in the 1950s had dimi�ished by the 
early 1970s. Although there were then still about 2 00 thousand regis ­
tered Chinese aliens in the labor force , few of them we re willing to 
work in industry at the wages paid there . Most Chinese we re self -em ­
ployed workers who had come to Tha iland in the 1940s , and maintaine d 
39The te rms "trade unions" or "labor un ions" we re carefully avoi d­
ed in the language of the new labor relations edict , Announcement 103 ._
The law was schedule d for passage on November 19 , 1971 , but the coup 
occurred ·on November 17 . Rumou·r has it that the e dict was put into 
effect in April in time for the June 1972 annual meeting of the 110. 
4 °Frank Lombard , "The Thai l\To rke r on the Move , "  Bangkok Pos t ,  
Supplement , August 31 , 1973 , pp. 5 ,7. 
41A Thai aca demician , Pasuk Phongpaichit , who attends many worke r 
meetings reports that often 300  to 400 worke rs are present . They are 
intereste d ,·ibut uninformed about how to organize. Interview , April 17 , .
1973. 
42 some. leaders have been quite active in recruiting worke rsi. The 
new leaders appeared to be a different breed fromi·those who gained
their experience in the 19 50s. The new ones were true "bread an d 
butter' .iunionists ; pragmatists and job site improvement oriented. Fore­
men have been active in worker o rgani zations , and at labor relations 
t raining seminars held at Chulalongkorn Unive rsity in 1973 , mostly 
foremen and academicians attended. 
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their alien status either to avoid the military draft or because they
could not read or write Thai . Hence, the industrial labor force is 
now essentially Thaii. Yet despite the ethnic homogeneity of the work 
force early in 1976, the World Bank reported that labor organizations 
were still relatively weak and few in numberi. 
New employee assiociations were required to register with the 
Department of Labor and have a minimum of ten membersi. Employers were 
also permitted to form associations, with at least three members, for 
purposes of representing their interests to employee associations, but 
none have done so .  Organizers of worker associations themselves had 
to be employees, but foremen. were required to form organizations sepa­
rate . from those of employees . The employee ass ociations were to be 
internally administered by an elected three-man board of directors, 
and the assiociation's regulations had to be approved by the membership . 
Rosters and annual reports were required. Members had to be at least 
eighteen years of age, and they could not be affiliated with more than 
one such associationi. Associations were limited to an enterprise which 
could be local, provincial, or national, or to an occupation; but in 
the latter case, the assiociation could not encompass employees from 
more than one provincei. Mergers of associations were permitted if 
these restrictions were not violated, subject to the approval of the 
Ministry of Interiori. In effect, these regulations prohibited the 
·formation of national unionsi. 
To protect the rights of organization under the regulations, un­
fair labor practices were specified . Interestingly, although the 
employer (or association) was obligated to accept the association's 
demands concerning employment conditions, the employer did not have to 
negotiate with the assiociation over the ·demands . Under the 1965 Labor 
Dispute Settlement Act, some company executives had refused to confer 
with worker representatives, absenting themselves in order to avoid 
receiving the workers' demandsi. Moreover, the 1972 regulations were 
silent with respect to procedures which could assure formation of work­
er assiociations free from employer interference, and they did not re­
quire employers to recognize associations as the representatives of 
workersi. However, the edict did provide for a nine-member Labor 
Relations Committee to process unfair labor practices ; to arbitrate 
labor disputes, or to engage in fact-finding missionsi. The committee 
was made up of the Director-General of the Department of Labor and had 
a majority of public members, most of whom were university profesisorsi. 
The administrative organization for worker associations is outlined in 
Chart l·. 
By mid 1976, some 150 worker associations had been established in 
a variety of occupationsi. Port employees again were among the first 
to organizei. Associations were formed in Japanese and Thai textile 
companies ;  and personnel employed by foreign airlines combined into a 
large associationi. Worker associations were formed in such internation­
al companies as Ess a  and Lever Brothersi. Hotel workers and transport 
employees also formed associations .i . Workers in the state railways
formed an association, as did those in the metropolitan electrical 
authority and the state tobacco monopolyi. Iron workers, glass workers, 
gunnybag workers, and teachers all formed separate organizationsi. The 
associations were initially moderate and responsible; no strikes were 
declared by members of any association up to May 1973 . Leaders of 
the associations met frequently with Labor Department official s and 
were aware that their organizations were on triali. Many leaders ack­
nowledged that they must remain non-political in order to survive, but 
they feared the effects if Thailand should reinstate general elections, 
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for they did not believe that politicians would permit labor to remain 
politically neutrali. 
Announcement 103 also repealed the 1965 Labor Dispute Settlement 
Procedure Act and substituted a similar procedurei. Although most 
labor officials acknowledged the inadequacy of the 1965 act, the de­
lays inherent in it were also present in the 1972 edicti. Under the 
1972 procedure legal strikes could be delayed for a period up to 105 
daysi. Written demands of employees presented through their representa­
tives or the Labor Dispute Mediation Officer might be delayed for 
seven days while the employer's representative was identified . If the 
demands were posted after three days the employer was considered to be 
informedi. Negotiations had to begin within seven days of identifica­
tion of the representatives, and if no settlement was reached within 
thirty days after receipt of the demand, the mediation officer had to 
be notified within seven days after the negotiations were stalematedi. 
The mediation officer was to begin mediation efforts within five days 
after his notificationi. Hence, forty-five days could elapse before 
any mediation occurred . The mediator could attempt to conciliate the 
dispute for up to fifteen days, and if the dispute remained unsettled,
he could advise arbitrationi. Fifteen days were permitted for the 
selection of arbitrators, who had to render a decision within thirty
days . If this route were followed, it could take up to 105 days to 
obtain a decisioni. If the parties did not accept arbitration within 
fifteen days after being advised to do so, a legal strike was then 
permitted . This route consumed up to seventy-five daysi. 
If the 1965 act could not prevent strikes, neither could the 1972 
labor dispute settlement proceduresi. In spite of the existence of 
martial law throughout 1972, the number of .strikes did not diminish . 
In the first half of 1973, forty strikes were recorded and labor unrest 
acceleratedi. Strikes were over a variety of issues: bridge construc­
tion, workers protested they were being laid off prematurely by a 
Japanese contractor so that they could not qualify for separation pay; 
other construction workers protested against irregular pay practices; 
employees of a movie producer protested regulations requiring them to 
schedule time to go to the toilet; gunny bag workers struck in protest 
over management absenteeism; Chinese newspaper workers and hotel work­
ers struck in protest of their New Year's bonus cuts; and textile wo­
men workers protested the company's denial of a weekly day of rest and 
failure to pay overtime; bus drivers struck for higher commissions on 
faresi. The longest strike in Thai history occurred in the Thailand 
Steelworkers Company from May 18 to June 16, 1973, when the management 
ordered a worker's arrest because he sought compensation for a fellow 
worker who had suffered serious injuries while at work. The detained 
worker was alleged to have defamed the manageri. The strike united 
fifteen of the existing worker associat-ions behind the steelworkers, 
and it received widespread publicity and appeals for ILO mediationi. 
The Labor Department's mediation efforts eventually succeeded, as the 
company agreed to improve work conditions, to reinstate all strikers,
and to pay each striker 200 baht in compensation for lost wagesi. 
These disputes were widely publicized, as were other evidencesi.
of social unresti. Thai university students, once a passive, conserva­
tive body, emerged as a forceful, well-organized and critical political 
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voice. 4 3 They were becoming alienated from Thai society , believing
they were a generation without a j ob. 44  In the past,  a college degree 
automatically led to government employment. Graduates were now find­
ing greater difficulty in obtaining employmentn, and it was not unusual 
for them to ·be unemployed for two years. 
Increasingly , students began to press for the restoration of a 
National Constitution, since the one of 1968 had been suspended in the 
November 1971 coup. In August 1973 some student groupsn- began drafting 
a constitution themselvesn, while others requested one in six months. 
The Prime Minister responded by promising one in three years . 4 n5 On 
October 6 ,  distributors of leaflets calling for a new constitution 
were arrested , including at least two Thammasat University professors. 
Immediately a wave of outrage was generated among students; tens of 
thousands of secondary , college , and university students began assembl­
ing in Bangkok to protest the arrest. By Saturday , October 13 , several 
hundred thousand students marched through the streets of Bangkokn, sup­
ported by thousands of ordinary citizens. The government feared a 
crisisn, and police and military units were alerted. Early the next 
morning, shots were fired in front of the King ' s  palace and students 
were killed or injured. All during Sundayn, October 1 4  the students 
fought police and selected military units with stones and crude Molotov 
cocktails. Scores were killed and hundreds were injured as the army
stood by , refusing to enter the fray. The generals in anguish criedn, 
"These are our children ! We can ' t  shoot our own children ! "  Late 
that evening , in response to the efforts of the King to end the blood­
shedn, the government resnigned and its principal leaders fled the coun­
try. The studentsn, who had merely wished to restore the Constitution 
and to secure the release of their arrested alliesn, had brought about 
the demise of a military dictatorship. 
43In 1967 when I first began a Visiting Professor appointment at 
Thammasat University , Thai observers of American university student 
demonstrations protesting the Viet-Nam War and other things assured 
me confidently that such events could never happen in Thailand. Thai 
studentsn, they arguedn, were too traditional; had too much respect for 
authority; and were only interested in having fun , graduating,  and 
getting a good job. A few months later , in August 1968,  students at 
Thammasat in mass boycotted their classes for several days in protest 
of the transfer of two military academy soccer players into the Law 
School. Even though they wanted the skills of the players on their 
team for the annual match with Chulalongkorn Universityn, they felt it 
was unjust ·for these two students to gain admission to the university
without going through the examination procedure that screens applicants
for the relatively few openings available. (Many students repeat the 
annual examinations several times before gaining admission. ) The boy­
cott succeeded and the two soccer players were removed. My students 
anxiously assured me that no discourtesy was intended , but that they
could not on principle attend class; and none did. 
4 4 11Student Stirrings , "  Fa!' Eas t ePn Eaonomia Review  , July 23 , 1973, 
pp. 24-26. 
4 5 1 1Student Militancy , "  Fa!' Eas tePn Eaonomi a Re view , August 13n, 
1973n, p .  32. 
59 
Labor Unrest Under the Democratic Experiment 
The social unrest was in part a result of adverse economic condi­
tionsi. Unemployment was increasing and inflation was accelerating .i4 6  
Just as employees are led to strike to seek redress of grievances be­
cause they are culturally constrained from-communicating with their 
employers, so were students and other common people alienated from the 
political process, where the leaders were unaware and unresponsive to 
their needsi. The combination of economic exigency, declining real 
wages, the Arab oil embargo, and a political and social revolution gen­
erated in late 1973 and through 1974, produced a �ave of strikes and 
demonstrations that far surpassed �ny that had 6ccurred heretofore in 
modern Thai history . Ov�r three hundred work stoppages occurred in 
November and December of 1973 alone, three-fourths of them in December . 4 7 
The pace continued throughout 1974, and the average duration of walk­
outs tripled . The lid was off; demonstrations were in vogue; and dis­
satisfied economic groups were quick to give vent to their frustrationsi. 
In contrast with the 1957-58 period, neither communists nor politicians 
were initially responsible for the unrest. Demonstrations were truly
at the grassroots level,i4 8  occurring in response to every conceivable 
complaint .i. Farmers demonstrated against rising costs and falling farm 
prices;i. students demonstrated against banks for not making credit avail­
able to farmers; two thousand teachers demonstrated against the Educa­
tion Ministry, protesting layoffs during the Thai summer; Dusit zoo 
workers struck for higher wages , threatening to release the caged wild 
animals if their demands were not met. Workers at the Metropolitan 
Electric Authority cut power for two minutes on December 7, 1973, to 
indicate the difficulties they" could cause if their demands were not 
met; planes went unfueled at the international airport as service work­
ers sought higher pay; pilots of the domestic airline company struck 
to remove the director of the company, as did television employeesi. 
Strikes for higher wages occurred in other state enterprises: among
railway workers, telephone employees, in the Bangkok Waterworks, the 
Government Savings Bank, the Port Authority, and in the Tobacco Monopolyi. 
Hospitals were struck, as were newspapersi. Banks quickly capitulated 
and raised wages as strikes in leading financial institutions closed 
them for a dayi. Petroleum companies, textiles,· mercantilei. establis.h­
ments, transit lines, hotels, factories all experienced strikesi. All 
46consumer prices had increased as follows: 
: 
Percentage Increase in 
Year Consumer Price Index 
1972 4 . 8  
1973 15 . 6  
1974 24 . 3  
1975 3 .i4 
47Frank Lombard, "Labor Unrest: The Pendulum Swings,i" Business in 
Thaialanda, S, 1, (January 1974) , pp . 7-12 . His data, showing fewer 
strikes, have since been revised by the Depart�ent of Labor .· However,
Lombard correctly reports the pattern of unresti. 
48"Manpower: Still a Few Teething Problems,i" Bangkok Post, Supple­
ment, December 30, 1975, p .  27 . 
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were successful in their demands . Even Civil Servants, and units of 
the police and the military demonstrated in vain for adjustments in 
the salary schedules, but for their efforts t hey only gained a promise 
to consider the feasibility of an adjustment .  However, this promise 
was honored by a revised civil service pay schedule that raised sala­
ries in 1975 by 50 percenti. 
The government urged moderation in the workers' demands and plead­
ed for negotiations rather than walkouts over the issuesi. The reluc­
tance of subordinates to confront management continued, however, and 
often walkouts occurred against a management eager to reach a settle­
ment but wit h  no one with whom to negotiate .  Other employers, alarmed 
at the assertiveness of their once docile employees, called for stern 
government enforcement of the anti- strike lawsi. But the interim 
civilian government was reluctant to act for fear of inciting a mili­
tary coup to "restore" order, and the police, still chafing under the 
public's hostility at their actions against the students in the October 
revolution, could not suppress the demonstrations .i4 9  The government 
did, however, implement a number of measures to relieve erosion of 
workers' real incomei. The export tax on rice was lowered in order to 
lower the domestic price of the basic food staple ; gasoline and canned 
milk excise taxes were lowered ; and the minimum wage in Bangkok was 
progressively raised from 12 to 16 to 20 to 25 baht over the next two 
years . The money supply was tightened and developmenti.iexpenditures 
were cut to ease excess demand . To appease vocal farmer groups agri­
cultural reforms were promised, and a social welfare program was worked 
outi. 
49Normally, Thai strikes are neither violent nor destructivei. 
Even in labor disputes, Thais pursue "sanuk . "  An approp-riate descrip­
t ion is the following: 
"A typical strike begins by surprisei. _iWorkers 
suddenly walk out and later submit a list of demands 
to  t he ·imanagement .  The list bears no signatures and 
is usually submitted by someone who is obviously not 
a true representativei. If the matter cannot be settled 
immediately, the Labour Department must be called in 
and conciliators foundi. Workers' representatives, real 
or unreal must be rounded up . 
"While negotiations are going on, many strikes 
take on a festive atmospherei. Danc_ing, drinking and 
on at least one occasion, a band was hired . The climax 
comes when the workersi' representative announces the 
terms of the agreement to a crowd of employees, only to 
be greeted by a chorus of boos together with accusations 
he has been bribed by managementi. A strike in Thailand 
is like nowhere else in the worldi. "  
Frank Lombard, "Labor Unrest, "  p .  9 .  Elsewhere Lombard has writ ten 
that it is customary for strikers to ask forgiveness from management 
for t heir actions once a strike has been sett1ed--a tribute to author­
ity, for the management is the patron and the worker is the client, 
and the client is expected to show loyalty to the patroni. The manage­
ment has lost face by the public strike, and a public apology is necess­
ary to restore the normal relationship . 
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In July 1974 the police were given the opportunity to act deci­
sively, and the Chinese community in Bangkok was the scapegoat of their 
pent-up frustration.nS O  A taxi driver was arrested in Chinatown and 
an angry mob became unruly because they felt he was being abused. A 
riot outside the police station resulted in six Thais being killed 
and others wounded. In subsequent nights of rioting byn- Chinese youths, 
twenty more were killed by police fire. Crack anti-insurgency troops 
were then called in to restore order, and Thai authorities were quick 
to deny that any anti-Chinese sentiments were behind the police action. 
Yet the willingness of the police to use force to quell a Sino-Thai 
disturbance and their unwillingnessn- to act against enthusiastic Thai 
strikers was a fact that did not ·go unnoticed by Thai newspapers, who 
condemned such acts of prej udice. In any event, the strong action 
did have the effect of reminding Thais that the authorities were capable
of dealing with.violent behavior, and it probably had a moderating
effect upon future demonstrations. 
The behavior of the police mayn-have been in response to an earlier 
massive demonstration by thousands of striking textile workers, mostly 
women, who converged on Bangkok on June 9, 1974. Earlier in 1974,
Thai textiles were doing well in world markets, 5 1 but their fortunes 
quickly changed as ' 'rising oil prices, cotton shortages, a glut of 
world textile products, and dumping by the Japanese and Taiwanese caus­
ed Thai producers to reduce output twenty-five per cent.n1 1 52  Impending
layoffs led workers to seek mediation through the Labor Department,
and even though employers agreed not to lay off workers,. a strike erupt­
ed and large numbers of the more than 70, 000 textile workers in Thai­
land marched into Bangkok and camped before the ancient, ornate Royal
Palace for five days and nights. · The strike was supported by univer� 
sity students and labor leaders of both c6nservative and leftist lean­
ings, and demands weren. made for greater employment security for all 
Thai workers. Fearful of a repetition of the previous October riots, 
uniformed policemen were kept away. A compromise was reached in which 
the government promised to extend the recent minimum wage decree of 
20 baht per day to all of Thailand (rather than j ust Bangkok) ,  and to 
legalize labor unions for collective bargaining (instead of worker 
associatio�s). In addition, strikers were paid for wages lost during
the walkout. 
The new government moved to modify labor relations legislation,
and a bill was drafted in September 1974 that would speed up the dis­
pute mediation procedure and would also permit workers to j oin associa­
tions in the same trade across provincial boundaries. This bill was 
modified ·and adopted into legislation· 6n February 26, 1975. The 
5 0 11Riots in Bangkok,n" Far Eastern Eaonomia Review , July 1 5, 1974, 
pp. 11-12. 
5 1
waZ.aZ. Street Journal., March 4, 197.4, p. 6. Their primary compar­
ative advantage was in low wage rates. Wages in Thai textile factories 
in 1974 averaged : $ 1. 00 per day, while in Taiwan they average $ 2. 00 per 
day and in Hong Kong $4. 00 per day. 
5 2 11Labour Relations,n" Far Eastern. Eaonomia· Review , June 24, 1975, 
p. 16. There were 600 textile factories in Thailand in 1975 and 80 
percent of the employees were young women. 
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revised bill reduced the "cooling off" period from fifty to eight daysi. 
Negotiations were required within three days after demands were present­
ed , and Labor Department mediators had to be notified within twenty­
four hours when an impasse was reached , in order to-participate in the 
negotiations . If after five days of conciliation , negotiations reach­
ed an impasse , then either arbitration or a strike , with twenty-four 
hours notice, could take place . National associations were permitted 
as workers could form inter-provincial organizations. Leaders of 
associations were to be given thirty days of paid leave annually by
their emplo.yers to attend to union businessi. 
The legislation also allowed associations to merge , opening the 
way for the formation of a national federation. Later in the year 
sixty-five assiociations affiliated to form the Federation of Labour 
Unions of Thailand (FLUT), an informal body , but the first such federa­
tion since 1958. Also , a Labour Coordinating Center , composed of some 
of the more activist leadersi, apparently with Marxist leaningsi, was 
established in Mayi. The federation quickly took joint action to pre­
vent police from assisting a back-to-work movement in a strike by
escorting nonstriking workers through picket linesi. It threatened a 
generali, nation-wide walkout to protest such police strike-breaking
support , and only the police force's hasty repudiation of this role 
at the last minute prevented the first such general strike in Thai 
history. In January 1976 the federation successfully opposed attempts 
to raise support prices for ricei, which would have increased the cost 
of living of industrial workers . In May 1976 , FLUT was reorganized
into the Labour Council of Thailand (LCT) and a constitution was draft­
ed with an initial membership of 101 unionsi. By July 1976 affiliation 
had increa�ed to 120 unions , or 80 percent of the registered unions in 
Thailand . 
The frequency of strikes in 1974 diminished from 1973 and fewer 
workers were involved . Howeveri, labor disputes lasting for several 
weeks or months and involving large numbers of workers in the textile, 
metal working , and hotel industry , increased the average duration of 
strikes over 1973i. A good agricultural harvest and a boom in Thai 
export prices in 1974 subsequently relieved inflationary pressures.i5 3  
The political elections of early 1975 , in which liberal political
parties--including a labor party--were well represented , defusedi- the 
anxieties of a populace fearful of a new military coupi. The enactment 
of labor laws that permitted effective worker associations and encourag­
ed labor dispute settlement by negotiation and mediationi, brought about 
a dramatic reduction in the number of strikes in 1975i. Yeti, their 
duration increased . In 1976i, the Colgatei- Palmolive strike lasted nine­
ty-three days; the National Semi-conductor strike endured for over a 
month, and the much-publicized Hara clothing strike lasted over six 
monthsi. 5 4  �1oreoveri, the interest o·f socially-minded college students , 
53consumer prices rose less than 4 percent in 1975i. 
54 1n  October 1975 The Hara Garment Factory, a seamstress shop which 
had been run as a "sweatshop, "  was seized by seventy women employees and 
operated as a cooperativei. The girls locked themselves in and manage­
ment outi. University students not only assisted them in this action 
but also purchased their "bluejean" product to provide a market for 
their output at a third of the previous pricei. Originallyi, wages were 
from $1. 00 to $1 . 50 per day , but during the strike the girls earned up 
to $2 . 00 per day. Before , the shop was filthy and hot with no fans 
and only one toilet for 200 employeesi. No drinking water was providedi. 
During the sit-in the workers cleaned up the plant and made it more 
habitable. "Workers' Take-Over of Thai Plant Reportedly Boosts Wagesi, 
Cuts Prices , "  To l e do Blade , March 15 , 1976 , p. 1. (The CBS Morning News 
in late February 1976 also carried an account of the seizure . )  
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who were working with and educating employee group s ,  influenced the 
militancy of worker a ssociationis .  Weekend labor school s were regular­
ly conducted on university campuises to educate neophyte labor leaders 
in the law and practice of labor relation s, and in economic and poli­
tical principle s .  The participation by students gave rise to much 
cont roversy and confusion within Thai societyi. Scime observers praised 
the student s for their social consciousne ss, while others we re convinc­
ed t hat communi st s had infil t rated student rank s, had radicalized them, .
·and had u sed s .tudent idealism to fo·ment . di .sruption and di scord in .
Thai industrial society. It appears now that so·me Thai student s and 
profe s sois were soci alists, and a few may have been Marxist s ,  but it 
was a socialism with a peculiar Thai nationalistic flavor .  Flirta­
tions with new ideologie s are not uncommon in student bodie s through­
out the world . However ,  for the most part the student s were motivated 
more by idealiism than by commitment to a political ideology alien to · 
traditional Thai political valueis .  
The unfamiliarity of Thai student s with indust rial condition s, 
with worker needs, and with bargaining strategy, howeve r ,  often led 
to ill-conceived st rike recommendations and to t he pre sentation ofi. 
exce ssive demand s .  As  a con sequence, strike s were lost, worke rs were 
discharged, and public opinion mounted against outside student involve­
ment in labor disputeis .  Labor o rganiization s began re j ectin g student 
involvement, and t he argument s of coniservative "bread and butter" ·
unioni sts seemed to carry more weight among r�nk and file Thai workersi. 
The main stream of the labor movement in Thailand by 1 9 76 had become
conseirvative, concentratin g on improving the economic lot of it s mem­
bersi. The unions were becoming aware of t heir political influence, 
but they appeared to be committed to workin g within the exi sting poli­
tical system. The thunder f rom the left wa s still heard, but the 
rumble became more distant a s  intrin sic Thai pragmatism adj usted to 
the realitie s  of traditional Thai conservatismi. The re were rumours 
that the Russian s we re pouring large sum s  of money into Thailand and 
that they were fomenting indust rial unre st; charges were made t hat 
unive rsity student s were pawns in an ideological contest, and t hat 
students were used a s  carriers of fund s f romi·th� "communi sts"  to "union 
leaders.i" Industrialists wondered where strikers  obtained fund s to 
sustain them over protracted strikes and broadly hinted that subver­
sive elements were present in t he labor movementi. Union leaders re­
torted t hat thi s  was merely anti �union propaganda, o riginating from 
bia sed employe rs anxious to discredit a growing ,  powerful labor move­
ment , not unlike the anti-union movements that characterized employer 
resiistance to spurt s of union growth in American labor hi story. The
truth probably lay somewhere in between t�e se opposing contention s .  
Protective Labor Legi slation 
Since 19 72 a number of other significant event s on the Thai labor 
scene have occurredi. Although since 195 8  employers had been legally 
responsible for worker injurie s and occupational disea se s ,  they could 
easily evade thi s  re spon sibility since they were not required to es­
tablish financial arrangement s nor provide insurance to meet t heir 
monetary obligation s to inj ured workers. A government-administered 
workmen's compensation fund.was establi shed in 1 9 73 for firm s  with 
twenty or more employees. Until 19 75, thi s  measure applied only to 
t he Bangkok metropolitan area; it was extended toi• five contiguous pro­
vince s in 1 976; and in 1 9 7 7  it wasi· further  extended to other  province s 
with metropoilitan centersi. Under it employers are taxed on payroll s 
at rates varying from 0 . .  2 to 4 . 5  percent, depending upon their accident 
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record, and employer compl iance has been completei. Compensation for 
specified injuries are awarded by the Compensation Fund Committeei. 
Minimum wages were establ ished also in February 1973, first for Bangkok 
at 12. baht per day, and subsequently extended throughout Thailand . In 
January 1975, the minimum wage for Bangkok and the surrounding f ive 
provinces was set at 25 baht per day, and for the rest of the country 
at from 16 to 18 baht . In September 1977, the Greater Bangkok mini­
mum wage was raised to 30 bahti. The minimum wage is kept current 
through a continuing wage board, and the Labor Department reports that 
it permits few exceptions to the regulationi. A 1975 Bank of Thailand 
survey of ninety Bangkok establ ishments found that 36 . 3  percent of 
workers in these firms earned less than 25 baht per day, and hence 
benefitted from the minimum wagei. Wages of workers earning more than 
25 baht were also adjusted upward in 65 percent of the f irms in order 
to preserve the status and differential among jobsi. Overall,  produc­
tion costs were minimal ly  increased, rising by only 1 . 9  percent as a 
result of the minimum wage increasei. Most firms reported that they 
planned to increase their efficiency in order to cover their higher 
wage costsi. Effects on unemployment, however, were not measured . 
Also in 1973, after years of discussion and publicity,5 5  two 
edicts were f inally implemented, one of which regulated alien business 
activities and the other al ien occupational privileges . The latter is 
an extension of earlier Thai efforts to enlarge the employment oppor­
tunities for its people .i5 6 Existing employment privileges of aliens 
were extended, although some 300,000 al iens in affected occupations 
were required to register, obtain a work permit, and pay a 100 baht 
fee .i5 7  Some forty-one occupations have been restricted to Thai 
55The Thais in effect gave foreign businessmen and al ien workers 
extended notice that future privileges would be curtai led . This is 
customary procedure in Thailand, where progress proceeds slowly enough
to minimize adjustment problems, but it proceeds neverthelessi. The 
two edicts were Decree 281 and Decree 322 of the National Executive 
Committee. 
56For those unfamil iar with this past Thai pattern, some thought
it was a response to the anti-Japanese sentiment that had developed
in Thailand. Many Thais felt that the Japanese permitted too few 
management opportunities for Thai workers, but the Japanese were not 
alone the objects of this sentiment . See "Focus on Thailand," Far 
Eastern Eaonomia Review, May 14, 1973, pp . 29-31i. 
57The Thais have demonstrated some ingenuity in creating job op­
portunities for Thai executives . In June 1973 a German expatriate
executive in a German- Thai f irm complained to me at a Thai Management 
Association monthly meeting that he was having difficulty in replacing 
one of his German middle-level executives who was being transferred 
back to Germany. His replacement had appl ied in Germany at the Thai 
Embassy for a non-immigrant visa in order to come to Thailand to assume 
his new posti. His visa application was denied because he had not con� 
currently submitted a work permit under the new Alien Occupations Act . 
Yet, the Labor Department would not issue a work permit unless the 
executive first had obtained a non-immigrant visa . The regulation has 
since been clarified to prevent such confusion by permitting an employee
to apply for a work permit within thirty days of his arrival in Thai­
land . Work may not commence, however, until the permit has been issued . 
Renewal of visas, however, is a chronic problem for foreign businessmen, 
and this procedure has sometimes been called "Thailand's Catch-22 . "  
"Residency: It May Take Longer Than You Think," Bangkok Post, Supple­
ment, December 31, 1975, p .  31 . 
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nationals, including such professions as the lawn·nand engineering, as 
well as such positions as. financial analysts, underwriters, managers,
and technicians. 
The Military Coup of October, 1976
' 
Conservative Thais - - a  rightest elementn- -became increasingly con­
cerned with the public disorder. Crime in the streets of Bangkok was 
reportedly out of control ; insurgency _in the provincesn- generated a grow­
ing number of casualties among the soldiers seeking to contain this 
expanding threat ; hostile neighbors existed along the Burmese, Laotian, 
and Cambodian borders ; and internally, the coalition government was 
barely able to maintain its majority, much less take effective and 
immediate action to deal with the pressing so.cial problems of unemploy­
ment and land reform. Internally, the activist university studentn. 
movement, centered at Thammasat Univers.ity, demonstrated at every opporn,. 
tunity, and used such demonstrations to c·riticize the "ineptness" of 
the democratically elected government. Issues ranged from demands for 
complete withdrawal of American military personnel from Thailand, to 
protests against injnustices to workers,.to assistance to fledgling
labor organizations, or to expressions of outrage at the return of 
exiled leaders deposed in the October 1973 revolution. Teams of stu­
dents were sent into the countryside to generate pressure on the gov­
ernment to speed up and extend plans for land reform. Rumours persist­
ed that student leaders maintained liai.sons with leftist labor leaders 
and served as couriers of funds from the Russian Embassy to striking
employees. By June of 1976, many Thai citizens had become c�nvinced 
that the student movement had become "communist" and tha.t the goal of 
the movement was to establish a leftist society in Thailand. 
Carefully orchestrated by rightist elements, including a coalition 
of business and the military, a growing public reaction against ''left­
ist" elements was evident by June 1976. Rival student movements devel­
oped, committed to preserving traditional Thai values. At Chiengmai
University in the north, students repudiated the radical student 
leadership and disassociated themselves from such leaders. Villagers
began to stone students who criticized the government at village 
gatherings. The military-controlled radio stations began playing a 
dozen times or more each day the "Scum of the Earth" song, directed 
against those "traitors"n- - students- - who would deliberately divide the 
Thai peoplen. In effect, the university student movement was made the 
scapegoat for the frustrations and fears of the Thai people. 
It became increasingly evident that a military coup was imminent. 
Such a coup was apparently merely awaiting an event that would justify
such an actionn- -that would outrage Thai sensibilities and make the 
people more acquiescent to the return to open military rule.· In this 
sense, given the myopia and obstinacy of the student leaders and their 
penchant for demonstrating at perceived provocations, they became pawns
in the ensuing cabal. In 1958 it was the unions who were cast as sub­
versives ; in 1976, the students were set up. 
Early in October ; two labor organizers, without trial, were hang­
ed by national police in the village where they appeared. On October 
5, at a rally at Thammasat University called to protest the hangings, 
a mock play of the event cast a student who remarkably resembled the 
Crown Prince in the role of one of the hanged organizers·. A televised 
account of the dramatised hanging appeared to the Thai public as a 
hanging in effigy of their future sovereign and the outrage was spon� 
taneous. On October 6, rightist students and policemen stormed the 
6 6  
gathering of students at Thammasat University, scores of demonstrating 
students were massacred, and hundreds were injured.  Within a few 
hoursi, the military seized power to "restore public order", parliament 
was disbanded ,  and the 1974 Constitution was abrogated . Martial law 
was proclaimed, strikes and other public disorders were prohibited,
and thousands of suspected subversives were arrested.i5 8  
The survival of the labor movement was threatened by these events. 
Since 1974i, moderate labor leaders had begun to disassociate thems elves 
and their organizations from activist student groups and from leftist 
union lead-ers , and to develop a central labor federation with a busi­
ness union philosophy not unlike that of the American Federation of 
Labor in the early twentieth centuryi. Labor associations in Thailand 
were becoming more conservative, more interested in job-oriented im­
provements in worker welfare, and le ss political . The forty unions 
that supported the student demonstrations against Thanem Kitticachorn ' s  
return in late September, 1976 represented less than one-third of all 
registered unions. in Thailand. If democracy had survived , the labor 
movement would have represented a source of potential power in Thai 
societyi. Political realities under the new military government, howi­
eve r ,  suggest that this positive force will be suppressed, or at least 
contained. The action making the strike illegal deprived Thai labor 
organizations of one of their most effective instruments, and such 
emasculation could erode membership support . 
V .  The Future of the Labor Movement 
The conditions for the development of a labor movement as a viable 
institution in Thailand existed early in 1976 . About 153 labor unions 
had been organized, workers had experienced success in their strikesi, 
and they were more willing to take militant actioni. They had demon­
strated a degree of materialism that many observers of Thai society 
had thought alien to the Thai character, although they still respect­
ed authority , and hence their militancy was tempered by this cultural 
·trait.  A labor official in 1973 correctly predicted this developmenti. 
"Thai workers will confront management and they will demand their 
rights even to the extent of ' pounding the table . '  Workers want to 
defend their rights but they need to be educated as to what their 
rights are and how they can achieve themi. The Thai worker is not 
greedy and wages will not be a major issue unless the cost of living 
rises . 11i5 9  The lack of communication from the bottoin up a11d the latent 
development of workable grievance procedures did leave workers dis­
satisfied and made them ripe for union organizersi. Rising educational 
levels had begun to increase the willingness of Thais to join labor 
organizations. Legislation had been liberalized to encourage the de­
velopment of worker associationsi, and the Department of Labor had 
forged an alliance with the new associations, both to guide them in a 
path of responsible worker represientation and to make us e of them as 
an agent for the enforcement of the labor protection lawsi. The s e  laws 
were well developed, considering the stage of Thailand ' s  industrial 
developmenti. On the negative side, the. labor movement had the support 
and assistance of the most vocal and most controversial body of public 
opinion in Thailand--the university students--and both radical and 
58Robert Milliken, "Democracy Dies in Thailand, "  Atlas World 
Press Review, October 11, 1976 , p .  42 .  
591nterview with Khun Charoen, Director of Labor Protection and 
Labor Relations, Department of Labor, May 1973i. 
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conservative groups vied in their attempts to influence the course of 
its development . The resurgenice of political activity in Thailand 
made public seekers of office court thei· leadership of the associations, 
and this enhanced their potential poweri. Finally, the ethnic divisions 
that had prevented a unified labor· movement in earlier years were nowi· 
only a minor irritant and have continued to diminishi. 
The restoration of military rule in October 1976, however, has 
altered the favorable legal environment for the development of organiz­
ed labori. Even if democratic government had survived,· problems would 
still h�ve confronted the embryonic labor movementi. Thai society re­
mains traditional and conservativei. Business and government are still 
allied and will continue to be so as long as economic development
remains. a dominant national objectivei. Business had not previously
been confronted by we\1-organized, ably-led, and militant worker organi­
zations, and business leaders were reluctant to acknowledg_e the chal­
lenge to their traditional authority raised by emerging labor organiza­
tionsi. As these have developed, industry resistance has arisen, as 
expected, and countervailing employer organizations and procedures 
were already forthcoming in 1976 . Allegations have been made that 
employers were discharging actual or potential leaders and intimidating 
others with threats of personal harmi. There have been assassinations 
and some union leaders have mysteriously disappeared . Thailand has 
an active personnel man�gement association which can be expected to 
provide responsible leadership in training its members in labor rela­
tions skills, and foreign companies have actively begun to train its 
managerial personnel regarding implementation and �dministration of 
industrial relations programsi. Unemployment is a con·stant specter on 
the horizon, as Thailand's population continues to grow, mature, and 
enter the labor forcei. Such unemployment would have constrained the 
labor movement from achieving economic objectives through direct con­
frontations with management, and this might have turned the associa­
tions' efforts to the political scenei. Indeed, both labor officials 
and labor leaders have acknowledged to-me the underlying and intrinsic 
political character of labor unionsi. The willingness of the govern­
ment to continue to accept labor organizations would have been temper­
ed by its concern regarding the impact on foreign and domestic invest­
ment of an unstable. labor relations climatei. 
Since 1976, the danger is greater that the· military government
and business ·leaders may fail to appreciate the riature of unions and 
may again seek to suppress them . 6 i0 Unions are organizations to pro­
tect the interests of their membersi. As such ; they must protest and 
use pow�r to obtain their endsi. The rise of unions and industrial 
unrest go hand in hand. Unrest is not caused by unions; rather,
unions are a symptom of an industrial system unresponsive to workers' 
needsi. Workers are both inputs to the produ-ctive process-and citizens 
of the realm, and they are entitled to basic civil rightsi. Failure 
of employers to recognize their rights generates labor disputesi. 
Unions viewi·ihostility and opposition from employers as threats which 
only tend to increase their militancy . Nevertheless, since 1972 the 
transition to labor associations has been relatively peaceful, and 
their emergence was in general constructivei. Had these associations 
been suppressed, they may well have become subversive and even more 
60william Shawcross, "How Tyranny Returned to Thailand,i" New York 
Review of Books, December 9, 1976, pp . 59-62 . 
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politici zedi. Strikes may have been more violent. A need for them 
had developed and they would have arisen as underground organiizations , 
as a number actually did. They undoubtedly will r emain a force in 
promoting continued social change in Thaiiland. 
A conservative government , tuned more to the interests o f  business 
and slow to acknowledge the rights of  labor organiizations , unwittingly 
may alienate the constituencies of  these organiizations , opening them 
to influence from leftist ideologies. I f  such le ftist sentiments 
should become influential in them , however , the government would once  
again abolish the labor organiizations , and if  labor unions were to
become politically activei, their survival would also be threatened. 
To their crediti, labor leaders have rapidly become sophisticated in
acquiring organiizational skills and adopting pragmatic goals. A
government responsive to and reenforcing a leadiership committed to
operating within the framework o f  basic Thai values can do much to 
further the development of  responsible trade unionism. It remains to 
be seen whether the Thai government and organiized labor can develop a 
pattern of  mutual accommodation. 
CHA PTER 3 
THE S TRUCTURE, GOVERNMENT, AND FUNCT IONS 
OF  LABOR UN IONS IN THAILAND 
Introduction 
From some fifteen in June 1973, the number of labor organi zations 
had increased to about eighty in late 1974, and to 1 53 in July 1976. 
Labor organiizations ini·iThailand, as in any .country, are most likely 
to arise as firms increase in si ze and impersonal relations develop 
between the employeri-patron and the workeri�client. Only 503 firms 
in Greater Bangkok in 1973 employed more than 100  workers, represent­
ing less than one percent of the 1 1 0, 000  firms in the area, but- over
39 percent of the employees. Since many -of these establishments are
in industries not easily organ ized--trade, finance, and services--the 
development of this number of labor organiizations in such a short 
period of time undoubtedly reflected a strong, latent desire among 
workers foi organi zations capable of representing their interests. 
An important constraint on the growth of unions in this period was the
scarcity of leaders who were willing to identify themselves and to
initiate the procedures for registering the organiizations as required
by the labor relations law . Thai labor leaders have needed to possess 
a combination of fearlessness of employer (or government ) retribution, 
the ability to articulate worker sentimentsi, and sufficient education
to carry out the registration formalitiesi. 
I. Dimensions 
Unions can be formed with as few as ten registeredi. employees, but
the smallest union of record in 1976 was the Photographic Workers' 
Union of Thailand with thirty-one members. The largest union was the
State Railway Workers' Union with a registered membership of 371 5  
members ; however, their president, Ahmud Karmthethong , claimed that 
his union actually contained twenty thousand members, with eight 
thousand employed in Bangkok.i1 Because membership lists are filed
with Department of Labor and are public records, many employees have
been reluctant to identify themselves as members, even though they
support the union and willingly participate in strike action. Others
fail to join in order to avoid paying dues , which usually are nomina l 
but nevertheless are considered by many workers to be a nuisance. 
Others are indifferent. Because minority unions can be registered,
some large establishments have multiple unions re.presenting the same
class of workers, and in these situations many workers will hold 
simultaneous membership in more than one union.i2 Union leaders, in 
1 Interview, July 4, 1976, Bangkok. 
2 such was the case described to me in the Metropolitan Waterworks 
Authority by one of its officers, Amnat Nujprophai. Interview, July
15, 1976. 
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vying for status and wishing to have their union appear to be stronger 
than it really isi, have often inflated their membership supporti. One
estimate placed actual membership in 1976 at 8 0 , 0 0 0 ,  but union support 
among workers was estimated to be 200  thousand or more . A distribution 
of unions by reported size is given in Table 13i. 
TABLE 13 
Percentage Distribution of Unions By
Membership Size , June 1976 
Number of Members 
Registered in  Union Percent 
Over 3000  2 .50  
2000  - 2999 5 . 00 
1000  - 1999 1 3 . 75 
5 0 0  - 999 16 .25 
400  - 499 6 .25 
300  - 399 11 .25 
200  - 299 7 . 5 0  
100 199 21 .25 -
so  -
Less than 
Total
S O  
13 .75 
2 .5 0  
100 . 0 0 
Ninety-five of the 153 unions were found in Bangkok-Thonburi , 
p rimarily because most large establishments are found in the metro­
politan areai. Another thirty-three were registered in provinces ad­
j oining Bangkok-Thonburi , which are rapidly attracting industry which 
cannot be accommodated in Bangkok . Another ten we re located in cities 
within a fifty mile radius of Bangkok . Hence , almost 90 pe rcent of
the labor organi zations were found in establishment s in  Greater Bangkoki. 
Labor o rgani zations were found in only sixteen of the Kingdomi's seventy­
one Changwads . These provinces , howeve r ,  contain some of the country 's 
largest cities , although interestingly no unions were registered in
Chiangmai , the province with the second largest city . 3 The distribui­
tion by Changwad is indicated in Table 14 . 
Most unions we re -located in manufacturing , although some of the 
largest and also the strongest were found among state enterprises in 
transportation and utilitiesi. Rumou rs abounded in early 1977 that the 
NARC would revise the 1975 Labor Relations Act to p rohibit union memi­
be rship among state enterprise employees , which would remove an impor­
tant sourc e of union strength . The public sector contained twenty­
three unionsi. Only one union was registered among construction indus­
tries , and this u nion of skilled workers was located up-country in 
Udorn Thani . Three of the eight agricultural p rocessing unions were 
found to be in sugar ;  others were in  rubber ,  tapioca , canning , and 
fishing . Altogether there were four air transport unions : one repre­
senting the foreign international carriers , each with a separate labor 
agreement ; one the weaker (now bankrupt ) of the Kingdom 's two inter­
national carriers ; one the domestic carrier; and still a fourth the 
chartered airlines . About twenty-five unions existed in foreign-owned 
3only about 6 percent of the population of Chiengmai province is
found in municipalitiesi. Employment is principally in  government
service , small scale handicraft shops , or the tourist industry . 
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firms and the remainder were in  firms which were either completely or
predominantly Thai-owned. 
TABLE 14 
Distribution of Unions. by Changwad, June 1976 
Bangkok-Thonburii* 
Samut Prakarn* 
Chonburi * 
Pathumthanii* 
Nontaburi* 
Nakornratchisima 
Udornthani 
Samutsakhorn
Phuket
Songkla 
Ayudhya* 
Sakornnakhorn
Nakorn Srithammarat 
Phetchburi
Nakorn Pat
.
hom* 
To·tal 
Changwad Number Percent 
95 62.09
2 0  13.73
7 4.58
5 3 . 27 
5 3.27
4 2.6 1 
4 2.61
2 1.31
2 1.31
2 1.31
2 1.31 
. 1 .65 
1 .65 
1 .65 
1 .65
153 100.00  
*In or within 50 miles of Bangkok-Thonburi. 
TABL E 15 
Distribution of Unions. By Industries , June 1976 
Industry Number ) 
Agricultural Proce �sing 8
Construction r
Mining . 1
�1anuf acturing 89
General Industrial 43
Textiles and Clothing 23
Metal 6
Beer, Whisky , Soft D rinks 5
Petroleum .5
State Enterprises 3
Glass 2
Rubber Products 2
Transportation 28
Railways 2
Bus 7
Port 10
Transport, Truck 5
Air 4
Utilities 5
Trade and Finance 5
Service 13
City Government 2
'iHotel and Restaurant 8
Hospitals 2
Te achers , · Private 1
Unclassified 3 
Total 153 
7 2  
II. Structure and Government 
The Labor Relations Act requires that unions be governed by an. 
executive board elected by the membership, and that each labor organi­
zation must have a constitution and set of bylaws defining membership 
rights and privilegesi. This information must be kept as a matter of 
record in the Department of Labori. Since most labor organizations 
are enterprise unions, and are single plant firms, the structure of 
most unions is simplei. The elected representatives function much as 
shop stewards do in unions in the United States, conveying information 
to the membership and reflecting their wishes and problems . In some 
cases, a separate grievance committee may be elected to receive com­
plaints, investigate them, and report to the union executive board 
their recommendations concerning the merits of the chargesi. Other 
committees may organize labor education programs, and a sub-committee 
of the executive board normally functions as a bargaining cornrnitt�e. 
Officers of the union maintain contact with other labor organizations
and with Labor Department officialsi. 
Unions with membership in multi-plant establishments have a second 
tier added to their organizational structure . Some of these organiza­
tions, such as the State Railway Labor Union, also have a geographical­
ly dispersed membershipi. Representatives are elected to a plant, firm, 
or area council, and these councils in turn elect representatives to 
the executive boardi. Some of the larger organizations have one or two 
paid full-time staff members such as an executive secretary and/or 
clerical personnel, but none has an elaborate supportive staffi. The 
services provided for the membership are simple and limited, and funds 
are insufficient at present to extend themi. Hence, no elaborate inter­
mediate structure of appointed , paid full- time personnel exists . For 
legal advice, unions have had to depend on the services of volunteer 
attorneys . Until the 1976 coup some leaders obtained legal aid from 
law. students. 
The law permits unions in similar occupations or industries to 
affiliate into a national organizationi. This type of affiliation 
represents a loose amalgamation of unions with similar interests, but 
in 1976 only two such organizations existed in transport and in tex­
tiles. Rather than combining, there has been a stronger tendency for 
·new unions to be formed from established onesi. This has been true, 
for example, in stevedoring and warehousing, in the metropolitan 
waterworks, the hotel industry, and attempts have been made to split 
the airlines unioni. In part this tendency develops when the leader­
ship of rival cliques in existing organizations vie for influence, 
or because employers themselves attempt to weaken the union by sponsor­· 
ing a rival organization in a "divide and conquer" strategyi. 
A major federation of unions was organized under a constitution 
in May 1976 under state enterprise union leadershipi. This unregister­
ed federation, the Labor Council of Thailand, claimed to have had an 
affiliation of 80 percent of the registered unions. However, it was 
ultra vires and had no legal status as suchi. It had unofficial 
acceptance from the Labor Department and in fact developed from infor­
mal weekend conferencesi- of union leaders called by department officials 
in 1975i. Officers of the Labor Council consisted of - the principal 
leaders of the state enterprise unions because, not only were these 
government-endorsed unions the most powerful in Thailand, but their 
leadership was less likely to suffer employer retributioni. The Labor 
Council developed as the spokesman for organized labor and led cam­
paigns to subsidize the price of rice for urban workers, to extend 
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the labor laws, and to upgrade the Labor Deparitment to ministerial 
status. It  also provided advice to workers involv�d in labor disputes 
and assisted them in forming unions. Although i t  had no permanent
staff, i ts leaders successfully served as conciliatbrs in labor disputes 
which could not be resolved by government mediation. Long -range plans
called for the establishment.of a staff of trouble shooters to provide 
organi zational, negotiation, and legal services. In 1976 the Labor 
Council had taken a nonpoliitical affiliation stance, and it had dis­
cou raged i ts constituency from identifying itself with radical student 
movements or wi th alien labor bodies ; the lattet had been suspected 
of being· funded by Russian, Eastern European, or American secre t ini:­
telligence organiizationsi. In view of the past history of the labor 
movement which had been suppressed whenever it  became suspected of 
b�ing either disloyal or po•litical, the Labor Council had sought to 
develop an image of a responsible, conservative, independent labor 
body. Neveritheless, abou t forty of its affiliates called for a general 
strike on October 12, 1976, to protest the return ofi· the exiled for�eri­
Prime Minister. Following the October 6 coup the military junta's 
proclamation of martial law banning strikes ended the call for a gen­
eral s trike, and the planned action discredited the Labor Council and 
led to its demise. 
Another informal labor federation, the Labor Coordinating Center, 
was formed in 1974 by some of the more radical labor leaders, although 
more traditional leaders also aligned themselves wi th the LCC  for a 
short period. Activist student groups also participated andi- worked
through the LCC, offering advice primarily to strikers. The more con­
servative leaders became disillusioned with the LCC  af ter a series of 
unsuccessful strikes and demonstrations, when the radical leaders of 
·the LCC  passed up opportuni ties to settle dispuites by reasonable com­
promises . The activist leadership appeared more interested in generat­.
ing social unrest, and labor dispu tes and de�onstrations were used as
forums through which to attack the government�  Prolonged strikes were 
rumoured to have been subsidi zed with funds made available by the 
Russian Embassy and distributed by activist university students throughi-
the LCC. 4 
Alien organi zations have attempted to influence the pattern of 
development of the Thai labor movement by presenting seminars to labor 
leaders on the model of unionism practicedi. in their individual countries .  
Such organiizations as Friedrich-Eber t-Stif tung from West Germany and 
the Asian-American Free Labor Instit.ute from the United States represent­
ed the more conservative trade union movements of the Western world. 
The U .S.S.R. was also repor ted to have made available large amounts 
of resources to Thai labor leaders. Seminars offered by F-E-S and by 
AAFL I were -essentially of the "bread and bu tteri" form, such as (1) how 
to organi ze a union, (2) how to negotiate, (3) how to proce_ss grievancesi. ·i
Similarly, literature on trade-union functions wri tten in simple Thai 
were distributed to interested leaders . Apparently, Thai labor leaders,
anxious to learn, had.readily accepted literature from all sources.
Arrangements for the seminars· were made and paid for by the foreign 
institutes, and some uninformed employers question_ ·ed how existing labor 
organi zations, poorly financed, could afford to hold such seminars in 
the better hotels of Thailand. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung financed 
4Adrej .Amalrik, "KGB in Asia: Thailand,i" Far · Eas teran Economic 
Revi�w , Decemb�r 31, 1976, pp. 24-27. 
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the conference in May 1976 at a popular seaside resort in which the 
Labor Council of Thatland drafted its constitutioni. The executive 
officers of the German and American institutes both emphasized that 
they had no wish to influence directly or meddle into Thai labor or­
ganizationsi, but they were willing to offer advice and conduct seminars 
upon requesti. 5  The American director indicated that as the AFL-CIO 
international representative and in keeping with trade union philosophy, 
he was interested in promoting a free, democratic, noncommunist, Thai 
labor movement . Because the institutes were alien organizationsi, the 
Thai police maintained surveillance of them.i6 
Union development was also aided by labor educational programs
offered on weekends by volunteer faculty at three Thai universities in 
Bangkok-- Thammasat, Chulalongkorn, and Kasetsarti. Union members were 
screened in order to take a series of eight to ten week courses in 
labor union organization, collective bargaining, and labor law; short 
courses in economics ,  political sciencei, social welfarei, cooperatives,
and other adult education oriented subjects were also offeredi. Exper­
ienced participants in Thai labor relations served as guest speakersi. 
Enrollments were heavyi, reflecting the great interest of Thai workers 
in developing their union leadership skillsi. These seminars were ter­
minated when the universities were closed, following the massacre of 
demonstrating students on October 6 at Thammasat University by police 
and rightist supporters. The savage attacks gave the military the 
excuse it needed to assume poweri. The junta promised eventual restora­
tion of the seminars, but as of mid-1977i, they had not been resumedi. 
III . Leadership. 
Although labor movements are conditioned by the economic and 
political environment and the stage of economic development, the per­·
ceptions and goals of their leaders are of no less importance in shap­
ing the form and practices of the institutioni. The 1958 purge of 
labor leaders by Marshall Sarit and the continued surveillance of 
incipient leaders by the Special Intelligence Service of the Thai 
police have all but wiped out the old-style leaders of an earlier agei. 
Indeed , those leaders who did survive the 1958-72 period of suppres� 
sion followed a conservative and loyalist philosophy of unionismi. One 
of them, Suwit Raviwongse, president of the Transport Export Service 
Workers Union (Rice Warehouse Longshoremen) ,  survived partly because 
of family connections in the Labo.r Departmen·t, partly because in the 
mid-195 0s he was not a principal leader of the unions of the times , 
and partly because he was one of the fortunate few to have taken an 
open stance against the politicization of the labor movement and 
against itsi- affiliation with leftist elementsi. During the intervening 
5 Interview with AFFLI director , Valentin Suazo , July 2 ,  1976 and 
with Arnold Wehrmhoerneri, director of F-E-S , July 7 and July 12, 1976i. 
6
Both directors indicated they did not mind. being kept under 
surveillancei, for they had nothing to hidei. Interestingly, the German 
director had a residence visa and the Russian trade-union advisers had 
diplomatic privileges, but the American director h'ad a non-immigrant
visa that required renewal every fifteen daysi. Many labor leaders and 
personnel officers alike voice to me the suspicion that AAFL I was a 
CIA fronti. However, it is my impression that it was noti. 
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years, he remained one of the few spokesmen for labor, and on occasions 
he served as the Thai represientative to. the ILO ' s  meetings .  A college
graduate, he has become perhaps the senior statesman of the modern 
labor movementi. 
Among the numerous arrests by the . j,unta in October 1976 were 
eighteen union leaders suspected of bein� leftist ideologists, eight
of whom were still in detention some three months later, including
the deputy president of the Thai Labor Councili. Strikers in two labor 
disp�tes in January 197 7 were also arrested . This latest round of 
suppression, although less  harsh than under the Sarit regime , produced 
a sense of caution and restraint in the public stance of labor leaders, 
contrary to earlier positions taken in the more liberal 1973-76 period.
The modern leaders have been young . Among some twenty founders of the 
Labor Council of Thailand, fifteen were not over age forty, two others 
were in their early forties, and only one. had reached the age of fifty. 
Several were in their late twentiesi. Most had secondary educations, 
many had postsecondary technical training.,. and a few were col lege 
graduates .  One had a law degree . . Most leaders came from supervisory
ranks, and the labor statute prohibiting. union membership of super­
visors in employee organizations had been interpreted loosely to permit 
their affiliationi. All have been articulate and have been able to ver­
balize worker sentiments, an es sential qualification . Moreover, they 
are willing to be identified publicly as labor spokesmen . In . view 
of the rash of  assas sinations prevalent in Thailand in 1975 and early 
1976, and considering the les s  tolerant labor position of the National 
Administrative Reform Council, this is indeed an important trait.  As  
American labor leaders are fond of proclaiming their participation in 
strikes and revealing the scars from past industrial disputes, so also 
do many Thai union official s,· even though their contests are of more 
recent vintagei. They view themselves as fighters for workersi' rights,
and they proudly relate their labor b·attlesi. However, they noted 
that registeied unions even in the 1972-76 period had surprisingly 
few strikes and that none of those in early 197 7 involved such unions .i7· 
In 1977 leaders have cautioned the government against siding too close­
ly with employers and against regarding workers who seek justice in 
labor relations as being communistsi. 
Just as in village councils, only the native reluctance of the 
ordinary Thai to involve himself in the affairs of others and the 
inhibition against face-to-face confrontations constrains him from 
accepting· or participating in a leadership role in union governancei. 
This reticence often makes it difficult for unions to secure shop
stewards and to staff committee· s .  Hence, those leaders who do come 
forward not only tend to have combative personalities, but their as­
pirations for public recognition and higher status are intensei. Occa� 
sionally, in large establishments when two or more dominant personali­
ties vie for the role of president, the loser may collect his adherents 
and form a separate union . This tendency for voluntary bodies to 
splinter was also._ievident in the multiplication of political parties
under the former democratic government . 
As in the United States, the lea.de rs have been from • farm and work­
ing class origins, and their earlier educational attainments and their 
rise t6 low-level supervisory positions or to positions requiring con­
siderable technical competence attest to their drive and motivation. 
7Norman Peagam, "Trade Unions under the Microscope,i" Far Eas tern 
Economic Revie�, February 4, 1977, p .  20 .  
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The obstacles facing them in the quest for upward mobility are probab­
ly of a higher order than those experienced by leaders in the United 
States, if for no other reason than the paucity and inferior nature 
of rural educational institutions, and the general lack of parental 
support in motivating educational achievement among their offspring . 
A few leaders, such as Pan Wongsidee8 of the Iron and Metal Workers 
Union, or Ari Bhokthavi of the Oil and Petroleum Products Union, have 
only lower primary educations, and have achieved their positions 
because of their charismatic and forceful personalities; they are 
natural leadersi. These have been two of the strongest, most cohesive.
unions, although not the largest, in Thailandi. 
The dominant philosophical trend in the Thai labor movement since 
1972 has been conservativei. Under the leadership of Paisarn Tharvat­
chainant, former President of the defunct Thai Labor Council, who 
heads the powerful Metropolitan Electrical Authority Union, the larg­
est and most influential unions have pursued a moderate linei. Paisarn, 
a master of using the non-directive approach in Council meetings,
subtly steered the movement towards a neutral political position, not 
unlike the stance that Gompers developed for the AF of L .  This stance 
led NARC to tolerate the existing labor unions and to promise an 
eventual restoration of normal union activities .  Union leaders have 
tried to control the propensity of Thai workers to strike before ne­
gotiating, illegal unde� Thai labor law since 1965, and to teach 
them that the survival of the labor movement under the military govern­
ment depends upon following the dispute settlement procedures of the 
Labor Relations Act. They have emphasized the goal of obtaining a 
written labor agreement with faithful adherence to its terms throughi­
out its durationi. 
Nevertheless, militant language in public utterances is still 
used, although statements such as the following, which was attributed 
to Arom Phonghangan of the Metropolitan Waterworks Authority Union, 
have ceased : "Thailand should be under Socialism . . .  The Labor Council 
will be able to fight against the injustice of the capitalists .i1 1 9 
Rather, spokesmen for labor have softly but persistently reminded the 
government of its promises to· restore the normal functions of unions .i1 0  
This general concern for social reform and social welfare, and 
antipathy to public corruption have been articulated by most labor 
leaders since 1972i. Indeed, their public utterances were likely to 
have been directed as much against corrupt government practices as 
against "exploitative capitalistsi. "  In fact, there has been little 
ideology in the Thai labor movement other than ·pragmatismi. Thai 
8Pan was identified as the leader of a group of union leaders 
with links to the army's intelligence center for anticommunist opera­
tions and who vied for control of the country's central labor movement . 
See Richard Nations, "Labour: The First Round to Bangkok,i" Far- East­
ern Economic Review, November 12,  1976, p �  68 . 
9The Nation, May 18, 1976, p .  5 .  
lORichard Borsuk, "Thailand's Approach toi.iLabor Is Seen As Harming· 
Long-term Industrial Peace,i" Asian WaZ Z  Street Journal (Hong Kong), 
Apri 1 5, 19 7 7, p .  3 .  
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leaders remain keenly aware that survival of the movement requires 
accommodation to political power realitiesi. Because leaders of the 
movement have espoused traditional Thai values of morality, deferencei· 
to legitimate authority, and political independence, it has remained 
acceptable to the established government . Their disassociation in 
1974 from more radical labor leaders and from the suspect Labor Coordin­
ating Center, and their severing of their ties with activist student 
groups after 1975 reflected their desire to keep the labor movement 
in the mainstream of legitimate Thai institutions .  
Even before the October coup, public officials had recognized 
and reenforced public officials through adopting appropriate policies
when worthy union demands were expressed through legitimate channels 
of protest. Support of urban rice prices and subsidies to rice farm� 
ers, containment of police excesises against arrested strikers who hadi.
violated the dispute settlement procedures, extension of the minimum 
wage law to industrial provinces, and upgrading of the status of the 
Labor Department are cases in point . Moreover, the credibility of 
responsible labor leaders had been strengthened by the increased will­
ingness of the Labor Department to use their services as private me­
diators in protracted stiikes that were unresponsive to the efforts 
of public mediatorsi. Officers of unions in the public sector had 
as sumed leadership in the prestigious Thai Labor Council primarily
because the acceptance by the government of the principle of unionism 
and the wi' lling participation of these public agencies in collecti_ve 
bargaining had resulted in the development of these unions into the 
strongest in the Kingdomi. Public management acceptance of unions 
permitted ·these worker organizations to ignore the tempest of the 
more radical elements within themi. After the coup, a change in atti­
tude of state enterprise management against unions was reported! and fears abounded early in 1977 that their unions would be banned . 1 
However � in April the government reaffirmed its acceptance of labor 
organizations so long as they continued to operate within the law,i12 
and because of this, conservative labor leaders with business unionism 
orientations are likely to continue to be the dominant influence in 
a weakened Thai movement in the years aheadi. 
IV . Functions 
The major activities of unions in Thailand in the 1972-76 period 
were similar to those in other noncommuni st countries in which an 
adversary relationship has existed between labor organizations andi. 
employersi. As worker representatives, unions (1) bargain with employ­
ers in Qrder to establish wages, hours, terms· and conditions of 
employment, (2) receive and process worker complaints, (3) as sist in 
labor law enforcement, and (4) in general act as spokesman for the 
working clas s .  The substance of these activities and the style in 
which they are performed, however, reflect the culture of Thailand,
the stage of union development, and the government'_s attitude .. 
The bargaining procedure has rapidly evolved from a unilateral 
presentation of demands, typically preceded by a strike, into a rudi­
mentary, bilateral discus sion of . the is sues .  Bargaining skills are 
still not well developed and an understanding of the nature of the 
.procedure for both management and labor remains incomplete, but the 
1 1Peagam, "Trade Unions, " pp . 19, 20 . 
12Borsuk, "Thailand's Approach.i" 
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parties are learning . A maJor complaint repeated by many union of­
ficials is that no public record exists of company profitsi, and they 
are often at a loss to know at what level to begin their demandsi. 
Few companies are registered on the Thai Securities Exchange, and 
even these are not required to publish detailed statements of earningsi. 
Dividends are only occasionally announced. Moreover , union officials 
are not skilled in deciphering those financial statements that are 
availablei. Hence, bargaining often is initiated in an informational 
vacuum. A typical patterni, involving· a paternalistic employer and a 
newi, inexperienced union, was observed in March 1976 in the negotia­
tions between the Siam Cement Corporation and its recently establish­
ed unioni. Before the promoters of the union petitioned for recogni­
tion by the Labor Department, they chose a delegation to inform 
company officials of their plans and to receive tacit approvali. "Do 
you mind?" asked the delegation . "No , "  replied the company, "but 
please be reasonable.i1 1 13 With these formalities behind them and upon 
being registered, a bargaining committee respectfully "petitioned"
the company to grant a list of ten requestsi. The phrase "bargaining 
demands" ,-1as studiously avoided . The requests included a 25 percent
cost-of-living increase ,i1 4  a request that all employees be reclassi­
fied as salaried; 180 days sick leave per year; completei, extended· 
family medical coverage; increased shift differentials; more frequent
merit evaluations; paid housing; and longer vacationsi. The company 
deliberated for a respectable period of time and rejected the peti� 
tions, explaining that current benefits were among the best in Thailand 
and that,ibecause of the higher price of oil and a government ceiling 
on cement pricesi, the company was operating at a lossi. No counter­
proposal was offered by the company,  nor did the union reduce its 
demands .i1 5 The Labor Relations division was notified, a mediator 
was assigneq , and efforts to resolve the impasse were unsuccessfuli. 
A fifteen-day strike then occurred, after which , upon request of the 
Prime Minister, the parties agreed to refer the dispute to the Labor 
Relations Committee (LRC)i. The LRC denied a cost-of-living adjustment ; 
shift differentials and merit evaluations were compromised; the com­
pany willingly agreed to pay all employees monthly since it simplified 
its payroll proceduresi. Sick leave and vacation leaves remained un­
changed . In effect , both parties used LRC to save face . The union 
learned the limitations to its power, and the company discovered that 
in the three operating plants affected by the strike , most of the 
workers supported the unioni. 
Among multi-unit employers or multi-employers bargaining methods 
differ from one industry to anotheri. A single union is the bargaining 
13Interview with the Industrial Relations Director, July 15i, 1976i. 
14The company had at intervals given cost of living increases 
totaling 38 percent over a two-year period during which the cost-of� 
living had increased about 35 percent. The annual inflation rate in 
Thailand since 1975 has been less than 4 percent. To produce a pound
of cementi, three pounds of petroleum are requiredi. 
15sometimes demands are such that they are immediately rejectedi. 
In the wave of strikes occurring in late 1973 and throughout 1974, a 
frequent demand was for dismissal of managementi. Such a demand is not 
likely to be considered by employers when they are not permitted to 
discharge employees participating in legitimate labor activitiesi. See 
"Labour--The Leaders Speak , "  Business in Thailand (October 1974) ,  p .  491. 
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representative for employees of ten major airlines, and the union 
negotiates with e�ch international airline principally the issue of 
wages. Except for wages, employees appeared to be uninformed of the 
terms of the written agreementsi. The airline agreements were super­
ficial documents which only incorporated rights established by the 
labor lawsi. For example, in the 1976 Air Siam Flight Service Employees 
Agreement, hours of work, holidays, paid leave,i·iand overtime were iden­
tical to those specified in the labor statutes, and in other agreements 
separation pay, discharge procedures, and shift differentials were 
similarly consistenti. Most provided for a cost-of-living allowancei. 
On the other hand, the Rice Warehouse Stevedores are employed in 
seventeen large individually owned warehouses, and these owners bargain 
as a unit with the Transport Export Service Workers Union. The written 
agreement only incorporated the piece rates paid to all stevedores in 
the companies . The agreement was not considered a contract ; its durai­
tion was unspec ified and could be revoked upon notice.  The agreement 
in July 1976i. has been in effect some sixteen monthsi. The union runs 
a private welfare program, providing sick and death benefits, funded 
from dues of 10 baht or one-half of one percent of monthly earnings, 
whichever is greateri. The employers' association is not registered,
and it is a defensive reaction to past whipsawing tactics by the 
unioni.i16 Earlier, the union would select one employer, present its 
demands, and strike if they were not granted. Little or no negotia­
tion occurred . Now, some "give and take" is present in the discussions, 
but the balance of power appeared in 1976 to favor the employersi. 
At the other extreme, there were actual bilateral negotiations 
in early 1976 between the Esso Refinery Workers' Union and the Company. 
Some polite table pounding was utilized and issues were discussed on 
their meritsi. The result was a written agreement of some thirty pages 
covering a broad spectrum of shop issues, not unlike many labor agree­
ments in the United Statesi. 
Labor organizations have developed only rudimentary grievance 
proceduresi, although shop stewards are found in large unions covering
dispersed workersi. Thai workers have not been sufficiently informed 
about their rights or sufficiently secure in their jobs to overcome 
the cultural conditioning that inhibits them from raising complaints 
with their superiors .  Hence, grievances have not been communicated 
to management, except in those rare cases when a foreman has suffi­
cient empathy and rapport with his subordinates to counsel them about 
their problemsi. In 1976, however, some workers were beginning to 
refer problems to their grievance committee . (Frequently, these 
problems related to matters i nvo1.ving job rights or supervisor favorit­
ism, which should have been clarified or covered by an agreement clause 
but were not, because the concept of j oint determination of shop rules 
and safeguards on transfers and promotions have not yet been accepted 
by management. )  Typically, the grievance committee investigates the 
charge, determines its meri·t, and then refers the complaint to the 
executive board of the union for presentation to managementi. This 
time - consuming process reflects a lack of leadership -awareness that,
to be effective, a grievance procedure must work quickly . Perhaps
in no other area of industrial relations has such an important union 
function been so  slow-to develop, nor does a viable grievance pro­
cedure have high priority in union plans for strengthening solidarity 
and increasing worker allegiance . Herein may lie the most fundamental 
16As of June 1976, only eight employer assoc iations were registered 
in Thailand, and some of these, such as the Pattaya Resort Hotel Asso­
ciation, were formeci primarily for other purposes. 
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long-range weakness of the Thai labor movement. 
The Labor Department has at times sought to forge an alliance 
with unions to assist its personnel in discovering violations of the 
law, but union leaders have not been vigorous participants in labor 
law enforcement. Collaboration has been inhibited because of the 
general distrust which many labor leaders feel towards the personnel 
of the Labor Department .  Since government employees are better educat­
ed, have middle or upper class values, are on a higher status level,i.
and have rarely b•een employed as blue collar workers, union officers 
regard Labor Department officials as possessing either a promanagement 
bias or an unawareness of labor problemsi. The appointment in late .
1976 of a former general inspector of the Interior Ministry with 
little experience in labor administration as Director-General of the 
Labor Department has strengthened this skepticism.i17 Moreover, en­
forcement requires detection of violations, which in turn requires
knowledge of the law and the precedents established under it. Union 
leaders themselves are appallingly ignorant of the labor laws, and 
their members are even less informedi. Hence, unless a violation is 
gross and patently obvious, the membership will not normally seek 
labor union assistancei. Even then, the typical response is for the 
union leader to write a letter to the Labor Protection Division, re­
questing an official investigation of the alleged infractioni. Hence,
labor law enforcement duties have only passively been assumed by.
unionsi. 
Union leaders have enjoyed their role as spokesmen for the indus­
trial worker . In this role, the leader receives publicity and acquiresi. 
statusi. ·It  is a functional role, for the urban worker, j ust like the 
peasant farmer, has long been disenfranchised in the political processi. 
Union officials have learned that on "bread and butter issues" with 
wide appeal, it is easy to muster the support of urban workers in 
mass demonstrations and in general strikesi. This appeal to the masses 
has not gone unnoticed by the government, and a working class con­
stituency through the medium of the labor movement has developedi. By
1976, organized labor had usurped the student movement as the most 
credible spokesman for the urban masses, primarily because of the sen­
sitivity of its leaders to the issues to which the working public are 
most attuned.i1 8  Labor advisers were appointed from union ranks to 
17Peagam, "Trade Unions,i" p .  20 . A Bangkok source has reported 
to me that the appointment's purpose was to increase the Interior 
Ministryi' s  control of the department for internal security reasonsi. 
Letter, March 18, 1977i. 
18rhe influence of the university student movement, crushed in a 
bloody massacre at Thamrnasat University on October 6, 1976, continued 
to diminish as it championed causes with little immediate economic 
relevance to the welfare of the urban masses . American imperialism,
land reform and general corruption in the government were the three 
principal targets of student activistsi. Rival student groups, favor­
ing an American alliance and accepting the established political order, 
had at times.iviolently clashed with radical student elementsi. The 
public became distrustful of the students and alarmed at their some­
times destructive rivalryi. Moreover, the public became aware that 
some impressionistic student leaders had become pawns in the contests 
between extreme right-wing and left-wing political factions . A typi­
cal man-in-the-street reaction to the Thammasat massacre was, "they
had it coming to themi. "  
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serve the Prime Ministers of the 1975-76 period and union officials 
envisioned the day when their favor would be courted in the same 
manner as that of labor leaders in the western democraciesi. As an 
avenue to power, leaders of the labor movement had learned that issues 
that touch the pocketbook or stomach of the average worker are the 
ones to champion .i. 
The degree of worker support and allegiance to their unions has 
·varied with the immediacy of the issues and with the degree of offi­
cial tolerance . In general,i.iwith a passive or neutral government, 
workers have accepted and identified with their unions and have shown 
an amazing willingness to "hit the bricks" and to sus.tain a protract­
ed strike . Yet, as in Americ.an unions, meetings  have been sparsely
attended when negotiations were not imminent or when immediate threats 
to their welfare were not present . They have also been reluctant to 
pay dues except during the months immediatelyi.ipreceding and following 
negotiationsi. Most unions impose dues of from three to five baht 
per month, but because the checkoff has rarely been provided by
management and because a network of shop stewards is not common, dues 
evasion is easy . This . inconsistent flow of funds does not permit the 
union to provide a broad network of continuous services and weakens 
the contact of the worker with his unioni. 
Lack of contact with the membershp remains a problem .. Since 
Ottober 1976, union meetings  have been prohibited . Some unions have 
published a monthly newsletter, and several labor magazines were 
published in Bangkok with news of union activitiesi. However, censure­
ship imposed by NARC limits union criticis m .  Some unions have cleri­
cal staff who send out notices to membersi. In state enterprises,
offices on plant grounds accessible- to employees were once· made avail­
able, but this is rare in the private sector . The traffic congestion
in Bangkok contributes to the· is olation of workers once they leave 
the work site .  Communication between members and union, then, has 
faced severe impediments, and has reenforced the worker ' s  rationali­
zation that ·he is obligated to support the union financially ' 'only· 
when it does something for him . ' ' Most workers responded affirmatively 
to a 1976 questionnaire .ithat asked, "should the government fund labor 
organizations ?" They thought this was a marvelous idea since it would 
obviate the need for their financial support .i1 9  Neverthelessij the 
evidence at hand regarding worker sentiments supports the contention,
voiced to the author in 1973 by labor department officials, union 
leaders, and informed industrial relations directors, that the time 
for unions in Thailand hasi.ifinally arrived, and that this development 
is now irreversible . 
V .  The Weapons of  Labor Disputes 
Union Weapons 
Until martial law was declared in October 1 976, the strike was 
.the principal weapon . in the union arsenal for winning contests with 
employersi. Whereas the. · grievance strike was initially used to attract 
the attention of the Labor Department, which then would dispatch 
mediators to resolve the complaint, more varied forms were later used . 
The general . strike has been used to obtain ends sought by the labor 
19Petsr.i Bumrungcheep, A Comparison of t he Thai and Singapore 
Airline Unions  , . (M. A .  Thesis, Thammasa·t University, 1976)i. This atti­
tude is typical of Thais who are conditioned to accept authority and 
who tend to rely upon the government as the arbiter of their problemsi. 
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movement, as, for example, the Federated Labor Unions of Thailand's 
threat of a general strike in January 1976, which won a ' subsidized 
price of rice for urban industrial workersi. Sympathy strikes have 
also been called to support the demands of fellow labor unions, such 
as the action of thirty- one unions who struck on January 3, 1976, in 
support of the strike of .the telephone workers against  the Telephone
Organization of Thailand.i2 0  Economic strikes were over grievances or 
wages, caused by employer unfair labor practices, and these strikes. 
assumed a variety of formsi. Female employees of the Hara Bluejeans 
Factory used the sit-down s·trike as a response to a management refusal 
to honor the terms of agreement reached through mediation efforts .  
For several months, the girls occupied the factory and excluded all 
but student advisers until they were eventually evicted by the police .i21 
Even the United States Chamber of Commerce openly acknowledged that 
many of the 102 strikes in the first five months of 1976 were caused by 
poor management practicesi.i2 2  
"Some of the strikes were in the opinion of the 
Chamber brought about by Management failing to observe 
the minimum requirements of the Labor Lawi. Other 
strikes were the result of management failing to meet 
the benefits provided by ot·her members in the same in­
dustry or of that adopted by similar organizations in 
the same community . Several strikes were the result 
of Management's failure to develop a line of communica­
tion and understanding of employee grievancesi. "  
The Chamber of Commerce goes on to note that other strikes were strict­
ly economic in origini. 
A noted strike that began as a grievance dispute and which never 
would have occurred if an effective grievance procedure had been opera­
tional was the Dusit-Thani Hotel strike on May 1, 1975 .  In April the 
union sought to open an existing agreement, scheduled to expire the 
following October, to discuss cost- of-living adjustments and fair 
Z O "The List of 31 Labour Unions on Strike,i" The Nation , January
3, 1976, p .  1 .  
21The Hara strike has been described in detail by Yupha Klangman, 
"How the Girls Took Over Hara,i" Busines s and Thai land , (February 1976)i, 
pp . 32-37i. In this article and in a subsequent personal interview, 
Yupha clarified the role of the student advisers to the girls . A mis­
conception �xists that the students persuaded the -employees to strike. 
Rather than the students instigating the strike, the girls approached 
the students and requested their council to advise them on how to deal 
with an employer who had clearly indicated that he was implementing a 
plan to shift production from the unionized plant to a non-union onei. 
Towards the end of the strike, Yupha found that the striking girls no 
longer openly admitted her to the besieged shopi. They had become 
suspicious of journalists and felt that such reporters were conveying
information about shop defenses to the police to be used in their 
final evictioni. 
22Newsletter to Membersi. A copy was graciously furnished to the
author. 
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dispersali-o f  service charge receipts to hotel employees.2 3 The strike 
quickly mushroomed into one with political overtones , allegedly des ign­
ed to generate an issue sufficient to repeat on the National Labor 
holiday the mass ive show of  worker support that had been evidenced in 
the textile demon�tiration during the previous June. Although several 
hundred demonst
.
rators periodically appeared , it neve r caught the im­
agination of  the working class. This strike , howeve r ,  violated an
exist ing agreement and had . ;ittle support from othe r unions. Moreove r ,  
the hotel management re fused to consider the demands, and they locked 
out the workers a fter strikers, who had occupied  the lobby until May 
22, had been evicted and a fter the hotel management had publicly called 
upon strikers to r.etu rn· to work. ln spite o f  repeated demonstrations , 
the hotel remained clos.ed until the strike was broken. The hotel re­
opened for business on July 31 a fter filling the 200  vacancies created 
by discharge of  the strikers. 
Strikes with .ideological content were sometimes instigated against 
American or Japanese firms as protests again st "foreign imperialism,i" 
even though these.· companies were wage. leaders in the Kingdom and 
practitioners o f  enl igl1tened labor relations. 2 4 An example o f  this, 
it is alleged, was the Colgate -Palmolive strike in early 1976 which 
lasted ninety -one days , ·th�  longest st rike in Tha iland's history. It
is rumoured that Russian money was used as strike funds to enable 
workers to rem iin out on strike. Eventually, the strike was settled
when the company agreed to expand its compromise offer ,  a gesture , it
has been said , ma·de in part because of  its com·pass io.n for the su ffering 
o f  the st riker·s. 
Thei· Colgate �Palmolive strike reflected the growing tendency for 
longer strikes. Collaboration o f  unions. in mutual self-help programs 
had increased the ability o f  workers to susta in a strike , and the ir  
limited needs in a hospitable tropical climate also permitted them to 
hold out longer. Disputes were settled eventually through the economic 
duressi- imposed upon both parties or through the mediation efforts o f  
Labor Department offic ialsi. Arbitrat ion , eithe r voluntary or compul­
sory , has been available as an option , although the parties have been 
reluctant to use the former. Disputes which have a discernible impact 
on the economy, re gardless o f  whether or not they occur in critical 
industries, are often re ferred to an arbitration panel , and in the 
case of  the 1976 Tejiri Textile strike , the government ordered the 
workers to return to work while negotiations continued. The tendency 
·o f  the government to interfere in noncri t ica 1 disputes and the prohi­.
bition on strikes since October 1976 , could permanently impair, or at 
least seriously delay, the development of  mature collective bargain -
ing rela-tions -between the part·ies. Yet, a gove rnment that, historically, .·
has been oriented to a pattern of  imposing settlements in labor dis­
putes even befo re the advent o f  unions , and
.
which is keenly concerned 
about the tarnished investment climate that labori•disputes generate, 
is not inclined to stand idly by as the process of economic seige 
brings the weaker party to its knees. 
23seei· "The Dusit Than i Affai r :  Focus on Labou r , "  The Investor,
(July 1975), pp. 23 -37i. 
2 4This point was made in· the U .S .. Chamber o f  Commerce Newsletter  
which added : "These strikes· , it is believed , are intended to disrupt 
tJ1e Thai econ·omy, discredit American employers and discourage further 
investment in Thailand." 
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Employer Weapons 
Employers had not revealed , as of 1976i, a willingness to combine 
to off set union bargaining poweri. Most Thai emp.loyers, it is safe to 
say , have not yet accepted the reality of unions, and even in such 
largei, modern companies as Siam Cementi, major changes in industrial 
relations practices have not been implementedi. Some managers undoubt­
edly expected the rightest coup to occuri, and hoped that in its after­
math there would be another wave of suppression of labor organizationsi. 
Certainly , in July 1976 a deluge of antiunion propaganda was emanating
from various sourcesi, which depicted Thai labor organizations as being
infiltrated by subversive elements and financed by communist fundsi. 
Would such organizationsi, it was impliedi, be in the national interest? 
More directlyi, it was alleged that some business leaders used their 
political connections to persuade the government to intervene in labor 
disputes and to impose a settlement favorable to their interests � 
Other traditional tactics have also been used to oppose unionsi. 
Prospective labor leaders have been identified and discharged before 
they were able to build a base of supporti. Unions-have been infili­
trated by company spiesi, who have either provided the company with 
information about union activities and union supporters, or sought to 
undermine the union's leadership and membership supporti. Intimida­
tion has also been used . It  is said that some Chinese employers , pro­
tected by their secret societiesi, will never be unionizedi, for to 
attempt to do so - would be sure suicide for union promoters .i2 5  One 
trick used by employers has been that of "framing" a troublesome 
employee by planting company property on his person and accusing him 
of thefti. Thisi, in turni, under the labor law justifies discharging
him for causei. A variation of such a tactic involves planting illegal
drugs on his person and then having him searched by the police. Thei. 
subsequent arrest removes the worker from the planti. 
No statute requires bargaining in good faithi, and a strongi. employ­
er can simply refuse to consider a union demand,  take and ultimately 
break a strikei. The credibility of the union is then destroyed , and 
workers are disillusioned with union affiliationi. Another related 
technique is to provoke an illegal strikei, and then lock out or dis­
charge the strikers. 
These tactics are, of coursei, not unfamiliar to students of labor 
contests in other countriesi. The newness of the labor movement in 
Thailand meansi, howeveri, that many Thai employers are �tilizing them 
for the first time and finding them no less effective than when used 
by other employers in other lands in earlier timesi. 
A tactic which , fortunately , is also often used by employers is 
to accept the reality of labor unions, and by building a well-trained 
management teami, aid in the education and development of a modern 
personnel program which leads to the evolution of responsible unionismi. 
This acceptance has most frequently been found both among state enter- · 
prises and in predominantly Western-owned corporations . The former 
reflected government policy of the 1973-76 erai. The latter is in 
response to good management practicei, but also is designed to limit 
25whether or not it is true , a widely-held belief is that assass­
inations can be arranged for as little as $25i, the cost depending upon
how much protection the intended victim may have and , consequently ,i. 
the risk to the assassini. 
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the growth of hostilei· sentiments among the citi zenry of Thailand . 
Were the f oreign companies to ad opt a p olicy of containment or opposi­
tion towards emerging unions, the resulting pattern of disputes could 
easily be used to  dem onstrate the validity of the charge of "Western 
imperialism" that seeks to  expl oit the masses of Thailandi. More over, 
in a contest between an alien firm and Thai citiizens, it is not con- · 
sistent with p olitical realities to  expect the gpvernment to be neutral 
in arbitrating the disputei. 
If the labor movement continues to · grow, eventually Thai manage­
ment must face up ·to the ch�llenges and cost implications of a m ove­
ment committed to improving the lot of the· Thai workeri. As both 
parties gain experience and maturity, it is to  be h oped that the 
practice of labor relations will become as peaceful and orderly as 
it is in the United States. 
VI. Summary and Evaluation 
The Thai labor movement is currently faced with a number of ser­
ious obstacles that threaten its survival and/or growthi. The p oliti­
cal .leadership is now more sympathetici· to  .the anti union views of the 
business community. The NARC objective of rapid economic devel opment, 
with a concomitant emphasis on f oreign and dom ·estic investment, has 
replaced the reform and income redistribution goals of its democratic 
predecessori.i2 6  An attractive investment climate is provided by domes­
tic stability, low labor costs, and peaceful labor relationsi. · Union 
wage pressures and disruptive strikes are, therefore, viewed as anti­
social behaviori. Hence, strikes are fotbidden and wage demands con­
tained by a weakened labor m ovement. The values of a Buddhist ·society
which perceive the community as m orally structured and inherently 
tranquil reenf orce the sanctions placed upori instruments of union 
p ower and protest. Employers, aware of the change in government senti­
ment, proceeded in 1977 t o  take advantage of the shift in p ower and
sought to  contain labori· organizations and t o  abrogate existing agree­
ments. 2 7  · · 
The military junta that comprises the NARC has also sought to  
minimize internal disorder f or purposes of national defense . Surround­
ed on three sides by hostile neighbors, two of wh om recently acquired 
through civj.l war communist governments, the Thai military ha.s been 
especially sensitive to  pub lic unrest . On the one hand, it has been 
this fear of demonstrations that has prompted the proclamation of 
martial. law and the quick arrest ofi· strikers. . On the other hand, the 
NARC appears to be aware that complete suppression of trade unions 
might radicalize the u.rban labor f orce and ·drive it underground, which 
in turn impl.ies a recognition that the commitment of urban workers · 
to  organi zed labor has developed to such _an extent that a reversal of
the process would invo·lve substantial ris•k of open conflict. Such 
risks mi�ht have been taken if. the junta its
.
elf had been unified and
stable, 2B :but an unsuccessful coup in March 1977- confirmed rumours of 
26Richard Nations· Fara, "Thais Rely on an Old Formula,i" Easteran 
Eoonomia Review, February 4, 1977, pp. 37-40i. 
z7Bo.rsuk, �'Thaiiland's Approachi. "  
28Norman Peagam, ' Politi.cal Stability at Stake,i" Fara Easteran 
Eaonomia Review, February 11, 1977, pp. 8, 9. 
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factions within the junta .i2 9 This fear of a potentially hostile labor 
movement that could become the formidable ally of a rival clique has 
led the j unta to adopt a policy of toleration towards a weakened, con­
strained and controllable set of unionsi. The NARC has resisted pres­
sures from within to abolish the legality of unions, and periodically
military spokesmen have calmed labor's fears of ultimate suppression
by reaffirming the government's commitment to the labor laws and by 
admonishing employers to deal fairly with their workersi. Neverthelessi, 
NARC has used rumours to control union militancy, since such rumours 
serve to remind labor leaders that strikes or overt forms of worker 
protest can lead to trade union suppressioni. Indeed, a positive sign 
that unions remain a viable movement was the replacement of the appoint­
ed civilian ·cabinet on October 21, 1977, by the NARC .  The military 
leaders rejected the far rightist policies of the Prime Minister and 
his cabinet, among which were those that banned most normal · union 
activities .i3 0 
29An astute observer of the Thai political scene, Dr . Naronchai 
Akrasanne, noted that the failure of the March coup in fact strength­
ened NARC and the Thai government because by supporting the entrenched 
junta, the loyalty of certain generals to thei.ijunta was thereby confirm­
ed . Interview, April 14, 1977i. 
3o"Thai Junta Ousts Civilian Regime,i" New Yo:r,k Times, October 21,
1977, p .  2 .  
CHAPTER 4 
LABOR LEGIS LATION - AND ITS AD�1INISTRATION* 
I. The Development of ·iLabor Administration 
·The growth of labor legislation and of agencies. set up to admin­
ister the laws ha s paralleled the development of the industrial labor 
force and the degree to which it ha s be come composed of Thai nationals 
rather than immigrant Chine se aliens . Occupations have be come progre ss­
ively re stricted to Thai nationals, and permits and fee s are now re­
quired from a ll aliens employed in Thailandi. Hence, the interest of
the government in establishing and maintaining labor standard s and in
stabili zing employer -employee relations has been reenfor ced by the 
protection whi ch such regulations impart to what i s  now a nonagriculi­
tural labor for ce comprised overwhelmingly of Thai citi zens . 
One of the rationali zations given for the military coup of 1932, 
whi ch replaced the ab solute monar chy with a constitutional one, was 
the high incidence of unemployment in the Kingdomi. (At most, however, 
it consisted only of a few thou sand in Bangkok . )  Hence, the first 
agency in Thailand to deal with a labor problem wa s e stablished in 
1933 in  the form of an  Employment Service Se ction in  the Registration 
Divi sion of the Mini stry of the Interior .  The following year it wa s 
transferred to the Ministry of Economic Affairs .  The offi ce continued
in the Department of Commerce of this ministry until 194 0 ,  when it 
was transferred to the Department of Public Welfare and upgraded to 
divi sion statu s. When the 1 9 5 6  Labor Protect ion and Labor Relations 
laws were enacted, it was further upg_raded to bureau statuis .  The
bureau was reorgani zed functionally into three divisions : (1) the
Employment Service Division, which included the employment exchange 
and the Vocational Guidance and Training Sections ; (2) the Labor 
Protection and Industrial Relations Division, which.handled labor in­
spe ction and labor dispute s ;. and (3) the Labor - Re search and Statistics 
Divisioni. 
In Octoberi. 1 9 6 5 ,  in order to d .eal more effectively with growing
manpower problem s, dep grtmental statu s was -conferred upon the .bureau,
and it continued a s  such for the next eleven year s . During this period, 
the number of per sonneli.of the Department of Labor increased from two 
hundred and fifty to about seven hundred � new divi sions were added as  
rtew statute s conferred increa sing responsibilitie s ;  and the number of 
regional office s grew from two initially to forty-sixi. New dutie s in­
cluded the establishment of minimum· wage s · _.for the metropolitan area of
Bangkok and for the rest of the Kingdom, the implementation of workmen' s 
compensation insurance and benefits, the registration and regulation
first of worker associations and later of labor unions ,  the extension
of controls over alien employment, and expanded mediation dutie s under
·a revised Labor Disputes Settlement procedure . These responsibilities, 
. . 
*This chapter has been coi-authored with Kundhol Srisermbhok .  
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together with those pertaining to labor protection and inspection, 
were reflected in the 1976 organizational structure of the department 
before it assumed ministerial status (see Chart 3)i. 
The evolution of the labor administration agency to cabinet rank 
was begun in mid-1976 when a Ministry of Labor was proposed by Parlia­
ment. Increasingly, labor disputes were disrupting the economy, and 
there were predictions of unemployment growing from over one million 
in 1 976 to an estimated 3 . 3  million in 1 9 8 1 .  In addition, the expand­
ing organizational and political strength of organized labor called 
for recognition on a par with other interest groups in Thai society . 
In response to these developments, the upgrading of the Department of 
Labor to ministerial status was seriously considered . 
The proposal called for upgrading each of the divisions of the 
old Department of Labor to departmental status, although the Employment
Service Division would be renamed the Labor Development Department, 
and the Occupational Skill Development Institute and the Alien Occupa­
tional Control Unit would be placed in this department.  Apprentice­
ship programs and the development of a standardized occupational
classification system would remain under the supervision of the Skill 
Development Institute and its affiliated council, and additional 
training programs would be supervised by the Labor Development Depart­
menti. The Office of the Secretary would be attached to the proposed 
Office of the Minister, and the Wage Board and Compensation Fund would 
remain as separate units under the direction of the Under-Secretary of 
Labori. The Office of the Secretary would administer internal personnel 
matters, supervise regional offices, register private employment agen­
cies, and handle complaints made against these private agencies .  Child 
labor and female labor certificates would be issued by the Under-Secre­
tary of Labori. 
The research functions of the Ministry of Labor would be performed 
by the Labor Studies Departmenti. Three principal divisions were to be 
established within the department ; Labor Statistics, Labor Studies and 
Labor Affairsi. The pre-1 976 Labor Studies Division had maintained an 
extensive library, but in 1 976 it did not have its own computeri. Rather,
it relied upon the National Statistical Office for processing its data. 
The proposed Labor Statistics Division would be responsible for collect­
ing annual data on firm size and employment in the Greater Bangkok
metropolitan area. It would also continue to collect monthly data on 
labor turnover from firms throughout the Kingdom with twenty or more 
employees, and questionnaires would continue to be distributed monthly
in which employers were asked to indicate the number of vacancies· 
currently existing or anticipated within the next three monthsi. This 
·information was published quarterly, and, as in the past, reports would . 
continue to be sent to the Labor Development Department in which the 
Employment Service is located .  The Labor Studies Division would still 
undertake specific research assignments, as for example in 1 972 its 
predecessor had surveyed the extent 6f industrial injuries in Thai 
industry to ascertain the need for a state-administered workmen's com­
pensation fund . That study had revealed that only one in four indus­
trial accidents involving inj uries were being reported, and that few 
of the inj ured workers received any form of indemnityi. The division 
also conducted wage surveys and engaged in studies on rural and urban 
unemployment and seasonal migrationi. A 1 976 unemployment study reveal­
ed that the national unemployment rate was closer to 5 percent than 
the less than 2 percent figure indicated by the National Statistical 
Office's biennial Labor Force Survey. The Labor Affairs Division would 
maintain liaison with statistical agencies of other countries and supply 
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data required by the International Labor Organizationi. Its predecessor 
had been involved in establishing a standard occupational classifica­
tion system for Thailandi. 
The existing Labor Studies Division has had resources diverted 
from it since 1973 as new duties have been imposed upon the Labor De­
partmenti. Personnel declined from about 130 to about 80 in 1976 . As 
a result , data gathering and processing were impaired , .and fewer in­
dependent studies were undertaken after 1975i. Its director in 1973 had 
argued against the charge that Thais do not understand or respect the 
use of statisticsi. "On the contrary,i" he stated, "Thai administrators 
do appreciate the need for data, but often they are called upon to make 
a decision before the data are available. The appreciation of the need 
for data is more advanced in Thailand than the collecting ,  processing , 
or interpretation of iti. Ofteni, data are gathered by statisticians 
with no understanding of the form in which it should be presented or 
for time intervals that are consistent and which permit the making of 
valid comparisonsi. Therefore, if data are not in the form that permits
interpretation and/or use, then Thai administrators can make no referi­
ence to it in making their decisions. 11i1 Yet, the reduction in staff 
reflects the priorities which Thais attach to data gathering and an­
alysis . 
While deliberations were in progress concerning upgrading the 
Department of Labor to ministerial status, opposition began to develop 
from business interests and from within the Ministry of Interior in 
which the Department is located . In part , business was opposed to 
granting increased status (and resources) to an agency designed to en­
force labor laws, which until 1976 had been easily evadedi. Vigorous
enforcement could impose substantial additional operating costs upon
employersi. The Ministry of Interior, on the other hand, was not anxious 
to be divested of a large agencyi, with great potential political in­
fluencei. Consequentlyi, in July 1976 , Parliament considered instead 
upgrading the department to an intermediate level between its present 
position and that of a ministryi. For want of a better name for the 
intermediate structurei, it was to be called a bureaui, a term used to 
identify the labor agency between 1956 and 1965i, before it achieved 
departmental status . The upgraded bureau , however, would be he·aded by 
a deputy-minister of interior rather than by the initially proposed 
independent minister or by the existing department director-generali. 
In keeping with the Thai custom of making changes slowly and after 
long deliberation in order to allow interested parties ample time to 
adjust to the changes, deliberations on the new status of the depart­
ment continued in Parliament thro·ugh August and Septemberi. The military 
coup on October 6, 1976i, the resulting dissolution of Parliament, and 
the conservative, probusiness orientation of the new leadersi, effective­
ly terminated legislative action on changing the departmenti' s  statusi. 
Eventually the process of industrialization must increase the functions 
of the labor agency sufficiently for its position in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy to be raised , but this event is unlikely to occur before the 
1980s.  
Two other agencies outside the Department of Labor administer 
allied labor lawsi. The Factory Control Department of the Ministry of 
1Interview, June 1973i. A follow-up interview in June 1976 with a 
new director revealed that attitudes of administrators had changed little 
in the three-year interval . 
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Industry has. almost a hundred factory inspectors and technicians, whose 
functions are to approve plans and specifications of factories under 
construction and to certify that such factories, when completed, con­
tinue to comply with factory safety and health legislationi. When com­
pliance has been achieved licenses. are then issuedi. In addition, the 
department inspects and licenses industrial boilers and elevatorsi. It 
would seem logical that such factory inspectors during their periodic
visits to establishments should also investigate whether legal labor 
standards are being practiced, and to report any violations to the 
Labor Protection Divisioni. In practicei, although a liaison committee 
exists for coordinating the activities of the two agencies, little 
communication actually takes place, ·and there is no coordinationi. 
Factory inspectors. are not concerned with labor standards enforcement, 
and unsafe working conditions are not reported to the Workmen's Com­
pensation Officei. Although accidents that result in -disabling injiuries 
for more than three days or in death are required by law to be report­
ed to the Factory Cdntrol Department, in fact many, if not most, are 
not reported and thei.ireports that are made are not forwarded to the 
Department of Labori. Industrial health and hygiene are responsibili­
ties of the public health authorities, and little coordination or co­
operation occurs between these three agenciesi. These factory safet¥, 
and health agencies are typical of Thai government offices in general; 
each is an encla�e unto itself, and interrelationships occur primarily
within vertically structured agencies rather than horizontally across 
ministriesi. Normally, agencies functioning in the same general field 
may have little or no knowledge of one anotheri' s  activitiesi. 
The second outside agency involved in administering a labor law 
is the Labor Relations Committee (LRC) , attached to the Office of the 
Ministry of Interiori. Its function has been to hear unfair labor 
practice complaints filed under the Labor Relations Act of 1 975 and 
to arbitrate unsettled labor disputes referred to it by the Prime 
Minister, principally in state enterprises concerned with the public
interesti. It consists of fifteen members, each appointed for terms 
of three years with one-third of the terms. expiring each yeari. Three 
of the members represent management, three organized labor, and nine 
are public representativesi. The committee utilizes the staff of the 
Office of the Secreiary of. the Labor Department to run the day-to-day 
affairs of the committeei. The members are, however,·inot full-time 
employees, and in fact subcommittees of LRC consisting of one labor, 
one management and three public members have done the actual deliberat­
ing on casesi. Each subcommittee in the 1974-76 period met at most two 
afternoons per weeki. The committee members have been paid an honorarium 
of 800 baht (forty dollars) per month. Cases are allotted to the sub­
committees and scheduled by t]:ie chairman of LRC . The committee has no 
investigative staff, no services of an attorney, and is not required
to utilize strict judicial procedure, although minimum requirements of 
due process must be followed .  Its rulings, however, are developing-a 
body of precedents which apply to the Labor Relations Act· . Legisla­
tion exists to permit the establiishment of a labor court at some time 
in the future, whose fu·nctions wou·ld replace the unfair labor practice
hearings of LRC,ibu.t there is a general· consensus that such a labor .·court is for political reasons a remote po·ssibility . 
The duties and functions of .the regulatory _departments of the 
Department of Labor wil i  be described in succeeding sections in terms 
of the stattites and edicts which they administeri. Both the laws ·and 
the agencies can be classified under the heading of (a) Labor Protec­
tion, (b) Labor Relations, and (c) Labor Development .  
92 
II . Labor Protecition 
Laws pertaining to labor protection were enacted in 1956 and 
repealed and revised in 1972 under the National Executive Council An­
nouncement 1 03 .  In this announcement ,  the Minister of the Interior 
was authorized and did so promulgate a wide variety of regulations per­
taining to child and female labor and to other forms of labor standardsi. 
These regulations were still in effect in 1976 , although growing pres­
sure on Parliament has developed to transform these ministerial regula­
tions into statutesi. Some of the regulations generically deal with 
employment security or labor relations problemsi, and these will also 
be considered in this section . 
The labor protection regulations apply to all firms in Thailand , 
regardless of size , although because of limited resources , the Labor 
Protection Division concentrates its enforcement activities upon the 
Greater Bangkok metropolitan region . In 1973 , there were almost 100 , 0 0 0  
firms in this region and the number has continued to increasei. Govern­
ment agencies ,  agriculture , nonprofit organizations , and household 
employers of domestic employees are excluded from the regulations .  There 
are only about thirty inspectors in the division assigned to Bangkok and 
fewer than twenty assigned to regional officesi. Their activitie s ,  of 
necessit y ,  are restricted to investigating and mediating complaints 
concerning violations of the regulations .  Only a few hundred employers 
each year are fined for violating the regulationsi, but there is general
agreement that evasion of the regulations is much more commoni. Although 
severe penalties are provided for violationsi, the fines imposed are 
normally light . Even major infractions carry at most a twenty-five to 
fifty dollar assessmenti. Labor officials believe that loss of face from 
a conviction is punishment enough.i2 
Employment of children below the age of twelve is prohibited in 
nonagricultural occupations , although exceptions are made for family
employment , newspaper or flower vendors .  This prohibition is widely 
violated throu.gh a number of rusesi. Children between the ages of twelve 
and fifteen may not be employed in hazardous occupationsi, in jobs in­
jurious to their moralsi, or at nighti, but again it is acknowledged that 
the regulations are ignored .i3 There is little coordination between the 
Education Ministry , which requires compulsory school attendance to age
fourteen , and the Labor Protection Division , and, in fact , s chool facil­
ities are not sufficient to accommodate all such studentsi. In effecti, 
school attendance ceases for the majority of Thai students upon the 
completion of grade fouri. In a country where urban working class family
income is not far removed from the subsistence level , the utility of 
2Jan Schut , "Focus on Labour : Are the Laws at Fault , "  Investor 
(June 1975), pp . 7-16 . This article contains an excellent account of 
the enforcement problem associated with the labor protection lawsi. 
3An As sociated Pres s  story reported the use of children as "slave 
labor . '' Fifty-fou� children , aged between ten and. fourteen , barefoot 
and ragged ,  had been held seven months as captives and forced to work 
daily from 6 : 0 0 a . m .  to 9: 0 0  p . m .  in a Bangkok factory ; Underfed and 
beaten , the children were kept on the top floor of the factory to pre­
vent their escape .i. Some had been lured to work for promised wages of 
$10 per month ,  none of which had been paid , and others had been sold 
outright to the factory owner by impoverished rural parent s .  "Thais 
Raid Fortress-Like Factory , Free 54 Hungry , Ragged Child Slaves ,'' 
Toledo Bladea, November 12 , 1975i. 
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TABLE 16 
Total Employment in• the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area,* 
by Size of Establishment, September 1970 and January 1973 . 
Establishment Number of Firms. · Cumulative Percent Number of Workers Cumulative Percent
Size by of Firms of Workers
Number of Workers 1970 1973 1970 1973 1970 1973 1970 1973 
77,119 120,867 15 . 14 15 . 67 1.000 and over 35 46 . 0 5 
500 - 82 . 12 . 11 31,951 56,. 763 21 . 41 23 . 03 
-300 499 106 . 24 . 21 28,972 41,099 27.10 28 . 36 . 
-100 299 315 503 . 72 . 67 52,765 82,264 37 . 46 39 . 02 
-so  500 825 1 . 4 9  1 . 42 33,837 56,784 44 . 10 46 . 38 
-20 49 1,774 2,776 4 . 21 3 . 95 52,731 82,541 54.. 46 57 . 08 
-10 19 3,774 4,899 10. 00 8 . 41 41,034 64,243 62 . 52 65.41 
-5 9 12,402 14,756 29 . 03 21 . 86 75,705 92,816 77 . 39 77 . 44 
-1 4 46,251 85,736 100 . 00 99 . 99 115,103 174,117 99 . 99 100 . 00 
Total 65,172 109,729 509,217 771,494 
Source: Department of  Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistias, l 9  7 2 ,  l 9 7 4  (Bangkok: Ministry of
Interior, 1975) .i. 
* Includes Bangkok, Thonburi, Samut Prakan, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani 
94 
marginal wages earned by children is high, and the incentive of parents
to permit them to be employed is great. 
Female labor laws are designed similarly to protect the health and 
morals of employed womeni. Limits are placed upon the weights that 
women can be required to lift ; nightwork for females under eighteen is 
prohibited; and employment in hazardous occupations in manufacturing, 
construction, and mining is forbidden . Pregnant females must receive 
maternity leave of up to sixty days annually, thirty of which are paid
if employment has b een for longer than six monthsi. Again, these pro­
visions are more often than not violated . Certificates are required of 
employers utilizing child labor and in some cases female labor, but 
their is suance is more often the exception than the rulei. 
The conditions of work of female industrial workers are often ap­
palling, e specially in small establishments .  The following describes 
such conditions in small and middle sized establishments: 
. . .  workers use half of their working space a5 combined 
bedroom and kitcheni. This makes it very unhygienic 
and creates fire hazard. Some women who have small 
children, bring them into the work placei. Sometimes 
the whole family works in the same place and the 
children's ages ·range from 10-14 yearsi. In textile, 
candy and bak�ry factories women work about 12 hours 
per day when orders are urgent and there is no over­
time pay. In consitruction work and road building, 
women work as diggers, cement mixers, gravel and sand 
carriers, iron cutters, floor polishers and some also 
work in high and dangerous place s . "4 
Hours of all employees are regulated. A . i48-hour workweek is man­
dated in industrial employment ; a 54-hour workweek in commercial firms 
is permitted, and in transportation, no more than 8 hours per day may
be scheduled . In hazardous industries, no more than 42 hours per week 
are allowed.- A re st period of one hour must be scheduled for every 
five consecutive hours worked . Where the standard workweek is exceed­
ed, an overtime premium of  time and one-half of the regular hourly 
rate must be paid . If a piece-work rate is utiliz ed, the rate for 
overtime hours must b e  150 percent greater than the piece rate standard. 
Work schedules and regulations pertaining to hours must be posted, in 
order for employees to be able to ascertain their rightsi. However,
few firms post such regulations or schedules, and overtime pay at 
premium rates is unusual . In general, employees are not well informed 
of their rights under the labor laws, and few risk employer retribution 
by complaining of violations .  
Thailand requires employers to give extensive periods of leave. 
At least thirteen official paid holidays mus·t be given to employees who 
have completed their probationary s ervice, and work on a holiday must 
be compensated at twice the normal ratei. A six-day workweek is defined, 
and work on the s eventh day is to b e  remunerated at double the regular 
rate . Paid sick leave up to thirty days annually must be provided, and 
for absences in exces s  of three days, a doctor's certification of ill­
ness may be required . A minimum vacation period of not less than six 
days must be. provided for employees who have one year or more of s ervice 
with an employer . In Western countrie s such benefits have normally 
4Translated from Nikom Chandravithun, Labour Problems in the 
Industrialisation of Thailand (Bangkok : 1968)i. 
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been achieved only after there has been a high level of economic develop­
ment, and even then they have frequently been the result of labor union 
pressure. It has been debated whether or not such liberal paid leave 
provisions are appropnriate for a country anxious to develop its economy
and to attract foreign investors, for such leave provisions fix the 
costs of labor and increase the risks of doing business. Maternity
leave provisions, for example, may even encourage women to have child­
ren, which in a country whose natural rate of population growth is as 
high as Thailandn' s  may not be consistent with development objnectives. 
On the other hand, it is argued that, as the laws are easily evaded and 
there is no tradition of vigorous enforcement, then the regulations 
represent no real barrier to development. The purpose of such laws is 
not so much to improve working standards and protect employees, as to 
demonstrate to the rest of the world, including the International Labor 
Organization, that Thailand, too, has modern, progressive labor legisla-
tion. · 
In addition to protective standards pertaining to paid leaves, va­
cations, holidays, and premium pay, the labor protection regulations 
also include another area frequently associated with labor relations. 
These are regulations which prescribe the imposition of disciplinary 
penalt ies involving discharge. Separation pay is required of employers 
for employees who have served beyond their probationary period unless 
they have been discharged for cause. Discharge for cause includes (1) 
dishonesty or conviction of a criminal offense ; (2) action intended to 
damage the employer ; (3) repeated violation of a work rule after a 
written warning has been given to the offending employeen; (4) absence 
without notification or justifiable reason for more than three consecu­
tive days, and (5) negligence which causes injury or damage to the 
employern. One of the most frequent complaints an employee makes to 
the Labor Protection Division is that he has been discharged without 
cause and denied his separation pay. A large· percentage of  these com­
plaints originate in alien firms in which voluntary compliance with the 
labor laws is perhaps most likely. 
In addition to safeguarding the health and safety of employees 
under the Factonries Act, employers are required to provide sanitary
toilet facilities and pure drinking water at the work site. In a tropi­
cal country where intestinal disorders are epidemic in occurrence, 
these facilities are of paramount importance to public health. Annual 
physical checkups must be arranged for employees, and first-aid faci­
lities in smaller establishments of between 10 and 200 employees are 
required. In establishments of over 200 employees, nurses and, in the 
largest firms, even physi cians must be available to treat employees in 
the company infirmary. In 1976, safety standards were established -for 
the construction industry, and such protective clothing as hard :hats,
leather gloves, and safety shoes must now be worn by employees.n5 
Employers of more than ten employees must maintain complete per­
sonnel records of all their workers, including their wages, work sche­
dules, and won-rk assignments. The Directonr-General of the Department 
50ne American official assigned to observe the labor scene express­
ed his opinion that, of all regulations designed to protect labor, this 
one would be violated most willingly by the workers. In a tropical
climate, they simply would not wear the protective clothing, even if 
they could afford to purchase it. Interview, June 28, 1976. 
96 
has confirmed that these records are not kept nor are posting require­
ments met .i6 Inspectors, who are lower grade officers with little in­
dustrial experience, lack technical knowledge, and it has been said 
that these officials are not strongly committed to improving the 
conditions of employment of the working class .i7 The job of enforcing 
the law is made more difficult due to the employees' general lack of 
information about their rights under the law, since enforcement is 
mostly by complainti. It was thought that the development of worker 
associations and labor unions would provide-new avenues to discover 
labor law violations, and even though in 1976 unions were increasingly
taking the workers' part in notifying the department of violations, 
unions are still few in number, and channels of commu.nication between 
union leaders and members have been sufficiently limited for little 
information concerning legal rights to be transmitted to workersi. 
Union volunteers in June 1974 did accompany factory inspectors on their 
rounds in hopes that they could assist in making inspections more effec­
tivei. The program was abandoned after one month of operation because 
the worker volunteers "got too excited and asked too many questions . " i8 
A record of complaint enforcement is presented in Table 17i. 
Inspectors typically make one visit to an establishment . If viola­
tions are discovered, a written warning is issued to the offending firm 
with an order to correct the violationi. It is inconceivable to an in­
spector that compliance with his order will not be forthcoming; hence,
few if any follow-up inspections occuri. Since it is physically imposs­
ible for the handful of inspectors to visit even a small proportion of 
the establishments in Bangkok, both large and small firms report that 
they are rarely inspected. The smaller firms are anxious to avoid any 
official contact with the government .  
Minimum daily wages have been in effect in Bangkok since 1972i. 
Initially set at 1 2  baht per day, the minimum wage was increased to 25 
baht in 19 75i. In addition, the minimum daily wage for provincial es­
tablishments has been set at 18 baht for Changwads contiguous to Bangkok
and at 16 ba�ti- for more distant onesi. The consensus of department
officials is that compliance is reasonably good in Bangkok, but that 
it is poor in the provincesi. Some evasion occurs in Bangkok by employ­
ers who take advantage of the "learner" exemption ; many employees
simply remain "learnersi. "  Enforcement of the minimum wage is princi­
pally by complaint, and in a labor market faced with increasing unemploy­
ment, as is true of Bangkok, even informed workers can be expected to 
be reluctant to jeopardize their jobs by informing on their employersi. 
Labor protection legislation must be regarded as excellent, given
Thailand's stage of economic development.  The paternalistic attitude 
of government towards its working citizens is reflected in the variety 
and extensiveness of the regulations, and there appears to be a commit­
ment to securing these standards for the workers among the top officials 
6Interviews, April 1973; _July 2 ,  1976 . 
.,, ' 
7Many are recent college or secondary school graduates. Little 
progress in training inspectors seems to have been made since 1965i. 
See earlier reports of American advisors to the Labor Department: (1)
Edgar C .  McVoy, "Department of Labor- -Functions and Programs, Thailand,i" 
December 20, 1965 (Mimeo), pp . 19 .: 2 0; also (2) Glen E .  Halm, "A. Report
of the Labor Administration Project to the U . S .  Operating Mission, 
Bangkok,i" October, 1970 (mimeo)i. 
8Jan Schut, "Focus on Labor,i" p .  11 . 
No. ot 
(Baht) plaint 
443 
17 
95 
97 
655 
TABLE 17 
Rulings on Labor Law Violations in Bangkok Metropolitan Area By Number of C.Omplaints, 
·Workers Involved, and Arnot.mt of Settlement, Selected Years 1965-1974 
zdom (1974)
of 
1974 Kin19701965 
TotalNature No. ot No. ot 
Com-
TotalNo.Total No. ofNo. ofNo. of Total No. ot 
Worker!: Awards Workers AwardsCom- Workers Awards Com-
(Baht)plaints (Baht) plaints 
of Com- l-lorker� AwardsCom-
plaintsplaintsn (Baht). 
Dismis-
3,535 5 ,657,797 1,784 2,578,293 1, 153 791276n,817 507197 287n. 134,684 249sal Pay 
5 ,425 3,706,006 2,054 1,375,743 989422,412 90727755,236 146Wages 75 
Savings
Ftmd 43,91014· 43,255 163 3 4,330 · 133 3 8,478 
Damages
Deposit 10 
Over-
time 60. 
Discrim-
ination 5 
C.Ombnin-
ed 
14 
259 
25 
5,966 
168,398 
300 
6 
17 
2 
12 
40 
15 
6 ,596 
47,072 
66,861 
12 
25 
-
21 21,583 14 9,903 19 
229 359,838 85 239,302 70 
-
10,760 23,696,269 .9,7372,343,941 - 720223154,003 177-Issues -
Vaca-
ti.on 
Pay 10 16 1,930 6 6 11,426 - 25 
. 63 54,001 41 170 104n,532 
522 8,143,457 8195,244 - - 60Others 
374,992Total 361 751 4,831 6,739,682 12,n106 20,499 41.n733.391 1,592 989,518 1,667 
Source: Department of labor, Yea.rbook of Labo:r Statistics,a· Z974 (Bangkok, 1975). 
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of the Labor Protection Divisioni. However, resources are woefully in­
adequate for enforcement and labor market conditions and traditional 
employer attitudes encourage evasioni. It remains to be seen whether 
economic development and high protective labor standards are consistent 
objectives, and if they are not, which one of the objectives will yield 
to reality .  If respect for law, however, is to be encouraged and if 
the Labor Department is to maintain its credibility among the workers, 
perhaps the Thai government should take another look at standards that 
encourage evasioni. 
IIIi. Labor Relations 
The Labor Relations Division, formerly combined with Labor Protec­
tion, was established to administer the Labor Relations Act of 1975i. 
This Act incorporated the 1 972 Ministry of Interior regulations per­
taining to the registration and operation of worker associationsi. The 
1975 Act broadened these regulations by (1) permitting the transforma­
tion of worker associations into bona fide labor unions ; (2) revising 
the labor dispute settlement procedure, to shorten the time before 
strikes are legal and to increase the efficiency of peaceful means to 
resolve disputes ; (3) allowing unions to combine into labor federations; 
and (4) providing for .ithe establishment of employee committees to con­
fer with management on employment problemsi. In carrying out these 
expanded functions, the Labor Relations Division maintains a staff to 
investigate applications for the formation of unions and to register 
those that are approved, to receive notification of impending labor 
disputes, and to record written agreements . Other functions are con­
cerned with mediating labor disputes and with labor educationi. At 
times the staff may be called upon to advise the parties or to arbitrate 
unresolved issuesi. The responsibilities of the division apply primarily 
to firms with twenty or more employees, which in the Greater Bangkok
Metropolitan Area in 1973 comprised only 4 percent of the firms, but 
which employed 57 percent of all employeesi. Although Employer Asso­
ciations are also permitted under the Act and are subject to the Labor 
Relations Division jurisdiction, employers have been hesitant to regis­
ter such groupsi. 
A labor union may be formed by application of as few as ten em­
ployees, acting as promoters, who either work for the same employer or 
work in the same line of work. This clause is intended to assure that 
homogeneous organizations will be established, and it is sufficiently 
broad so that outside organizers with employee status may assist in 
forming-the unioni. The promoters must be loyal Thai citizens who are 
over age twenty. However, the statute is so constructed as to permit 
multiple unions within an establishment, all with minority status, and 
no provisions exist to establish "an appropriate bargaining unit" 
whose members may elect an exclusive representative agent. In practice, 
the Labor Relations Division scrutinizes applications for union registra­
tion and it has been reluctant to establish multiple unions within the 
same operating unit of a firmi. However, the possibility remains, and 
this potential source of union r ivalry and labor relations instability
is a danger to which the government eventually must address itself . 
Membership is restricted to Thai nationals of at least age fifteen,
and they possess the right to elect representatives to the union execu­
tive boardi. The union must have a charter and set of bylaws and conduct 
regular meetingsi. Supervisors may not be members of an employees' union� 
although they may form organizations of their owni. This regulation. is 
often ignored, since many union leaders in fact have supervisory statusi. 
Unions may sue or be sued as legal entitiesi. 
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Upon proper application to management union leaders are entitled 
to time off to attend to union business and to engage in negotiations, 
and such time off is with pay if  approved by management . Moreover,
they possess immunity from arrest for engaging in legitimate concerted 
activities in behalf of their union. Hence , criminal laws cannot be 
invoked against them for callingi, organizing or participating ih strikes 
or demonstrations or for making demands upon the employer.  Indirectly , 
the government bestows legitimacy upon forms of worker protests and in­
hibits employers from using law enforcement agencies to break a unioni.. 
or to intimidate its leadershipi. Unions in the same industry are per­
mitted to merge across ·ichangwad boundaries in order to form national 
associations , in addition to their right to form laiger labor federa­
tions.  Although some unions in state enterprises have multiple locals 
dispersed through�ut the Kingdom and actually have the character of 
national unions , most unions are restricted to one employer , . and ini · . 
many cases to one set of operations of an employer. In July 1976 , there 
were 153 unions in the country with an estimated membership of about 
100 , 000 . The informal F�deration of Labor Uriions of Thailand , organized 
initially by the Department of Labor in 1975 , dev�loped into the more 
formal Labor Council of Thailand. In May 1976 the Labor Council adopt­
ed its constitution , which initially was s.igned by 101 unions. An 
additional twenty-four unions affiliated with the Labor Council in the 
next few months , and the council became the accepted , unofficial voice 
of organized labor in tbe Kingdomi. Because voluntary associations in 
Thailand have had a tendency to splinter , even if the council had not 
been suppressed in late 1976 after the October military coup , it may 
still have lost its influenc e .  
The Labor Relations Act encourages the development of bilateral 
determination of wages , hours and conditions of employment in firms 
subjiect to the Act. The employer must enter into a written agreement
with his employees which will have a maximum duration of three years
and a minimum duration of one year . Moreover , the agreement must speci­
fy separation procedures, the grievance procedure used in the company , 
and �rocedures by which the agreement may be amended. In practice , 
firms without unions can simply issue to employe es a written set of 
rules covering the required items . Many firms do not even do this , and 
the required posting of the written -terms of employment is generally 
ignored . On the other hand , firms ·imust file a record of the written 
rules with the Labor Relations Division� but the latter normally does 
not investigate to determine if  employees have been given the rules. 
At the anniversary date of the agreement,  either a minimum of 15 
percenti· of the employees may submit a written demand under their sig­
natures, or,. if 20 percent of the :. employees are registered members, 
the union may submit a written demand on
.i
behalf of the employees to 
the employer . Demands which arise out of grievances associated with 
the agreement may also be presen·ted in writing to the employer .i In
• .both cases, negotiations must begin within three days of the submission,
with representatives , not to exceed seven , from each sidei. If negotia­
tions do not take place within three days or if negotiations have 
occurred but an impasse is reached, a conciliation officer in the Labor 
Relations Division must then be notified within twenty-four hoursi. The 
conciliation ·officer upon receipt of the notice must immediately under­
take efforts to resolve the dispute or impasse , and such efforts may 
continue fo.r five days , during which time no strike is permitted. 
After this period has expired , if the dispute remainsi·iunresolved and 
if a written notice is given within twenty-four hours , either the union 
or employees may initiate a strike� or an employer may institute a lock­
out , or the issue may be referred to voluntary arbitration in private 
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firms or to compulsory arbitration in firms essential to the public
welfare. 
Strikes or lockouts are illegal if any one of the following pro­
cedures are violated: (1) a hlritten notice to negotiate issues in dis­
pute is not communicated to the opposing party ; (2) the three days 
waiting period for negotiations to begin i s  not honored; (3) the media­
tor is not informed of the deadlock ; (4) the mediator is not given the 
full five days to resolve the dispute; (5) a twenty-four hours written 
notice of intent to strike or lockout is not given to the opposite
party . The government has indicated its commitment to enforce these 
requirements, and leaders of strikes who have contravened them have 
been arrested .i9 
A compulsory arbitration award in industries essential to public
welfare may be appealed to the courtsi. In other industries vital to 
economic development, the Labor Relations Committee may be called upon
to render a decision in the dispute, and this decision may be appealed 
to the Prime Ministeri. If either party fails to abide by the decision 
of the final reviewing authority, only then may ·the other legitimately 
call a strike or impose a lockouti. In practice by late 1 976 the 
parties had never agreed to voluntary arbitrationi. 
Most illegal strikes that do occur are instigated by employees 
not affiliated with a union or by recalcitrant employees who ignore 
the advice of the unions. The leaders of most unions seek to comply 
with the requirements of the revised labor dispute settlement provisions, 
and the strikes that are called by them are typically legitimate . It 
rem�ins true, however, that most employees are predisposed to "strike 
first and to negotiate only after a mediator app·ears,i'' and it probably 
will take a period of vigorous enforcement before employees will accept
the wisdom of utilizing the reverse procedurei. 
The new labor dispute settlement procedures are a significant im­
provement over those contained in the 1965 acti. There are, nevertheless, 
some important flaws either in the procedures or in their administrationi. 
A primary deficiency is that the procedure does not distinguish between· 
disputes arising from contract interpretation or agreement violation 
and those arising from the negotiation of an initial or modified labor 
agreementi. The procedures as specified are more suitable for the latter 
than for the formeri. Flagrant contract violations may provoke a lock­
out or strike, and the legality of such may be open to questioni. Cer­
tainly, procedures should be instituted that encourage the voluntary, 
private adjiustment of differences of opinion arising from agreement 
administration--that is, reliance upon a workable grievance procedure 
must be encouraged. At this stage of the development of labor relations, 
it may be too early for the participants, who are too close to tradition­
al society, to have learned the advantages of such a voluntary system 
9An article in the Bangkok World revealed that of eight strike 
leaders who had been arrested at a gunny bag factory in Karat, six were 
being held in chains in prison while awaiting triali. Their lawyer pro­
tested the action as being unfair, since they were being detained on 
minor charges and, if convicted, would serve a maximum of 6 months or 
pay a 1,000 baht ($50) finei. Police had asked the court not to grant 
bail to the detaineesi. See "Strike Leaders Chained,i" Bangkok World , 
July 10, 1 9 76, p .  1 .  Not only will such zealous police action dis­
courage illegal strikes, but it may discourage strikes of any form, 
whether legal or noti. 
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of dispute settlementi. An effective grievance procedure requires that 
employers must have accepted the reality of the continued existence of 
organized labor, and evidence exists that employers are not yet convinc­
ed that this is truei. 
The newness of the practice of labor relations is also reflected 
in the immaturity of the labor conciliators . With experience, thei.r  
expertise will increasei. To some extent, it  is as unreasonable in 
Thailand to expect lower grade officers to have sufficient status to 
persuade executives of large companies or leaders of powerful unions 
to accept their proffered compromises as it is to expect similar status 
officers in the United States to effect a settlement, say, between U . S .  
Steel and the United Steel Workers. In such cases, the intervention of· 
high level Labor Department officials or of the cabinet may be required 
to bring about a settlement . Yet, well-trained, experienced mediators 
can be persuasive in less dominant firms, when their solutions are 
practical and their credibility has been established .  Mo-reover, it is 
important for the government to develop procedures to control the inter­
vention of outside agitators or of well-meaning but ill-informed student 
advisers who interject themselves into disputes of which they are not· 
intrinsically a part. In either case, such intervention is likely to 
increase the alienation of the employer from· his employees and impair 
even further effective communication between the primary partiesi. 
This is precisely the type of alienation that is not needed for the de­
velopment of stable labor relationsi. Unless a dialogue can be establish­
ed between the employer and his employees, or between their representa­
tivesi, mutual probl ems cannot be resolved peacefully and promptlyi. Ini. 
the process of developing mutual respect and awareness of one another's 
power and problems, conflicts unfortunately are inevitable . However,
it is important that emotions not be inflamed any more than they already 
are and that the issues not be enlarged to include those of generalized 
class warfare .  In other words, in order for necessary conflict to be 
contained and kept in proper perspective, the parties should be permit­
ted to work out their own problems, with the help of neutral government 
experts, rather than by the intervention of unrelated third parties 
with ulterior motives . 
The act does attempt to encourage a dialogue among employees and 
employers in firms which are so large that impersonal employm�rit rela­
tionships may developi. In firms of fifty or more employees, an "Employees
Committee" may be established consisting of elected representatives .  
The size of the committee varies with the size of the establishment and 
may consist of from five to twenty-one membersi. The committee must 
meet and confer withi- the employer at least once every three months to 
( 1 )  make arrangements for the (welfare of employees, (2) consider employ­
ment regulations,i.i(3) consider· employees' grievances, and (4) to attempt 
to resolve disputes through compromisei. Provision is made for union · 
representation on the committe e, and all members may be appointed by 
a union which has majority status in the company . Several large ent�r­
prises, primarily of Western ownership, have instituted "Employee Con­
sultation Committees'  and company labor relations officials meet weekly 
or monthly with employee representatives . In many of these enterprises 
no union exists, although in ·others, despite the existence of unions, 
the committees have been formed in those operations not organized by 
the union . The establishment of such committees has not been without 
controversy, for unions fear that they will dilute employee allegiance
and make memberihip drives less productivei. Unions in Thailand have 
not generally concerned themselves with details of shop or job problems 
administration, and such committees may increase this organizational 
deficiency in the unionsi. l1oreover, the productivity of such committees 
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(2) 
may be questioned if they meet with employers only once every three 
monthsi. Even if job problems are identified in such meetings, there 
will be sufficient delay in finding or working out solutions to deprive
the committees of any credibility in the eyes of workersi. 
Unfair Labor Practices 
Union leaders, unioni, members, and representatives on Employee
Committees are protected from employer coercion and discrimination for 
participating in worker organizations by a list of unfair labor practicesi. 
Employers are forbidden to: 
( 1 )  discharge or prevent an employee, employees' representative,
committee member or a union or federation from working
because of participation in a legitimate union activity or 
because the person appeared as a witness-in a case arising
out of an unfair labor practice or disputei. 
discharge an employee for union membershipi. 
(3) prevent an employee through threat or promise of reward from 
joining a. unioni. 
(4) obstruct legitimate -union or federation activitiesi. 
(5) otherwise to interfere with a labor unioni. 
It is also unfair to compel an employee to become a member of a union 
against his wishes, which in effect outlaws the closed shop, or to 
assist or encourage an employer to commit unfair labor practicesi. No 
unfair labor practices have been defined for union actions, and employ­
ers have voiced concern that this may lead to irresponsible union be­
havior .  
Unfair labor practice charges must be filed with the Labor Rela­
tions Committee within sixty days of the alleged commission of the 
violation, and LRC is obligated to hear the case within ninety days of 
receipt of the complaint . Preliminary investigation of the validity 
of the charges is not madei. In addition to hearing unfair labor prac­
tice cases, the LRC also may be called upon to arbitrate and render 
decisions in disputes involving industries critical to economic develop­
ment. The Labor Relations Committee was enlarged from eight to fifteen 
members by the 1975 Act, and terms of office were extended from two to 
three years. Over 90 percent of its cases involve unfair labor prac­
tice charges, and in the first two years of its existence, nine out 
of ten cases were decided in favor of the complaining workeri. In addi­
tion, many charges are disposed of by mediation or voluntary compliance 
by the of fen.ding employer who, when apprised of his probable guilt, 
acknowledges his willingness to repair the injury to the workeri. Unfair 
labor practice awards are remedial in nature and require ( 1 )  reinstate­
ment of the full rights of employees victimized by discrimination and/or
(2) reimbursement for economic losses incurred by the victims of unfair 
labor practicesi. 
A former member of the LRC reported that only the most flagrant
violations are brought to the attention of the committee, 1 0  and -that 
these probably constitute only 10 percent of all unfair labor practices 
committed by employersi. Only gross violations will motivate employees
to risk employer reprisals by filing chargesi. Most charges are filed 
by individual employees, although increasingly unions are bringing
charges to the committee on behalf of their membersi. The LRC member 
101nterview, July 6, 1976i. 
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acknowledged that probably most public members have a promanagement
bias. When the inconsistency of this j udgment with the pattern of de­
cisions was mentioned, he replied, "Not at all. Please understand that 
these cases were flagrant violations and that a decision in favor of 
the employer was impossible.n" However, in other respects the b ias of 
the committee members was evident. LRC members often roughly question 
the workers who, in appearing before the Board, are already intimidat­
ed by their inferior status. Moreover, the size of the settlement was 
often less than that to which the worker laid claim. Such practices
have contributed to a widespread belief that the LRC is not prolabor . 
The decisions of the L RC are not published, nor is much publicity
given to them. This is in keeping with the wishes of many LRC members, 
but it may not contribute to effective compliance with the Labor Rela­
tions Act. It will neither stimulate workers to b�ing charges of vio­
lation before the committee, nor further the educationn- of workers as 
to their legal rights and of employers as to. their obligations under 
the Act. In  part, my informant declared, this reluctance of the LRC 
to publicize its decisions is because ·the members have other full-time 
duties and they have no wish to add to a work load that is already sub­
stantial and for which they are only nominally remunerated. Further­
more, there is some concern over the tendency of the government to 
refer more disputes to LRC for arbitration before the collective bar­
gaining process has been allowed to run .nits course. This is damaging 
to the development of collective bargaining, but it is in keeping with 
the tendency of Thais to let the government make the decisions, even 
though in the process of making those decisions the development of a 
mature and operational system of voluntary dispute settlement may be 
inhibnited. Government interference has also been noted through the 
efforts of some prominent government leaders to influence the decisions 
of the LRC in favor, presumably, of their clients . Fortunately, the 
L RC has been able to maintain its integrity and to resist such inter­
ference. 
The Act provides varying penalties for thirty-six violations. 
Penalties range from two yearsn' imprisonment and/or a fine of 40,000 
baht ($2,000) down to. one month ' s  i�prisonment and/or a fine of 1,000 
baht. The most severe penalties can be imposed for failing to comply
with decisions of the Labor Relations Committee or the Minister of the 
Interior; with the next highest applying to bribery or corruption "to 
negate labour decisions or to reduce the amount or benefits due.n" Fail­
ure of leadersn: to register membership lists in employersn' associations 
and labor unions is also penalized. Only minor penalties are imposed 
upon outsjders who interfere with 1abor negotiations or in labor dis­
putes, and hence the attempts of activists to disrupt society in 1976 
were only mildly discouraged.n11 
IV. Labor Development 
.
Labor developmentnin 1976 consisted of three basic programs : (1)
employment exchanges, (2) skill development and occupational training,
and (3) the Alien Occupation Act. Employment exchanges are operated
in nine offices in the Greater Bangkok area and in thi·nrty-nine regional 
11Less technical discussions of the Labor Relation Act are found 
in "Laws and Regulations : Labor Relations Act, B. E. 2518," Business 
Reviewa, Part I (October, 1975), pp. 478-79 ; P�rt I I  (November, 1975), 
pp. 528 - 29 ;  Part III (December, 1975), pp. 602-3. See also '�Labour 
L aw Synopsnis," Business in Thai land (June, 1975), pp. 71�74. 
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officesi. Unfortunately, since the regional offices are-administered 
through the Office of the Secretary of the Labor Department, personnel 
in the provinces are not responsive to communications originating from 
·the operating departments in Bangkok, including the Employment Security 
Divisioni. As a result there is a lack of coordination among the region­
al. offices and with Bangkok, and informational exchanges, so important
in a national ·employment exchange system, are poori. Throughout the 
Kingdom in 1976, some eighty persons were involved in registering job 
applicants and attempting to place them in available vacanciesi. The 
principal Bangkok office of the Employment Security Division provides 
a number of services, including j ob counseling (on an individual basis)
primarily for youths, occupational guidance to public schools through
a visitation program, some skill testing-- principally for motor vehicle 
operatives and for typists--and private employment agency supervisioni. 
In addition, monthly bulletins of labor market information are publish­
ed . The staff for these services, however, are few and their activi­
ties are only token in nature. The primary task of the Employment 
Service, of course, is soliciting job vacancy requisitions from pro­
spective employers and the referral of job applicants to these employ­
ers . Applicants over the age of- seventeen who register with the 
Employment Service must possess an official identification card, and 
migrants who have not registered with municipal authorities or appli­
cants who have a police record may sometimes try to pass as youths in 
order to escape this requirement . Applications of job seekers who do 
not find employment and who fail to maintain an active file are closed 
after one monthi. The service does not refer applicants to firms engag­
ed in strikesi. Many if not most employers, partiGularly in the modern 
sector, are reluctant to use the Employment Service in recruiting work­
ers because they claim that the service does not properly screen re­
ferrals to themi. The exchange is principally for low-skilled employeesi. 
A summary of the employment exchange program is presented in Table 18 . 
TABLE 18 
Vacancies, Registered Applicants and Placements 
in Thailand, 1965-1974 
Placement 
Registered Public Private 
Year Vacancies Applicants Agency Agencies 
1965 13,940 14,985 8,105 5,572
1966 14,601 16,410 7,452 6,422
1967 13,765 12,955 6,805 7,840
1968 "13,552 15,911 6,928 11,524
1969 14,171 18,628 7,659 14,396
1970 14,947 21.,557 8,637 14,423 
1971 21,666 38,280 11,466 15,587
1972 33,944 60,587 18,769 16,014
1973 52,715 61,443 25,352 14,864
1974 49,308 77,553 24,651 16,507
Source: Department of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, Z 9 7 4  
(Bangkok, 1975), p .  37 . 
The skill development program has been assisted by. International 
Labor Organization advisers, and an occupational training center exists 
as the National Skilled Development I nstitution (NSDI)i. Ultimately,
the Department of ·Labor seeks to establish training institutes in each 
region of the Kingdomi. About sixty personnel are assigned to training 
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programs, most of them are at the Din Daeng Vocational Training Center 
where skill development is taught in carpentry, auto mechanics, cabinet 
making, building construction, airn. conditioning and refringeration, radio 
and T.V. repairs, welding, metal working, machine shop and other crafts. 
Most of the trainees reside in dormitories at the center, although both 
day and night programs are offered to Bangkok residents. Military 
veterans may attend without paying tuition, although the program is 
oriented more towards youths from poor families who have completed at 
least seven years of schooling. A second program of NSDI has been to 
arrange in-plant training programs based upon the needs of employers.
Programs have been developed for.·nhotels, auto assembly plants and dom­
estic workers. Apprenti�eship standards have been developed for certain 
crafts ; and registration and placement of graduates have begun. A 
third program is directed towards supervisory training in personnel ad­
ministration and human relations skills. This type of program is view­
ed as having a two-fold pay off. Not only does it serve to upgrade
Thailand ' s  managerial skills, but supervisors trained in the program 
may be more willing to list vacancies with artd accept applicants from 
the Employment Service. However, this type of.training program is d i ­
rected towards middle-size firms and towards lower level supervisors.
Larger firms arrang.ne their own in -service training programs for -lower . 
and midd1e-level management. The Development Institution does not par­
ticipate in vocational rehabilitation programs nor does it cooperate 
with agencies dealing with problems of the handicapped. It has nenither ·
the tr�ined personnel nor the facilities for this type of program. 
Public unemployment compensation insurance does not exist in Thai­
land and no system is now being planned. Although unemployment is a 
growing problem in Thailand, the fact that·nover 80 percent of Thailand ' s  
population is rural means that many unemployed are able to return to 
relatives on the farm. Hence, the economy can absorb workers experienc­
ing temporary unemployment more easily than could a more urbanized 
society. In addition, the legal requirement of separation pay which 
increases with years of service, together with an implied commitment of 
employers of smaller firms to provide continuous employment, cushions 
the impact of cyclical swings in economic activity. .  Employment tends 
to vary seasonally with the planting and harvesting months, as uncommit­
ted migrarits enter and leave the urban labor force (see Table 19) . 
Thailand has also sought to inc.rease employment _opportunities for 
its nationals by restricting the employment of aliens. In  recent years,
the Thai government has sought to promote- employment opportunities for 
nationals at the skilled, technical, and managerial levels, and since 
197 3 · new aliens entering the country for employment p.urposes have had 
to regist_er with and obtain workn.npermits from the Off ice of the Secre­
tary of Department of Labor, securing the ·appropriate visas from the 
Division of Immigration. These two o·ffices do not always agree or 
coordinate their policies, much to the distress of companies needing to 
import specialized technical and managerial personnel. "The only 
government office whose word in labour matters is not challenged is the 
Board of Investment, which may insist on alien employees in promoted
companies. n12 The Labor Department in the first two years of the Alien 
Occupation Act had issued about 400,-000 alien work permits, of which 
there are three types. About 300, 000 residence permits have been 
grant�d to aliens, mostly Chinese, who hadn.nlived and worked in Thailand 
for years before the 1972 Alien Occupation Act was promulgated. A 
· 
-second ·type is a temporary work permit issued to holders of nonimmigrant 
visas, and only · about 5, 000 of these have been issued. The nonimmigrant 
12"Alien Occup.ation Laws,n" Business RevieuJ (November, 1974), p. 551. 
106 
TABLE 19 
Labor Turnover Rates in Establishments with Twenty or 
More Employees in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, 1973 
Month Total 
January 1 . 7  
February 2 . 0  
March 1 . 9  
April# 1 . 6  
May# 2 . 4  
June# 2 . 2  
July 1 . 5  
August 1 .  7 
September 1 . 2  
October* 1 . 6  
November* 1 . 8  
December * 1 . 3  
Access i on Rates 
Manu- Non-Manu 
turing facturing 
2 . 1  1 . 4  
2 .  5 1 . 8  
2 . 4  1 . 6  
2 . 2  1 .  2 
2 .  7 2 .  3 
2 . 9  1 . 8  
1 .  5 1 . 5  
1 . 8  1 . 6  
2 . 1  0 . 8  
1 . 6  1 . 6 . 
2 .  2 1 .  5 
1 . 4  1 . 2  
SeEaration Rates 
Manufac- Non-Manu-
Total turing facturing 
1 . 4  1 . 9  1 . 2  
1 . 2  1 . 8  1 . 0  
1 . 8  2 .  2 1 . 6  
1 . 6  2 . 3  1 . 3  
1 .  8 2 . 3  1 .  5 
1 . 5  2 . 2  1 . 2  
1 . 4  1 . 5  1 . 3  
1 . 1  1 . 3  1 . 0  
0 . 8  1 . 2  0 . 7  
1 .  5 2 . 0  1 . 2  
1 . 4  1 .  7 1 . 2  
1 . 0  1 . 0  1 . 0  
# Planting Months * Harvesting Months 
Source: Department of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, l 9 ?4 
(Bangkok, 1975) , pp . 52, 53 .  
visa is good for only thirty days, and it may be extended twicei. Hence, 
every three months (or sooner) , holders of these visas must leave the 
country and reenter on a new nonimmigrant visa.  The third type of work 
permit is an annual one which is given to permanent residents who have 
entered restricted occupations since the enactment of the new l aw .  In 
1974, some 1,639 alien work permits in Bangkok were requested and 1,343 
were granted .i1 3 In order of ·national importance, the most frequent
applicants were the Japanese, Americans, English and Chinese and by
industry most applicants sought employment in hotels and restaurants, 
manufacturing, and personal servicesi. 
V .  Social Security 
In 1976 the only law relating to social security was the Workmen' s 
Compensation Act, the fund for which is financed by a payroll tax on 
employers .  The draft of a social security law providing for compulsory 
retirement insurance has been in preparation since 1965 and was sub­
mitted in 1975 to the Cabinet Ministers comprising the "Committee to 
Eradicate Poverty and for De-centralization of Government,'  where it 
received unofficial approval .i1 4  A new division in the Department of 
Labor to administer the proposed act is contemplated, the personnel for 
which will have to undergo several months training before the act can 
be implementedi. The Workmen's Compensation Fund will be transferred 
to and administered by this division, and the social security program
will apply first to firms and employees in the Bangkok metropolitan area,
from which it will be expanded throughout the Kingdomi. In 1976, how­
ever, there was considerable opposition among business groups to the 
enactment of this law, and it may well be 1980 or beyond before the Thai 
government, in its customary fashion, has educated opposing interest 
groups sufficiently to accept the concept . 
13nepartment of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statis tics, l 9 ?4 (Bangkok,
1975), pp . 57, 59.  
1 4Jan Schut, "Focus on Labour," p .  13 . 
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Thailand has long required employers to report accidents, to main­
tain safe and healthy conditions of employment, and to assume medical 
expenses and to pay indemnity to workers injured on the job . Although
most employers historically have insured themselves, many have subscrib­
ed to workmen's  compensation insurance issued by private companiesi. In 
both cases the financial incentive to evade or contest payment to- dis­
abled workers has been considerablei. To eliminate such problems, in 
1973 The Workmen's Compensation Fund was established , financed by a tax 
on -employers of twenty or more employees . The tax varies from- O . 2 to 
4 . 5  percent of the total payroll, depending upon the accident and dis­
abling injury experience of the employeri. The tax was imposed from 
1973-75 only upon employers in Bangkok and Thonburi; in 1975 it was 
extended to the surrounding Changwads of Samut Prakan, Nontha Buri,
Pathum Thani, Samut Sakhon, and Nakhon Pathom, and in 1977 it will be 
applied in other urban centers in the Kingdom, including the Changwads 
of Phuket, Songkhla, Chon Buri, Saraburi, and Ratchaburi . No problems 
of major consequence have been encountered in securing employer com­
pliance with the taxi. 
Notice of a disabling injury must be given by the employer to the 
Labor Protection Division within fifteen days of its occurrencei. Dis­
abled workers must file for compensation from the fund without undue 
delayi. Employers are obligated to provide at their expense immediate 
medical care to the injured employe e .  Death benefits are provided to 
dependent survivors upon application to the compensation fund . These 
benefits consist of a lump sum payment equal to three times the aver­
age monthly wage of the deceased employee to cover funeral expense.s, 
and a monthly payment to dependent survive.rs equal to 60 percent of 
the average monthly wage for up to ten yearsi. 'Also, the latter payment 
applies if a worker becomes totally, permanently disabled. Lump sum· ·
payments are discouraged to prevent misuse of the compensation award 
by the recipients. For temporary disabilities lasting from seven days
to one year, compensation is paid to the disabled worker in amounts 
equal to 50 percent of his average monthly wages; for permanent, partial
disabilities, compensation is equal to 50 percent of the average month­
ly wage for periods varying up to five years, depending upon the type 
of physical impairment incurred by the injured workeri. This form of 
compensation is in addition to temporary disability payments to w-hich 
he may be entitled . .  Limits are placed upon the amounts of monthly com­
pensation payments, varying from a minim�m of 250 to a maximum of 3,000 
bahti. A variety of occupational diseases are also covered by the act, 
including various forms of chemical poisoning, diseases of the skin, 
and -diseases caused by noise, heat, intense light, darkness, vibration,
air pollution, and other environmental conditionsi. 
The Compensation Fund in 1974 disbursed 3 . 4  million baht in lump 
-sum paymentsi. and appro.ved claims to be dispersed monthly amounting to 
12 million bahti. Tax receipts are deposited �ith th� Department of 
Labor and the fund atimid-19"76 had accumulated reserves of over 21 
million baht . If the fund continues to accumulate reserves after cover­
age of the act is expanded to major urban centers throughout the country, 
the tax premium may be reduced . At present, the program is functioning 
successfully, although no protection is o£fered to the 43 percent of
the nonagricultural labor force employed in establishments of under 
·twenty employees. Many _iof these, however, consist of paid or unpaid
family workers who will receive care if they incur a disabling injury . 
Other major faults with the program lie in the failure of the government
to institute a coordinated safety inspection, accident· reporting, and 
safety training program to accompany the Workmen ' s  Compens·ation Lawi. 
Accidents are costly, and firms should be assisted in accident preven­
tion campaigns not only to safeguard their employees but to reduce 
their operating costs and tax premiumsi. Injury statistics are reported 
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in Table 20 . 
TABLE 20 
Injuries Sustained by Industry in the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Area, 1974 
Permanent Permanent 
Industry Total Death Temporary Partial Total 
Agriculture and 
Other Primary 1 1 
Mining 8 7 1 
Manufacturing 2,469 1, 977 450 8 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 15 1 11 3 
Construction 23 386 40 5 
Trade 415 28 366 18 3 
Transport and 
Communication 291 27 240 - 22 2 
Services 127 16 94 15 2 
Other 10 2 7 1 
Total 3, 690 131 2, 989 550 20 
Source: Department of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, l 9 74 
(Bangkok, 1975), p .  89 . 
• VI . Summary 
Thailand has made great progress in the development of labor 
legi slation in recent yearsi. Substantial success has been achieved in 
developing administrative programs in labor relations and in Workmen's 
Compensationi. Major deficiencies remaih, however, in enforcing the 
labor protection laws and in providing employment exchange servicesi. 
In these areas, the development .of legislation has outpaced the exten­
s ion of adm inistrative servicesi. However, with the eventual upgrading
of labor administration to cabinet rank, it i s  to be hoped that it will 
be allotted more resources to carry out its programs .  Not only will 
the Departm�nt of Labor be able to act more independently and be more 
neutral than is poss ible in the probus iness environment of the Minis­
try of Interior, but it will have the implicit support . of organized 
labor to use as leverage in b idding for its share of the annual govern­
ment operating budgeti. 
Labor problems can be expected to increase as Thailand industrial­
izes . Unless thi s  industrialization occurs with sufficient rapidity 
to absorb its growing labor force, unemployment looms as an increas ing­
ly severe problem on the horizoni. Yet, on the other hand, rapid indus­
trialization produces work-related tens ions which are sources of indus­
trial conflicti. Moreover, external diseconomies in a factory society 
develop as child labor and femalei. labor abuses, industrial injuries, 
old age urban dependency, and income variations with cyclical fluctua­
tions in bus iness become s ignificanti. The functions pertaining to the 
adm inistration of the labor laws, in any case, cannot help but expand . 
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Does the relatively quicker pace .of development i n  labor law pro­
mulgation over that in admini stration support the Jacob ' s  the si s  that 
Thailand's moderni zation i s  in truth superficiali- -t hat the laws are
but a veneer, e stabli shed to show a modern face to the re st of the 
world ? Is  the lack of concern with enforcement a pragmatic design so 
as  to pre serve a favorable climate for inve stment ; so nece ssary for 
continued growt h ?  While Thailand can reply to such social critics a s  
t he International Labor Organiization that she ha s adopted measures to 
protect the welfare of labor, on the other hand, investors are rea s su-r­
ed by the knowledge t hat, in fact, evasion of the laws will be simple, 
and that Thailand ' s  abundant and cheap labor will remain a s  a variable 
cost of production .  
Thi s  latter line of reasoning, although plau sible to the cynic, i s  
not without its fallacies . First, the enforcement t hat does occur i s
directed primarily at large firms, particularly We stern one s, and so
the benefit s of evasion are le ss  likely to accrue to large investors, 
who incidentally are also le ss  likely to violate the lawsi. Second, a
belief per sists in Thai bureaucratic society, a s  it does in most stable
and functional government s, that laws for the most part will be obeyedi. 
Thai employer s, when informed of t he law, have a mo·ral obligation toi· 
heed it, and most in fact will do soi. To the extent that compliance · 
is  achieved, society benefit s  from the law . Yet, Thai s are realist s .  
Some laws must and will be broken. If a parent does not mind permit­-
ting his child to �ork, then why should a labor inspector ? It i s i- not
that the inspector i s  permitting a violation of the law to occur for,
if the child were endangered, he would order the firm to correct the 
condition. The inspector i s  aware that child labor in Thailand i s  
endemic, t hat Thailand i s  a developing count ty, that if t he child were 
not at work he would be on the streets and certainly not be in schooli� 1 5 
Hence, the law, patterned after one that i s  relevant to a modern, devel­
oped economy i s  adminiistered under the realitie s of a developing one.
The advantage s that Thailand obtains from such legislation then is  
fourfold : (a ) to the extent that voluntary compliance i s  achieved, t he 
induistrial labor force i s  protected ; (b ) society ha s already accepted
the �rinciple of such legi slation, and the delays arising from parliai­
mentary lethargy need not be encountered when working conditions reach 
a cr isi s  stage t hat require s affirmative action; (c ) the preexiistence 
of t he legi slation permits the intensity of enforcement to vary po sitive­
ly with pace of development ; (d ) in  the meantime, means exist to deal 
with the more flagrant violationsi. 
This reasoning i s  not intended to defend the lack of enforcement 
of labor legislationi. Rather, it recogni ze s t hat developing countrie s 
such a s  Thailand are often forced by thei. pu.blic opinion of advanced 
countrie s to enact social legislation that i s  as  inappropriate for 
their stage of development as  it would have been for t he now advanced 
countrie s at their earlier c6mparable stage of developmenti. The un­
developed level of enforcement, theri, i s  a pragmatic compromiise to a
body of legislation imposed upon Thailand that i s  in advance of her
economic development. 
15A fathe �  a sked hi s .iservice station emp loyer to give hi s fourteen
year old son a job_. The father, earning a daily minimum wage of 25 
baht, agreed to accept 15 baht a day for the inexperienced, immature 
son. A few -weeks :later, a labor insp.ector c rune by and discovered the . . ·i
vio lation and wa s faced with t hi s  dilemmai. If he forced the service·
_station operator to pay the minimum wage, the employer would have to
discharge ·the child, for the child did not produce 25 baht of income 
per day. Should he enforce the law or shouild he protect the job of the 
child ? 
CHAPTER 5 
INDUSTR IAL RELATI ONS IN THAI LAND 
I .  Industrial Relations and Cultural Change 
To a great extent, a country's level of development conditions 
the practice of its industrial relationsi. As a result, the personnel 
problems experienced by managers in one country differ from those 
experienced in another at a different stage of developmenti. This is 
also true within a country at different periods of timei. The differ­
ences in these industrial relations problems flow not only from the 
maturation changes which have occurred within the labor force in terms 
of its motivation, its commitment, and its age, skill, sex, and occupa­
tional composition ; but the differences also relate to the developing 
capacity of management to adapt to changes over timei. Comparedi·ito 
1950, the labor force of Thailand today is more urban, better educat­
ed, more materially motivated, and better disciplined t� factory worki. 
It should, thus, be easier to managei. Yet, by .American or German 
standards, it is still comparatively primitivei. Skill composition 
and productivity are lower, commitment is weaker, and training takes 
longeri. 
Industrial relations policies and programs in Thailand vary widely
·by types of firmsi. In general, the employment relationship is less 
formal and less overtly structured than in more developed countries, 
and this permits a less well-developed system of personnel administra­
tion by corresponding sizes of firmsi. Recruitment procedures are more 
informal and selection procedures, in the absence of job specifications, 
are perhaps more subjectivei. Most establishments place little reliance 
upon public employment offices, but to obtain specialized personnel 
in Western firms, some use is made of private employment agenciesi. 
Training is for the most part of an on-the-job character. Vocational 
schools and commercial schools do provide some off-job skill develop­
ment facilities, but even graduates of these programs require addition­
al on-the-job skill enrichmenti. Apprenticeship programs do exist among 
some of the older crafts, but the delay in the growth of trade unions 
has hindered the development of formal apprenticeship programs in the 
more modern craftsi. 
The urban labor force, once composed essentially of alien Chinese,
has become predominantly ethnic Thai since 1960, and these Thais are 
becoming committed to nonagricultural employmenti. As this trend con­
tinues, the traditional Thai attitude towards superior-subordinate
relationships can be expected to change. The Thai worker, from a pre­
dominantly rural society, uneducated, and individualized without a 
history of membership in permanent, cooperative group organizations, 
came to accept the imbalance of power with authority figures, chiefly
agents of the monarchi. Survival needs and wisdom taught the Thai to 
defer to authority, to submit to it when no other alternative was 
available as was frequently the case ; to evade or avoid authority fig­
ures as much as possible; and to seek a protective patron against the 
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encroachment of rival authority figures. This traditional pattern was 
in response to a set of circumstances against which the individualistic 
Thai felt hopelessly unable to contend. The reluctance of Thais to 
become. emotionally involved with others , to confront peers , and especial­
ly to challenge superiors is rooted , perhaps ,  not in the feeling of 
self-worth of a Thai- -which most observers agree is high - - but in the 
sense of being powerless. The corresponding attitude of those in power 
or in a higher status position is that they do possess the capacity or 
strength to deal· effectively with subordinates. The traditional 
superior-subordinate relationship has been re-enforced by the persist­
en:ce of these attitudes. Workable grievance procedures are rare because 
few provide protection against the imagined greater power and potential 
r�tribution of a superior sufficient to. guarantee their use by sub­
ordinates. 
Yetn, employees are learning that they do hav·e certain rights under 
the labor codes and that the Labor Department will intervene in their 
behalf against an employer. The strike has proven in recent years to 
be an effective weapon forn- securing redress of grievances and increases 
in wages. Labor associations are developing and providing leadership 
to represent workersn' interests. All of these actions receive wide­
spread press coverage. Hencen, Th.ai  workers are learning that there are 
alternatives to complete submission to employer actions. The labor 
force reflects the young age distribution of the population , and the 
rebellious nature of youth , exemplified by the actions since 1972 of 
mass student protest and interest in social reformn, becomes a character 
trait of  that component of the labor force. 
The immature union movement similarly had not until 1973 required
the sharpening of human re.lation- skills the part of management ors on 
the development of a codified body of work rules in the establishment 
which required systematic application and adjnudication. As the union 
movement has developed and become more militant , however , deficiencies 
in personnel adminnistration have become more glaring. · A November 1974 
survey of eighty-one large _ firms by.the .American Chamber of Commerce 
in Bangkok revealed that 85 percent had published work-rules. ·nThe 
larger the firm and the more Western its orientation , the more likely
it was that it had formalized company rules , oriented employees to 
them, and sought to enforce them. Similarly , well-developed industrial 
relations departments exist only in :the larger establishments. The 
same U. S. Chamber of Commerce survey revealed in 1974 _that only 60  per­
cent of the surveyed companies employed a personnel manager. Thailand 
is still essentially a country composed of small, family owned and 
operated. businesses (see Table 21) , and recognition of the need forn. 
modern personnel administration develops only as the number of large
employers increases , as labor legislation is extended and enforced, 
and as the labor union movement expands , gains experience, and flexes 
its muscle. 
Thai management is essentially paternalistic , especially in small 
and middle size firms. In the smaller firms , much of the labor force 
may -be composed of  family members. Employment of strategic personnel , n. 
if not for life, entails a long-term commitment of the firm to the 
master-servant relationship. This commitment is reenforced by legisla­
tion imposing high separation costs upon employers for releasing long­
service employees. Hence, most firms divide their labor force into 
two components , a·npermanent and a temporary element. The permanent
element will consist of employees whose skills are more specific to 
the firm and who require a period of on-the-job training. These include 
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TABLE 21 
Total Employment in the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area,n* 
By Size of Establishment, September 1970 and January 1973. 
Establishment Number of Firms Cumulative Percent Number of Workers Cumulatnive Percent 
Size ·br of Firmsn· of Workers 
NumEer of Woriers 1970 1973 1970 1973 1970 1973 1970 1973 
1000 and over 35 46 . OS . 04 77, 119 120, 867 15. 14 15. 67 
82 . 1 2 . 11 31, 951 56, 763 21. 41 23. 03 500 
106 . 24 . 21 _n28 ,972 41,099 27.n10 28. 36 - 499300 
100 -· 299 315 503 . 72 . 67 5 2, 765 82, 264 37.46 39. 0 2  
s o  99 500 825 1.49 1 . 42 33, 837 56, 784 44. 10 46. 38 
2 0 - 1, 774 2, 776 4. 21 3.95 5 2, 731 82, 541 54. 46 57. 08 
10 - 19 3, 774 4, 899 10. 00 8. 41 41, 034 64, 243 62. 5 2  65. 41 
5 - 9 12, 40 2 14,756 29. 03 21. 86 75,705 92, 816 77.39 77. 44 
1 - 4 46, 251 85, 736 1()0.00 99. 99 115, 103 174, 117 99 . 99 100. 00 
Total 65, 172 ·10 9,729 509,n217 771,494 
Source : Department of Labor Yearbook of Labor Statistics,  Z 9 7 2 ,  Z 9 7 4  (Bangkokn: Ministry of 
Interior, 1975). 
* Includes Bangkok, Thonburi, Samut Prakann, Nonthaburi ,  Pathum Thani 
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operatives as well as skilled. maintenance personnel, and all have serv­
ed a probationary period of service ranging up to six monthsi. Temporary
employees serve for less than six months, are typically unskilled, and 
are put in j obs requiring little trainingi. Many are raw recruits from 
rural areasi. Others may be workers supplied by a labor contractor, a 
practice still in common use . in Thailand, whereby a broker employs,
often seasonal, village labor for service in other areasi. Frequently 
a large portion of the community is transported to the work site where 
they continue to live in make-shift abodes as a community for the per­
iod of contracted employment . 
Employees in Thai establishments have specific, limited assign�ents . 
If these assignments are not coordinated and synchronized with others, 
such as is true in most shop and mercantile establishments, the time 
at which the tasks are performed is not a matter of great concerni. 
The employee understands his obligations and is permitted to pattern 
his work and lif�style in a manner most pleasing to him, provided, of 
course, that he. fulfills his obligations .i. The Thai worker respects
authority and because the owner-manager can personally supervise the 
work force, the work culture does not require an elaborate set of formal­
ized work ·rulesi. Even in larger Thai establishments, the principle of· 
specified work assignments and answerabili ty to one· and only one source 
of authority militates against a formal set of operating rulesi. In 
foreign firms, however, the culture is less well understood by both 
Thai and alien managers, and more reliance .is placed upon a formal set 
of personnel policies � 
As in any Thai social relationship, status rankings are well defin­
ed, and if they are not well understood, personnel problems result .i1 
The management hierarchy is delineated by family and kin relationships,i· 
experience, and educationi. Typically, a college degree is a prerequi­
site for entering both the Civil Service as an officer and into manage­
rial ranks in private enterprise .  A foreign degree from a European or 
1status is conferred by onei' s  position in a company and is rein­
forced by the network of interpersonal relationships :which are estab­
lished on the j ob .  It ' ha? been observed that loyalty to status is more 
binding than loyalty to company, although status is conferred by both 
the company and the positioni. "One manager of a company, which has had 
only two people leave over a ten-year local history with a staff exceed­
ing fifty, feels compelled to say that he believes his employees stay 
not out of  loyalty to the company, but for reasons of status . "  ,iThai 
Attitude� and Modern Management,i" Investora, (January, 1971) , p .  63 . 
This, however, may simply be another way o.f saying that workers recog­
nize that their position in their current job is better than they could 
obtain elsewherei. Deyo has provided some insight into this question 
relating to white collar workers by explaining: "The Thai male desires 
higher status, but is not greatly dissatisfied to stay at his current 
rank, nor realistically anxious to "change" his job in the direction 
of higher rank . . .  1 (Thai-Chinese males) indicate a lack of ambition, 
show an idealized stress on loyalty and intimacy among peers, the sub­
ordination of personal advancement to the maintenance of group harmony, 
and a lack of materialism .'' The sets of values for both ethnic groups
would tend to lower turnoveri. Frederic C .  Deyo, "Ethnicity and Work 
Culture in Thailand:  A Comparison of Thai and Thai-Chinese White 
Collar Workers,i" Journa l,, of Asian Studies, 34, 4, (August, 1975) , pp.
101,i12. 
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American university carries more prestige than does a degree from a 
Thai institution, and combinations of prior government service, a 
foreign education, and an advanced degree influence status accordingly. 
Foremen and other lower level supervisors in Western firms typically 
have secondary educations, although in Thai firms this is not as com­
moni. The work force is similarly structured, and because occupational
skills in terms of in-school specializations and trainability are 
related to educational attainment, the -status rankings from skilled to 
unskilled personnel tend to parallel years of schooling . In smaller 
firms and in establishments outside Bangkok, the majority of the work 
force tend to be unskilled with only a lower, primary level of educa­
tion (1-4 years)i. Within the metropolitan region, the greater avail­
ability of secondary schools permits a more varied skill mix in the 
labor force, and this availability reenforces the necessity of firms 
that need such skills to locate in the Bangkok-Thonburi areai. 
Advancement in the work force or management hierarchies is perhaps 
more performance oriented in the private sector than in government 
service, but personal relationships still are highly regarded, because 
of the persistence of the patron-client value structure as an important
factor in promotionsi. Seniority is also an element, but close personal
ties and seniority go hand in hand with job knowledge and experience, 
so it may not be entirely accurate to imply that performance criterion 
is not widely utilized. Moreover, because pay increments tend to 
follow years of service, seniority and the wage structure tend also to 
be correlated. In a society in which formal contracts are not preva­
lent and where their enforcement is not easyi, evidence of loyalty and 
trust may be a vital element in appraising an employeei' s  overall 
productivity . 
The cultural norms of the Thai work force should be better under­
stood by Thais, one would assume, than by foreigners, and hence one 
would expect fewer instances of labor-management conflict in Thai than 
in foreign establishmentsi. Moreover, it is a widely held belief that 
in the good Thai society, all elements should work together harmonious­
ly and cooperatively, and since Thais share this value more than 
foreignersi, industrial relations in Thai firms ought, therefore, to be 
more harmonious .i2 Yet, conflicts of interests in all industrial set­
tings between employers and employees seem to be a fact of life, and 
where work rules have not been developed delineating the legitimate 
interests and roles of the respective parties, industrial conflict 
seems to resulti. The Thai pattern of handling conflict, while work­
able in a rural setting or a small firm relationship, has not adapted
well to the modern industrial scenei. 
"Thai workers generally have a large number of 
outstanding grievances to settle with their employersi. 
The traditional Thai method of handling interpersonal 
conflicts is outmoded and conflicts persist that cannot 
be solved except by the worker leaving his jobi.i·_ Indus-
·itries, however, do require disciplined behaviour aimed 
at achieving certain goals at certain timesi. Dealing
with an industrial labour force that comes mostly from 
the countryi' s  rural areas requiresi·istrong-minded floor 
2rhis opinion was expressed to me by the distinguished Sri Prinya 
in a March 8, 1973 interview. Also, see "Thai Attitudes and Modern 
Management," p .  61 . 
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management if high levels of productivity are to be 
achieved. This, however, can go too far, resulting 
in suppressed resentment. Because there is little 
in the way of systematic procedures for dealing with 
worker grievances - - andn- any dealings tend to be dom­
•inated by managements -- real labour problems have a 
habit of suddenly flaring up. Managements . . .  tend 
to feel betrayed, under the impression that be�ause 
th.eir employees were receiving what the management 
deemed to be fair and adequate remuneration, this 
should have been enough.n"3 
Good personnel policies, practiced by a modern industrial relations 
department can minimize these disputes. Relatively fewer Thai compa­
nies have such departments than do foreign companies, and among the 
latter, the personnel practices of Western companies appear to be more 
developed than those of Japanese or Chinese companies. Hence, in 
terms of indices of employee unrest, \\Tes tern companies tend to have 
fewer work stoppages and less employee turnover than do Japanese or 
Chinese firms, which, in turn, have less turnover and fewer labor 
disputes than do native Thai firms. It may be true, of course, that 
because of the foreign element, in those alien establishments in which 
labor disputes do occur, sentiments may be stronger and the feeling
of outrage against alleged abuses may be more volatile. Hencen, labor 
disputes in foreign firms may be more publicized because of the drama 
associated with them, and this can contribute to the popular miscon­
ception that more conflict exi�ts between Thai workers and foreign 
management than with Thai management. 
II . Personnel Policies in Small Firms 
Small firms are predominantly Thai- Chinese family enterprises, 
which are owner-managed. In about 110,000 firms in Greater Bangkok
in 1973, fully 96 percent employed fewer than fifty employees. Most 
owner-managers have acquired their managerial skills through on-the­
job training, and nany do not comprehend that they need more training.
The personnel function is one of many assumed by the owner.n· In small 
firms, the relationship is- likely to be in the form of anemployment - -
entourage, with a patron and a client. The ownern- patron is the poo 
yai (big person) and the client-worker is the poo noi (small person).
The poo yai is the master and the poo noi obeys. "Docility is more 
highly valued than ability. Obedience and loyalty are more important
than productivity.n"4 The worker-manager relationship is personal ; 
orders are direct ; training is informal ; wages and benefits are 
paternalistically determined. Business relationships are also person­
al and built on trust. If working capnital is small, often the opera­
tion proceeds on personal credit without the formality of a contract. 
Successful management depends more on the ability to establish 
horizontal ties and contacts and less on the management of subordinate 
personnel.n· Superior-subordinate roles are traditionally determined, 
3111abour : A New Emergent Poli-t;:ical Force,n" Far Eastern Eaonomia 
Reviewa, O ctober 18, 1974, p. 9. 
4Frank Lombard, "The Thai Worker on the Move,n" Bangkok Post,  
Supplement, August 31, 1973, p. 7. 
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so much so that it is almost taboo for a subordinate to challenge a 
superior.n5 
Recruitment of nonfamily employees is primarily by word-of-mouth 
referrals. An employee has a friend who wants a j ob, or a business 
associate knows someone who would make a good employee. Some of the 
larger Thain- Chinese firms sometimes will advertise in the newspaper, 
but few such firms make use of the governmentn' s  employment service. 
Both Thai and Thai-Chinese workers are recruited, and some distinction 
is made between them. The overwhelming majnority of Chinese descendents 
in the present generation are Thai nationals and so regard themselves,n6 
but those with Chinese ancestry are more likely to be able to speak
the Chinese language, which is an advantage that enables even the un­
skilled to move into higher-level employment. In interviewing appli­
cants, evaluation procedures are essentially subjnective, and recommen­
dations are given great weight. 
In small factories or shops, skilled employees have mostly receiv­
ed their training in previous emp�oyrnent. Much of the work requires
little training as the machines are simple to operate, and most employn­
ees spend a week or two with a fellow employeen-to learn their assign­
ments. Induction is informal, and the worker acquires his knowledge 
of the work rules by observing the behavior of his peers. Some firms 
rely heavily upon temporary seasonal emp1oyees. A long-term commit­
ment to employ workers seems to apply only to the more skilled of the 
work force. Layoffs are used to reduce the work force when demand 
varies, and only then.nmore skilled are retained. Often, even they are 
idle. Not all of them, however, are paid during retrenchment ; rather, 
many of the semi-skilled are given advancements against future earnings.
Promotional opportunities are not plentiful, and because of the limit­
ed skills of the firmn' s  labor force, replacements for higher positions 
usually come from outside the existing work force. 
Although there is little difference between Thai-Chinese and 
ethnic Thai unskilled labor in their capacity to learn a j ob, the 
Chinese often have an advantage of experience since ethnic Thai ordin­
arily have rural backgrounds. Those with Chinese parents are more 
likely to have received some indoctrination in business affairs, and 
they tend to be more stable employees. They also tend to have more 
education than Thais, an advantage that enables them to move upward
in the firm, although in fact there are not many opportunities for, or 
steps in, promotion. 
Work intensity is light and j ob beh�vior is casual. Work posi­
tions are n�t well attended, and employees mingle and converse at 
their pleasure. Strict adherence to production schedules is not re­
quired. The employees appear to be practicing "sanuk,n" and the ab­
sence of foremen gives them wide latitude in their j ob behavior � The 
5In a celebrated steel strike, a·nworker who did voice in public a 
grievance against the plant manager was promptly j ailed for "slander.n" 
See the editorial entitled "Steel Strike (cont.),n" Bangkok Posta, June 
19, 1973, p. 4. 
6In interviews with owner-managers, I was often told that those 
nationals of Chinese ancestry who enter government service become in­
stitutionalized, think of themselves as Thai, and sometimes even deny
their Chinese origin. However, Chinese are less likely to prefer 
government employment and are more likely to favor a commercial endeavor. 
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flexible work assignments and output requirements make consistent 
attendance unnecessary, although a worker is not paid if he does not 
sl1ow up for worki. Apparently he also understands that he may not be 
·absent chronically . 
Employees are occasionally discharged for repeated bad performance 
or chronic absenteeismi. Verbal reprimands may be used for disciplinary 
purposesi. An interesting comment by one Chinese shop owner, when I 
asked how he responded when he felt like shouting at an employee for 
a stupid error, was the matter-of-fact statement "I shout at themi. 
The workers may grin or look sheepish, but it is an accepted preroga­
tive of the employer . '  I questioned a personnel director of a larger 
Thai firm about this statement and was told that Thai-Chinese employ­
ers can yell at their T�ai employees, particularly if they use a little 
humor in doing it, and the Thai employees do not object; some may even 
appreciate it. It is the way it is done and by whom it is done that 
mattersi. An alien employer ·who attempted to do the same thing would, 
however, affront the employee and cause him to lose facei. 
There is ordinarily no grievance procedurei. Employees usually 
defer to the employer out of respect, but j ust as a child may be per­
mitted to engage in some verbal sparring with a parent within limits, 
so may an employee with an employeri. I f  grievances are small, employ­
ees may gripe and g•rumble among themselves, but rarely will they ·icom­
plain to their employeri. However, workers will sometimes raise major 
grievances with their employer and, if they receive no satisfaction,
they quit.  Major face-to-face confrontations are avoidedi. Neither 
are workers likely to offer suggestions about improved ways of doing 
things, although infrequently a skilled employee may make a suggestioni. 
Employees in small firms are
.i
not normally organized in either 
formal or informal worker associations .  On the other hand, organiza­
tions do exist among traders and merchants, although the mutual aid 
and self-help organizations that are found in the Thai-Chinese commun­
ity are not worker organizationsi. Owners of small firms avoid contact· 
with government agencies, particularly the Labor Department and the 
Factory Inspection officesi. The owners are not particularly safety 
conscious, and they can evade the safety laws because such laws have 
n6t been rigorously enforced . Employees seem to be ill informed about 
the type of protection provided them by the labor lawsi. 
Wages are usuallyi. paid monthlyi. Salary advances are sometimes 
giveni. Monthly wages in 1976 varied from 400 baht for unskilled labor 
(j anitor) to 1,500 baht for truck driversi. I n  addition, many employ­
ers prov�de living accommodations andi. three meals a day to employeesi. 
There is no incentive pay but, as is the ·iChinese custom, a bonus is .
customarily paid at the Chinese lunar new year, based on the profits 
of the firmi. Salary increases are not frequent . Some informal sick 
leave is all.owed and the firms often pay for medical expenses of em­
ployeesi. Pensions are rarely providedi. The work day varies from ten 
to twelve hours or more, and in many small businesses a seven-day week 
is worked. Few holidays are provided, although there is a three or 
four-day break at the Chinese new yeari. Lunch breaks and periodic
comfort breaks are not scheduled; workers eat or go to the bathroom 
whenever they cani. The employer ordinarily sponsors no recreational 
·activities with employeesi. 
Few small business owners are well educated or trained in modern 
management practicesi. I nventory control is loose, and production may
frequently be interrupted because of equipment failuresi. Many com­
panies are under-capitalized ; much of the working capital is borrowed, 
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and supplies are purchased on credit. Products have been designed 
and produced without determining the market demand, although in recent 
years some marketing research has been undertaken before introducing 
new productsi. Production is not well planned ; facilities and personnel 
are frequently idle while employees wait for another department or 
process to supply them with a needed component . Supervision is sparse, 
and few foremen are utilizedi. Consequently, quality control is not 
maintained, and there are numerous rejects, often after items have 
been delivered to dealers .. Most departments do not maintain records,
and those which are kept are incomplete and often inaccurate . 7  
I I I .  Industrial Relations in the Modern Sector 
Large firms in Thailand are both Thai and alien-owned,i8 the 
latter being joint ventures with some Thai ownership . Whether owned 
by Thais or aliens, large firms, of  necessity, utilize more modern 
managerial techniques ;  the management hierarchy is highly structured, 
and both line and staff organizations are utilized . 9  In 1 9 7 3  in 
Greater Bangkok there were only eighty-two firms that employed more 
than five hundred workers -- about one-tenth of one percent of all 
firms -- yet combined they employed almost one-fourth of the metropol­
itan industrial labor force . The management of these firms are pro­
fessionals, the upper executive levels are well represiented in the Thai 
Management As s ociation, and the personnel or industrial relations offi­
cers are members of the Personnel Management Group .i1 0  Managers of the 
Thai companies are largely indigenous executives who have had foreign 
educations and/or experience . Even here, cliques based on family ties 
and friendships, reinforced by intermarriage, may often dominate the 
key positions of directorships and top executive assignmentsi. Many
middle executives formerly worked for the government as civil service 
officer s .  In the alien- owned companies, top and many middle-level 
executives are themselves aliens, although increasingly Thais are 
moving up the executive ladderi. Here, too, Thai executives are fre­
quently from the Thai bureaucracy ; often, they are former military 
officersi. In most large companies, the chief personnel officer is 
himself Thaii. Foreign owned companies tend to exercise tighter con­
trol within the organization than do indigenous Thai firmsi. 
Because staff relationships are usually horizontal and their 
authority is advisory, personnel directors tend to be at the top execu­
tive level . This is necessary because status consciousness in Thai 
society tends to be vertical, not horizontal . Because relationships 
in all hierarchies tend to be personal, linkages occur only betweeni· 
two levelsi. An individual has only one "immediate" boss to whom he 
is responsible, no matter how many managerial levels may exist above 
his supervisori. Little cooperation among equals, as staff executives 
tend to be, is expected or occursi. This is more true in the bureaucracy 
7similar management practices are described by Chirmsak Pinthong,
Eaonomias of Smai i  Traator Production in Thailand, (M . A .  Thesis,
Thammasat University, 19 74), pp . 23- 3 9 .  
81n 19 72, Thais owned 68 percent of total investment . 
9 1n Japanese firms, fewer supervisors and more "leadmen" are 
utilized. The Japanese structure tends to be more shallow than in 
other foreign firmsi. 
10of the fifty members of  the Personnel Management Group in May 197 3, 
thirty-seven companies were represented . Of these companies, fourteen 
were Thai, four were Japanese, and nineteen were alien-Thai companiesi. 
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than in private enterprise ,i11 and more true in Thai firms than in 
foreign firms . Hence, for staff functions to be effective , they must 
be implemented by executives of superior statusi. 
Development 
Large companies spend a great deal of effort through in-house 
seminars to upgrade and train middle and lower level executives, who 
are frequently deficient in human relations skillsi. In this training 
emphasis ii  placed upon the type of leadership skills that will eli c it 
information from subordinates and at the same time point up the in­
appropriateness of the poo yai - poo noi relationship in a large, mod­
ern business. Other seminars are devoted to acquainting managers w ith 
the cultural traits of the Thai worker and the type of leadership that 
is -required to elicit appropriate behavior from him . In essence , this 
training not only seeks to transform the Thai manager into his Western 
counterpart , but also in the interim process to provide the executive 
with a real-istic set of expectations of Thai worker performancei. One 
of the biggest complaints is that managers do not understand the Thai 
worker, who means no personal offense when he is absent , tardy, or 
ignores company rules . That is his nature . If he is to be changed 
into a disciplined, predictable employeei, he must be trained, and 
trained in a manner that permits him to keep hi i self-respect and his 
regard for his superior as a helpful, concerned, benevolent leaderi. 
Because Thailand's wage labor force is still relatively small and only 
recently remo.ved from a rural culture, the industrial relations func­
tion is especially important to management seeking a responsive, 
committed, and productive work force. 
The scarcity of locally trained managers has compelled interna­
tional companies to import personnel at great cost to fill positions 
at various steps in the management hierarchy .i12  Top management is 
usually imported by most multinational companiesi. It is often advis­
able and even necessary to duplicate some of these top positions with 
indigenous managers, especially since Thailand requires some degree
of joint ownership by a national in the venturei. At lower levels, 
line executives with unique technical skills may also have to be import­
ed. 
The inescapable need to communicate means that the lower strata 
of management must of necessity be able to speak the language, in 
order to mediate between the needs of the company and the traditional 
work habits of  the employees and to translate performance standards 
into terms comprehensible to the workersi. Because expatriates are 
thought to have bridged the cultural and language gaps, they are some­
times used to fill a number of intermediate positionsi. Certainly,
at the intermediate and supervisory levels, indigenous personnel must 
be used . Opportunities for Thai p·roduction workers to be promoted 
to supervisory level positions in alien owned businesses are extremely 
rare because of the dual language requirementi. It is normally the 
11An example is the lack of interchange of data among agencies . 
Ministriesi' independence of one another creates many policy problems. 
An American advisor to the Labor Department noted to me that provincial 
labor officers ignore directives from Bangkok officialsi- of equal civil 
service ranki. 
1 2Excluding travel, in 1 9 7 1  an upper level foreign executive 
could live quite ni cely on $ 1 ,250 per month � In 1975 the same level 
of living would cost $2, 050 . See "The Farang's Cost of Living,i" 
Investor, (December, 1 97 1 } ,  p .  97 7 - 8 1 . 
120 
better-educated Thais who have a facility to speak English, and super­
visors in alien firms are, therefore, drawn primarily from this sector 
of the labor forcei. Hence, supervisors are employed from the external 
labor market of alien firmsi. On. the other hand, in Thai owned estab­
lishments, language is no barrier, and opportunities for the rank-and­
file worker to rise to a supervisory position are correspondingly much 
greateri. The lack of opportunity of native Thais to move into manage­
ment positions in Japanese-owned firms has been cited as one of the 
primary reasons for the enactment of the Alien Business and Occupation 
Act of 1973 .i1 3 
Attempts by alien managers to mold indigenous Thai personnel into 
an efficient producing unit, without making allowances for cross- . 
cultural attitudes and values, are likely to result in intra-organiza­
tional conflict .i14 An executive who is conditioned to speak bluntly 
in direct interpersonal exchanges can alienate subordinates who are 
accustomed to an indirect, soft approach in receiving reprimands or 
changes of procedure with which they are identifiedi. The existence 
of tensions and disharmonies can be particularly
.i
pernicious when two­
way communication does not operatei. Even where formal grievance pro­
cedures have been instituted, recourse to them is not being made 
because cultural norms of behavior make it unthinkable for a subordinate 
to question his superiori. Embarrassing confrontations are to be avoid­
ed. If conditions are intolerable, a subordinate may prefer to leave 
the firm rather than to raise the issuei. Employee groups may simply 
walk outi. Even then, the manager may find that he can only discover 
the issue through a government mediator with whom a delegation of 
workers feel more free to talki. 
Such spontaneous walkouts are common even though labor organiza­
tions were illegal in Thailand until 1972. The existence of a labor 
movement, however, does not assure that a greater level of worker­
management communication will take place .i1 5  A movement which is in­
experienced and has a history of being suppressed is apt to be less 
job-oriented than politicali. I have talked with executives in Thailand 
who, conscious of the communications gap, have considered instituting 
company unions as a last ditch method of developing two-way channels 
of information with employeesi. 
131 1Focus on Thailand, 1973,i" Far Eastern Eaonomia Reviewa, �1ay
·14, 1973, pp . 29-31i. To encourage the employment of Thai nationals, 
alien personnel have been harrassed by visa restrictions which require 
periodic exit and reentry into the countryi. Moreover, it is not un­
common for· an alien to be unable to secure an entry visa from the 
Foreign Ministry because he has not first obtained a work permit, but 
the Labor Department refuses to i�sue him a work permit until he has 
first obtained the appropriate entry visai. 
14A General Electric Company study of personnel failures in for­
eign assignments found that 60 percent of them were owing to poor 
cultural adaptabilityi. R . B .  Blomfield, "The Importance of Foreign 
Language to a Career in Business,i" Journal of the Ameriaan Soaiety of 
Training Direators (October, 1961), p .  35i. 
15R .  n.  Robinson, International Management (New York: Holt, Rine­
hart & Winston, 1967), pp . 61-63i. 
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Performance 
Performance by Thai workers may, however, deviate from Western 
norms be cause of cultural influences . A Western employee 's  concept of 
i dentifiication with and commitment to the company may be alien to a 
Thai workeri. The Thai employee may identify with a superior, w ho 
assumes t he role of a patron, or may be loyal to the status w hich his
position in the company bestows upon him, but in Thaiiland there is no
counte rpart to the "organi zational man" . Moreover, in the trop ics, a 
basi c p rinciple seems to be "minimize the expenditure of ene rgy by 
accept ing t he most easily obtainable result " .  This p rinciple does not 
make for thoroughness in analy zing alternative courses of action . In
keeping with this princip le, t he most apparent details are considered 
to be the only relevant onesi. Indee d, because statistics are sparse 
and re cord keeping has no history, management has little appre ciation 
for facts and only little understanding of the. need to co lle ct and 
analyze data to assist in de cision making. Subordinates may carry out
directives .iwithout a thoug ht of questioning even t hose orders whi ch 
are clearly in error, for to admit that one does not understand amounts 
to an admissiion that one is not competenti. Instead, the subordinate 
supplies his own interpretation, taking refuge in the knowledge that 
the supe rior will be hel d responsible for the error. Ordinarily, 
mistakes will not formally be brought to t he attention of a superior, 
nor will responsibility be a ccepted for errors. The reasoning p roceeds 
as follows : "since no error was intended, the mistake must have been 
engineered by fate ; hence, it was not within my powe r to p revent it
and I am therefore not responsible for it . "  Su ch attitudes play havoc  
w it h  the cont rol function of management, for they result in only a 
one-way flow ·of information - from top to bottomi. There is also an
unwillingness to impose oneself upon a superio r -- Kriengjai -- ; to 
bother him or seek assistancei. It is "out of place " and does not show 
proper respe cti. Consequently, needed clarifications are not soughti. 
The importance of labor p rodu ctivity of cooperating resources, 
particularly as exp ressed in the form of the capital �labor ratio, is 
well understood .  The scarcity of critical complementary resources, 
such as managerial talent, contiributes also to low levels of worker  
pro ductivity. Moreover, cultural traits of t he labor force can also 
contribute to deficient levels of output . 16  · Productivity is normally 
measure d in terms of output per unit of time, and an attitude which 
does not regard time as having an opportunity cost is not one which
is sensitive to admonitions to maximize output per unit of timei. In
Thailand, work has low value if it cannoti- be enjoyed, and labor force 
participants do .inot readily accommodate themselves to situations in
which the a ctivity is devoid of "fun" .  Where reward and advancement 
are roote d in t raditions of personal relationshipsi- and seniority, t he 
p rinciple of merit has little incentive valuei. Although Thais are 
general ly well fe d, poor nutirition and inadequate caloric intake may 
limit the capacity of some elements of the work force to undertake 
sustained or rigorous expenditures of energyi. Poor health can contri­
bute to absenteeism and ca.n sho rten work life expectancy. Because of
these consiiderations, the si ze of a labor force require·d to perform a
given unit of work is often greater in Thailand t han in a more . developi­
ed country, even aside f rom the substitution of labor for capital w hich 
.16 Keith Davis, "Managing Produ ctivity in DevelopingiCountries,i" 
in Management in International Perspe ctive , e d .  S .B .  Prasad (New York : 
Appleton-Century-Croft, 1967), pp . 148-59. 
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accompanies low wages. Conventional managerial techniques to improve 
productivity, which apply in developed countries, may prove inadequate 
in the face o f  these cultural differences. 
Turnover and Training Costs 
Separations are composed of layo ffs, quits, and terminations due 
to deaths or retirement. The last source o f  separations are trivial
in Thailand, wh ich has a relatively young labor forcei. Rather, quits 
are the pre dominant cause o f  turnover. The seasonal or ritual attrac­
tion o f  rural culture has been strong, and seasonal turnover in urban
employment has been correspondingly highi. As recently as 1964, it was 
observe d that "a great many wage earners are only seasonal workers." 
Many rural Thai fill nonagricultural positions only between rice planti­
ing and harvest time. Such workers constitute a large proportion o f  
the unskille d labor which is the major component o f  the nonagricultural 
work force. These temporary, unskilled workers are not fully committed 
to nonagricuiltural labor. They will work, or cease to work, in response 
to their immediate feelings, the actions of friends - particularly from 
their home village or region - or the extent to which "facei" and tradi­
tional value requirements have or have not been satisfied . i1 7 Also,
since Thailand is a Buddhist country, periodic quits are occasioned 
by the obligation of  a young man at one time in his li fe to spend
several months in the monkhood. As development progresses, however, 
turnover associate d with rural links should be re duced, and a more 
committed, more stable labor force should resulti. 
Other factors can lower separations rates, such as the strict en­
forcement of the Separations Pay Act, where workers laid off through 
no fault of their own are given termination pay based upon their length 
o f  s ervice. In firms which are committed to a traditional style of 
lifetime employment, or which are subject to high separation payments, 
or which have large training costs, layo ffs will tend also to be rela­
tively few in number.1 8  Finally, in  ai· dual labor market where modern, 
high wage firms exist in one sector and traditiional, low paying firms 
exist in another, workers in high paying firms will tend to have lower 
quit rates than those in the traditional sectori. The modern sector is
likely to have the most "committed" employees.
Statistics on separation rates in Thailand reveal that in manufac­
turing establishments such rates are about onei-half of those in the 
United States. These statistics, however, are collected from establish­
ments of twenty employees or more and are voluntarily supplie d through 
a mail .questionnaire. Hence, the data is undoubtedly biased in the 
sense that the traditional sector 1s underrepresented and the modern 
sector is overrepresente d .  The latter would tend to have lower layoff 
and quit rates for the reasons indicate d above. These rates also vary 
cyclically in Thailand as they do in the Unite d States. 
Koji Taira has studied the reasons for the lower separation rates 
by interviewing thirty-three firms divided among Thai, Western, and 
17iu . s .  Department o f  Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Thailand, 
BLS Bulletin 267 (Washington, 1 964 J,  p. 26. 
18Thai executives have told me that Japanese firms in Thailand 
do not practice their Japanese custom o f  providing li fetime employment 
to their employees. It is Thai firms rather than Japanese firms that 
are most committed to this philosophy. 
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Japanese owned factories.i1 9  All are relatively large, with an average
of over six hundred employees, and are obviously in the modern sectori. 
All have much lower separation rates than the U . S .  average in manufac­
turing, although no comparison is made ·with the rates in firms in the 
U . S .  modern sector .  He finds that separation rates vary inversely
with wages and with "good" management practices . The order of separa­
tion rates is highest in Thai firms and lowest in Western owned firmsi. 
Training costs, of course, are related to the amount of turnover. 
To the extent that members of the labor force involved in quits move 
to related jobs at higher pay, the employing firms experience an ex­
ternal economy, where costs of training are imposed upon other establish­
ments. To the extent that skills acquired on earlier jobs are not 
transferred, then a social loss from investment in training is incurredi. 
As economic development proceeds, a reduction in the latter type of 
turnover c·an be expected, while the former increases, so that the na­
tional stock of investment ·in human industrial resource groi.vsi. Train­
ing costs, then, are composed of two elementsi. One of these involves 
converting an unskilled, undisciplined rural labor force into an in ­
dustrial one with a hierarchy of skills - call this "transformation 
training costs"; the other involves upgrading a partially trained in­
dustrial labor force - call this "upgrading training costs . "  In 
countries experiencing early stages of development, the composition 
of a company's training costs is heavily weighted with the first type_ 
and, because of the turnover induced by rural-pull, such training 
costs continue over an extended period. As growth proceeds, the weight 
shifts towards the second type of training costsi. Obviously, the 
composition of weights are influenced by both the pace of development, 
which conditions the rate of absorption of the rural labor force, and 
the skill needs of the expanding economy . A rapidly growing company
in a vibrant economy of a less developed country, such as Thailand,
finds its training costs still heavily weighted by transformation costs. 
IV .  Conclusions 
The above. generalizations about the practice of industrial rela­
tions must be recognized for what they are -- indications of common 
practices -- for there are wide variations within Thailandi. Moreover,
with economic development, rapid changes in practices are occurring. 
There are variations between metropolitan and provincially located 
establishments, between lar·ge and small firms, and among Thai, Thai­
Chinese, Japanese, or Western firmsi. 
Alien companies often tend to be concerned with the effects of 
labor conflict only to the extent that political considerations require
it. If a venture is short term, it may not be economically feasible 
to invest substantial sums into enlightened personnel policiesi. More 
long term ventures, on the other hand, require sustained efforts to 
minimize conflict, particularly since the government is sensitive to 
social disorder, or if operations require importation of large numbers 
of technical staff who must work clo.sely with indigenous personneli. 
Whether the costs are in the form of lower levels of productivity, in 
resources not utilized because of a labor dispute, in increased r.isks 
of expropriation, or in the imposition of more stringent regulatory·i
statutes, employer-employee conflict can be expensive. 
. 
- 19Koj i Taira,i "Work Force Management and Labor :t-.1:arkets in Thai 
Industry" (Paper presented at Midwest Japan Seminar, University of 
Kansas, Lawrence, November 22, 1975)i. 
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As traditional Thai employer-employee relationships changei, en­
lightened personnel policies as a consequence must develop if managei­
ment is to deal effectively with the industrial relations problems of 
the near futurei. As more severe challenges arise from the extension
of existing organiizational technology, in order to survive an enteri­
prise increasingly requires a management that is able to develop its 
skills accordingly . Stated another way, the management of those firms
that do not learn how to deal effectively with employer-employee con­
flict may not long survivei. Hence, through Darwinian evolution , 
management must become more professional . 
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I.  The Siam Building Materials Company
1 
The Siam Building Materials Company consists of a group of 
five subsidiaries and includes the manufacture of specialized pro­
ducts as well as marketing divisions .  In 1976 it was the second­
largest private employer in Thailand, having about 9, 000 employeesi. 
(The largest is Bangkok Bank with 12,000 employees. ) Only a fraction 
of its employees are female. The company uses about 250 women in 
manufacturing and another 200 are employed in clerical j obs . In 1975 
about 1, 000 temporary employees were made permanent. Only about 
twenty-five aliens are now employed; they include some long-time 
Chinese employees who retained their alien status to avoid military 
service .i2 When the parent company was established in 1913, it im­
ported Chinese laborers as fitters and machine tenders. Over the 
years, the Chinese work force has trained new Thai employees, so that 
the work force in the _many plants located throughout Thailand is al­
most completely composed of Thai citizens .  The industrial relations 
department is centrally located 1n the parent company and formulates 
policy for all subsidiariesi. In 1976, it had a staff of fifty employ­
eesi. This office centralizes the functions of training, testing of 
monthly employees, records, and administration of benefitsi. Each 
subsidiary has its own personnel director and each plant has a 
personnel officer. Employees are administered on a local basis .  
The personnel departments are operated as staff organizationsi. 
Their function is to assist and advise managers in other departments. 
The staff function is acknowledged and performed in this and other 
large Thai corporations, although it 1s understood that in small and 
middle- size Th�i companies, the staff function has not been separated 
from line activities .  Employee records are centralized and computer­
ized, and data processjng _ is quick. Hence, the personnel department
is able to provide rapid and reliable information to line executivesi. 
Modern personnel procedures are in use. Job descriptions and 
specifications were developed in the parent company in the 1960s, but 
these elements of job analysis have not yet been extended to the sub­
sidiaries, which are relatively recent acquisitions of the companyi. 
The company is not convinced at this time that the time and cost 
needed to develop these procedures would yield sufficient benefits in 
the other branches, although it is keeping an open mind to its future 
use. The job hierarchy has been created by line management, and the 
rationale for the structure has been provided by custom and inherent 
function, mixed with some planning . The executive and clerical hier­
archy evolved similarly, and both s ystems are functional . The person­
nel executives believe the structures are close approximations to 
systems established more formally .i. Job grades are established for the 
occupational structure, and there is a systematic procedure for wage
and salary progres sion through it . 
1This report is based on interviews with the Industrial Relations 
Director, the Director of Employee Relations, and the Director of 
Training and Testing, March 23, 1�73 . A follow-up interview was con­
ducted on July 16, 1976 with the Indusitrial Relations Directori. 
2Military service is a requirement of all male nationals .  At 
the time these Chinese were eligible for Thai citizenship, many were 
mature, had responsible jobs, with growing families .  Military service 
in such circumstances would have been an extraordinary burden on these 
workersi. 
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Recruitment 
The plant personnel offices are used for the hiring of production 
workers, and local employees are preferred since it is better for 
community relations. The company uses both walk-ins and personal re­
ferralsn. Word-of-mouth has been a good source of communication for 
local vacancies. The company believes that the best applicants do 
not use the Employment Service offices of the Department of Laborn. 
Hence, they infrequently use these services because they have found 
that applicants are riot well-screened by the Employment Service. This 
company echoes the opinion of other firms that the Employment Service 
is.more interested in the number- than the quality of its placements . 
References carry heavy weight. The company prefers to recruit young 
persons, since its employment relationship is life oriented. After 
selection, the new worker is oriented by the personne1n·nofficer, is ren­
ferred to his supervisor for assignment, and goes through a period of 
on-the-job training during a probationary period of from three to six 
months. 
Recruitment for monthly employees begins with a requisition to 
fil l  a vacancy submitted by a supervisor to the personnel department. 
The personnel department then proceeds in the fol l owing sequence of 
steps to obtain the needed employee. First, there is an internal 
canvassing of existing employees with the necessary qual.ifications to 
determine those eligible for promotion. Next, a search through exist­
ing records of walk-in applicants is made to locate suitable app li­
cants. These records are kept current. Third, a personnel officer 
may personal ly visit or telephone schools, institutes, or colleges 
for applicantsn. Fourth, advertisements may be p laced for positions
which require special skil ls or experience. Fifth, private employment 
offices may be contacted, and specialized agencies may be used for 
executive placement. 
Selection 
The selection process for monthly employees begins -with comple­
tion of the application form. In some. cases, where relevant, a battery
of tests is given to d�termine a�titudes and attitudes. A personal 
interview is then scheduled, and if the applicant is deemed qualified, 
a medical examination by company physicians is required. These employ­
ees, either c lerical or execut.ive, receive more formal orientation in 
the personnel department, and they are referred to their supervisor
for his final approval. In effect, then, supervisors set the ultimate 
standard for applicants. At al l levels, including production employees, 
the life_ time nature of the employment commitment with the company is 
explained, and the company rules and regulations are clarified for the 
new employees . The obligation of the employee to abide by these rules 
is made a condition of the reciprocal commitment of the employer. The 
benefits provided by the company are detailed and workers are informed 
as to what to expect in their employment with· the company. 
Training
Training begins with the orientation sessions. For production 
and c lerical employees, training is essentially  "learning while doing,"
under the close supervision of a more experienced worker or foreman. 
Supervisors are given training in human relations and employee rela- :_ 
tions, and the results of the training are appraised in folnlow-up 
s tud.ies of supervisory per£ ormance. 
In 1976, additional efforts were made to provide supervisors with 
training in human relations- skills in which the company has acknowledg­
ed that their supervisors are most deficient. Because of changes in 
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revealed attitudes of Thai workers, who even in this company have be­
come increasingly assertive and militant, supervisors have been defi­
cient in dealing effectively with their subordinates . The advent of 
a union in July 1975 in three of the company ' s  five divisions has been 
attributed to worker dissatisfaction with poor supervision. To remedy 
this deficiency, the company in 1976 ran seminars for 600  supervisors . 
With a training staff of only five, such training has proceeded slowly . 
Executives may also go through a type of one-the-job training, 
although at present no formal system of rotation in various assignments 
is used. Supervisors and executives are exposed to executive develop­
ment seminars on pertinent subjects--emp1oyee relations, record keeping, 
quality control, cost budgetingi. The in- service seminars are arranged
by the Central Testing Officer, and follow-up measures of effectiveness 
are made to determine the results of this trainingi. Executives also 
attend seminars held outside the f irm by the Personnel Management Group, 
the Thai Management Association, and the Personnel Officers Association 
sponsored by the Department of Labori. 
These associations hold seminars to improve Thai management. The 
Thai Management Association: runs intercultural seminars to aid in the 
solution of problems which Thai and Western managers face in dealing 
with each otheri. These seminars assist both groups in learning how to 
work with one anotheri. The seminars also stress that customs and tradi­
tions are peculiar to each Thai company within the larger context of 
Thai culturei. Hence managers are exposed to problems of adapting to 
individualized customs as well as to national customs and traditions . 
The management associations provide opportunities for Thai managers to 
meet and discuss common problems and solutions to themi. Wage surveys 
are conducted which are more specific and more useful than the exten­
sive surveys conducted by American Chamber of Commerce of Bangkok . It 
is felt that in the surveys of the latter the wage ranges are too broad 
and the occupational categories are too general to be of operational 
use by Thai managers . Seminars are held to acquaint managers w ith pro­
cedures required under such new labor laws as minimum wages , the Alien 
Occupation and Business Acts, and the Labor Relations Acti. 
Motivation: Wages and Benefits 
Repeatedly, the company emphasized that it has a lifetime commit­
ment to its employees and a commitment to provide stable employment,
which amounts almost to a guaranteed annual wagei. Its range of fringe 
benefits is large for hourly employees . The designation of hourly 
employees is misleading, however, because until 1976 they were paid
weeklyi. A union demand in 1976 called for employees to be paid monthly,
since such an interval of payment carr�es great status with it .  The 
company willingly granted this demand, since it simplified its payroll 
procedures and, in fact, was less costly . ·iThe workday is eight hours 
and the workweek is six days, although employees are paid for seven 
days.  Production and cl�rical employees are paid in cash, which is 
almost a universal Thai practice ; supervisors and management are paid
monthly by check, although many cash their checks at the d isbursement 
office. 
Workers are rewarded partly on the basis of seniority and partly 
on the basis of meriti. Merit evaluation had been conducted only once 
annually btit,· in response to a 1976 union demand, the procedure was 
changed to a twice-a-year review process, although the once-a-year pay
adjustment pattern was retained. There is a step progression of wages, 
depending on tenure with the company i Within each grade there is a 
� 
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minimum and maximum. range, within which merit determines the position.
Merit is used in considering employ.ees for promotion. lVorkers are 
evaluated by their supervisors through a merit-rating form, and this 
rating is ·reviewed by the .next step in management. The worker is in­
formed of his rating, and it is reflected in his wage progression.
Wage increases are built into the progression system to correspond to 
income needs at different times in a worker ' s  life, and supplemental 
payments are scheduled at marriage, birth of children, education of 
children, etc. Bonuses are paid annually. The company provides uni­
forms at one-fourth of their costs , but employees launder them. The 
company has a cafeteria at each of its plants, and it controls the 
prices and quality of ·the food, but the employee pays for the food. 
Many workers, however, bring their own lunch. The company maintains 
a cooperative store for employees, and it has a recreational facility 
at a popular seaside resort·nwith cottages. Buses are provided for 
transport to the resort, and vacations, varying from one to three 
weeks, are paid. Pensions are provided, and the company ' s  contribution 
varies from 5 to 2 0  percent of the base salary. Retirement is at age
fifty-five. A savings plan exj_sts whereby the company matches one-half 
of the employeen' s  personal savings. �fedical facilities are available 
to employees and members of their immediate family at company expense.
·The ·company pays the workersn' income tax, and it providnes low interest 
.loans for automobile or home purchases. Paid sick leave for up to 
forty-five days, with anothner forty-five days which are unpaid, is 
provided. 
Executives receive fewer fringe benefits, but instead they receive 
relatively higher salaries. The company believes that executives can 
allocate income for themselves and save rationally, but it recognizes 
that these actions are more difficult for workers. Some Thai comnanies 
provide executives with automobiles, but this company does not. Manage-
ment income is high, but by no means is it the highest in Thailand. 
(However, it has a reputation of being the leader in Thailand. ) Manage­
ment receives pensions, participates in executive development programs,
·and may purchase company stock, but does not receive other types of 
welfare benefits provided hourly employees. 
Discipline 
A six-step discipline procedure of increasing severity is used. 
Employees are kept informed of company rules and regulations, and they 
are expected to abide by them� Verbal and written warnings are first 
directed at an offending worker. A formal reprimand is used as the 
second step, with a statement to the effect that penalties will be in­
voked ifn.the infraction is repeated. Suspension for a varying period 
is the next most serious form of discipline invoked. The fourth step
involves termination of employment, but with severance compensation. 
The most severe penalty is discharge without compensation. B efore 
step three is used, the personnel department must be informed of the 
sanction. Steps four through six cannot be made without appropriate
consultation with the personnel depaitmentn. Appeals against disciplin­
ary action may be taken up through higher ·levels of management and 
ultimately to the Board of Directors. However, no evidence was offered·n
as to the frequency with which appeals are used. The impression was 
given that discharges were infrequent and that sanctions are imposed
only after careful deliberation. 
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Employee Relations 
Until 1976 only one strike had occurred in the company. This was 
in 1957n, and officials believe that it was a political action of the 
times rather than an expression of worker dissatisfaction. A second 
strike occurred in March 1976 after an impasse had been reached in 
negotiations with the newly organized union. The company has a grievn­
ance procedure among its rules- and regulations ,  as it is required to 
have by law , but no formal, operational system is in use. Such a 
system is in the planning stage and will be introduced at the opportune
time. Company officials believe that workers are unfamiliar with the 
concept of a grievance procedure , and they must be educated to use it. 
There were some expressions of fear that workers might even abuse the 
procedure. An informal system is used , however , whereby the worker 
may complain to his immediate supervisorn. The supervisor may refer 
the matter to his immediate superior for reso. lution , but in pra<;:tice 
the status differential between supervisor and middle �anagement limits 
the use of this second stage. Appeals by workers over the immediate 
supervisorn' s  head are unknown because status differentials are insur­
mountable. Moreovern, workerns have little contact with middle manage­
ment . This raises the question as to how effective a formal procedure
would be if it were instituted in view of the cultural barriers to its 
operation. However-, workers do complain to their union representative , 
and a work council on a collective basis does pursue class- action-type 
grievances. Confirmation was given regarding Thai reluctance for 
confrontations. 
Suggestion systems are not used. Workers are not now rewarded 
for advice on how to improve operations. Although supervisors are en­
co· to make use of employeesn' ideas , formal system exists touraged no 
transmit them. The employee relations director feels that a suggestion 
system is desirable , that it could work if suitable rewards were given
for good ideasn, and that one might be developed in the future. The 
general impression confirms the often quoted observation that communi­
cation in the .Thai firm is essentially a one direction process ,  from 
the top downward , and that no great desire for two-way communication 
exists on management ' s  part. However , the industrial relations direc­
tor perceives that situations could occur in which two-way communica­
tion could be beneficial to managementn, and he hasn, in factn, introduced 
an employee ·ballot whereby employees can indicate their approval or 
disapproval of policy changes that will affect them. Thai executives 
often do not know whether employees wish a policy change relating to 
working conditions or fringe packagesn, or the administration of the 
latter � How do workers feel about work hours , overtime scheduling,  
the form and frequency of wage paymentsn, etc.n? The questionnaire is 
designed to elicit employee opinion. 
No worker associations existed in the company prior to July 1975. 
Management had feltn- that the development of labor associations would 
be hindered by worker apathy , but this proved to be erroneous. They
had noted that Thai workers are pragmatic and would not support organi­
zations promising them benefits that cannot be delivered. The govern­
ment , they believed ,  would tend to limit the range of activities in 
which labor asnsociations could engagen, and this would impair the re­
cruitment of workers. Thai executives further believed that workers 
were not sufficiently educated to be responsible trade union partici­
pants. Apparently , the events of the 1955-5 8  period had left employers
apprehensive about the development of labor organizations in Thailand. 
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In July 1975, a worker representative informed the industrial 
relations dire ctor that a group o f  employees were pet it ioning for union 
reg istration and, a ccording to Tha i custom, sought company approval 
o f  this challenge to tradit ional authority. The approval was given and 
accompanie d by a request that the union be reasonablei. A union was 
forme d under the leadersh ip of a company superviisor w ith members from
three of the company 's fivei· operating div is ions. Formally, the union 
was a m inor ity organiization s ince it enrolle d only 2 3  per cent o f  the 
produ ctiion workers o f  those divisiions. The union presented a l ist of 
ten demands, and the company and union negotiiated for several months 
to an impasse. The demands inclu ded.a 45 0 baht monthly adjustment to 
compensate the employees for increases in the cost-o f-liv ingi. Shift 
differential increases were also'irequested. The company refused to 
grant the cost-of-living a djustment, arguing that it already had g iven 
such adjustments, amount ing to 7 4 0  baht, and these more than compensat­
ed its employees for such price increases. 3 The oompany did, however, 
offer a comprom ise on sh ift different ials and on other selecte d demands. 
When the impasse was reached, a fifteen- day stri ke occurred in March 
1976, whi ch was honore d by all the production employees in the three 
diviisions. The government intervened, stopped the str ike, and ordered 
the issues to be arbitrate d by the Labor Relations Committee. In May 
1976 the LRC denied the cost-of-l iv ing a djustment, but ordere d compro­
m ises on other issues, such as extens ion o f  me dical facilit iesi' use to
immediate fam ily members, extension of s i ck leave, and more frequent·
evaluat ion. · 
The company feels that it won the dispute, but that in the process 
both the company and union learned some valuable lessons about the 
extent o f  each other's power. Some worker d isaffectation w ith the 
union occurre d, but th is may be more of an indicat ion of worker reluc­
tance to pay union dues than of worker dis illus ionment w ith the ir union. 
Management spoke of having feelings o f  being betraye d by "employeei- dis­
loyalty, " _because the company had always pri ded its el f on taking a 
parental interest in its employeesi' welfare.i· 
Ethnic rivalry in the S iam Bu ilding Materials Company has not been 
a problem, s ince few al iens are employe d. Cliqves among workers have 
ex iste d. One, made up of ten or twelve employees from a common schooli�
create d some d is cord by acting as though its members were super ior to 
·other workers.i. The company has learned to disperse and m ix .such ·sub­
groups . in order to avoid the development o f  potential confli ct. Workers 
orig inat ing from many areas o f  Thaiiland in general have no problem in
working s ide by s i de with one another. Employees o f  Ch inese ancestry 
tend to regard themse lves as Thai nationals and follow Thai customs. 
·3nata on pay, cost o f  l iv ing adjustments pai d  by the company, and 
the Bangkok consumer pr ice index are as follows : 
July l ;  Jan. 1, July 1, Jan. 1,
1 9 73 1 974 1974 1 9 7 5  
Average Pay
(Baht ) 1,526 1,8 95 2,176 2,370
C�o-1 adjustment 1 0 0  3 0 0  2 0 0  1 4 0
Percentage of Pay 6.6 .1!5 .. 8 9 . 2  
.5. 9 
Bangkok CPI Index 135.1 158.4 ·i174.6 175.6
Percentage Change 6.1 17.2 1 0. 2  0. 6 
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Conclusion 
The Siam Building Materials Company appears to be a leading Thai 
establishment with respect to the practice of modern personnel manage­
ment . The top executives are informed and appear to be sensitive to 
employee problems. They are concerned with employee morale, and they
follow the Buddhist precepts of benevolence and concern for others. 
The company is benevolently paternalistic, and workers are treated as 
a part of the extended family; this is unique for such a large organi­
zationi. Data gathering procedures and record keeping are modern, and 
the Industrial Relations Department makes use of the company ' s  sophisti­
cated data processing centeri. Its executives are active in profession­
al management associations, they utilize wage surveys, and exchange
relevant information with executives o f  other companies . 
Turnover rates have been low and wages are high relative to other 
Thai firms -- as much as 30 percent higher. The company is progressive
and enlightened and cooperates with relevant government agenciesi. It 
regards labor associations with some apprehension, and although griev­
ance procedures are not yet well-developed, it is attempting to estab­
lish two-way communication with its employeesi. In 1975 and into 1976 
the company showed a profit lossi. This occurred in part because of 
the decline in the growth of investment in the Thai economy associated 
with the worldwide recession and in part because a price ceiling had 
been imposed by the Thai government, even though costs of production
had increased through a five-fold increase in energy costs. As the 
Thai economy continues to develop and as the construction industry ex­
pands, however, the company should continue to grow and prosperi. 
II . The Thai-American Energy Company4 
The Thai-American Energy Company is a large multinational petro­
leum company . The managing director is an American Ph.iD. in industrial 
engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he re­
tains an executive staff composed almost equally of well-educated 
Americans and Thaisi. The sales manager is Thai and a M . I. T .  graduate 
as well . The director of industrial relations was a former Thai air 
force colonel; he was trained as an engineer in the prestigious Thai 
Military Academy, the West Point of Thailand. The company employed 
over 1, 200 people in 1973 but only 1,100 in 1976, 60 percent o f  whom 
are white collar. Blue collar employees are composed of refinery work­
ers (150), warehousemen and barge terminal employees (300), truck driv­
ers (60), and, formerly, operators o f  company owned service stations 
(100), ani- operation that has since been divested . 
The industri�l relations department is a staff organizationi·iand 
has no difficulty in operating as such . The industrial relations direc­
tor was employed by the Thai-American Energy Company because o f  his 
leadership experience with the militaryi. He notes that there exists 
a great shortage of executive talent in Thailand , and the Thai-American 
Energy Company prefers to recruit engineers for management positionsi. 
Although engineers are numerous, few have had any managerial experiencei. 
He himself has found it more time consuming and difficult to become a 
company (organization) man than to become a labor relations specialisti. 
Management personnel are expected to adj ust to the Western concept o f  
4The following account is based on interviews with the Industrial 
Relations Director on March 29, 1973 and July 9, 1976. 
1 33 
the management hierarchy, with multidimennsional sources of authority, 
including those of staff executives. A common problem among Thai man� 
agers, he feels, is that they have not yet become truly professional.
Most managers have learned their skills through practical experience,
and many do not perceive that they need or can benefit from additional 
training. He observes that the skills of Thai management are develop­
ing, as they must, and this is true also of the traditional Thai char­
acter with respect to adapting to industrial employment. In  this com­
pany, Thai managersn.nunderstand that they must adapt if they wish to 
remain with the organization. 
Recruitment 
The industrial relations department receives requisitions from 
supervisors to fill vacant positions. The company discourages walk-in 
applications, but it does accept them for public relations purposes when 
they occur. It relies more heavily upon internal, word-of-mouth sources 
and it does do some recruitment via newspaper advertisements. There 
is · some use 0£ existing personnel to fill higher level vacancies, and 
there is a gener�l policy to promote from within. For skilled posi­
tions, it advertises in newspapers and it recruits junior executives 
from universities and colleges. lt uses neither the government nor 
private employment agencies, for it considers both to be unreliable. 
Applicants are not screened carefully, nor are their references check­
ed by these employment services. Job descriptions exist for lower 
level positions, but until 1975 the. industrial relations department
made little use of them in determining the type of qualifications it 
sought in its applicants. Apparently, the descriptions had been pre­
pared haphazardly some years earlier and were not revised with changes
in job duties until 1975, so until then the industrial relations direc­
tor regarded them as unreliable. However, the greater attention now 
being paid to personnel matters as a consequence of the growth of labor 
unions in Thailand has led to a det·ailed analysis of the job structure 
in the company and an updating of all job descriptions and specifications. 
Selection and Induction 
An applicant is initially an4 briefly interviewed. References are 
then checked, and for some positions a skill test is given. The per­
sonnel department does not use batteries of tests to measure. applicantsn' 
aptitudes, for few tests exist that are programmed for Thai workers. 
Applicants who pass these initial screening procedures are then given 
a more intensive interview and, if this is satisfactory, are referred 
to the supervisor, who makes the final selection. Then and only then 
is the applicant required to pass a medical test, after which he is 
offered employment. 
The nature of a workern' s  duties are indicated, and company rules· 
and policies are explained. These are stressed, according to the in­
dustrial relations director, because the typical Thai w6rker does not 
believe that he is bound by rulesn; he may go along with them, but only 
as long as it is convenient for him to do so.  Many, if not most, em­
ployees have· prior job experience, and they have for the most part ac­
quired an aptitude to accept the greater job discipline imposed by 
Western firms. During their probationary period, their capacity to 
acknowledge �ompariy rules is one of the factors on which their perform­
ance is appraised. 
Training 
The company uses vestibule training for refinery workers. The 
cost of the equipment and the hazards associated with its use make this 
134 
type of training practicali. Thais learn quickly, although not always 
with complete thoroughness, and because they tend to be fatalistic, 
they often take unnecessary chancesi. Hence, careful training is re­
quired in situations where the existence of adverse traits can prove
to be dangerousi. On-the-job training is given for clerical employees,
who already possess basic, general skillsi. Supervisors and executives 
receive in-house training, and the company each year conducts biweekly
seminars . The program has been expanded since the advent of labor 
unions, for the company feels that supervisor.s, in particular, need 
human relations trainingi. New supervisors tend to believe that because 
they occupy a position of authority, they also possess the necessary
qualities to. function in that positioni. This self-satisfied attitude,
·perhaps due to the Buddhist perception of merit, when blended with in­
experience in leadership situations, can create personnel problemsi. 
Discipline and Turnover 
Turnover has tended to be high among certain types of personneli. 
Engineers with experience are in demand, and some leave for better 
jobs after they have acquired administrative experience, although man­
agerial turnover in 1976 was low, undoubtedly because of the recession 
in the Thai economy which led to a scarcity of executive vacancies. 
Turnover among service station operations was also high, essentially
because it required both long hours and a business aptitudei. Few had 
sufficient business experience to succeed, and it was this deficiency 
that led the company in 1975 to divest itself of this phase of the 
petroleum businessi. Truck drivers come and go . They are in high de­
mand in the economy, yet the company has had an honesty problem with 
themi. 
The company utilizes a formal discipline procedurei. An infraction, 
if not unduly severe, is first treated with a verbal warning and sub­
sequently with a written warningi. Suspension is the next step in the 
procedure, followed by dischargei. Termination may be with or without 
separation pay, depending upon the nature of the infractioni. A worker 
who continues to violate company rules after suspension may be given 
the choice of accepting a demotion or submitting his resignationi. In 
most cases, because a demotion is an unthinkable loss of face, the work­
er will quit. 
The company, on occasion, has been contacted by the Department of 
Labor in connection with its discipline procedure when a worker has 
been discharged for cause and without separation payi. The worker may
appeal to the Labor Department, who will investigate the casei. Except
for this type of situation, the company has little contact with the 
Labor Department, but it does make a conscious effort to abide by all 
th·e labor laws and regulationsi. As labor legislation expands, the in­
dustrial relations director noted that middle-size firms will find it 
necessary to employ a full-time professional personnel officeri. 
Labor Relations 
The company utilizes merit rating in evaluating worker performancei. 
Ratings by supervisors are made annually in accordance with a prescrib­
ed form. The ratings are discussed with workers and are used as a basis 
for additional training, advancement, promotion, and pay increasesi. 
The refinery workers are organized into a labor union, and the 
company in 1973 was charged with committing an unfair labor practice 
by discharging two employeesi. The court action alleged that the com­
pany discharged them for union activity, but the company claimed that 
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the workers were discharged with separation pay for violating company
rules ,  all in �ompliance with the labor law. The company ' s  pos ition 
was ultimately sustained by an appeals court. The company provides 
the union with an office on company property. The industrial relations 
director acknowledges that management was respons ible for the workersn' 
desire to form the union. The company had employed an expatriate 
manager who d id not understand Thai workers. (The refinery manager is  
now an American with both technical experience and labor relations 
training. ) A Thai manager would have. been. desirable, but no experienc­
ed Thai was av�ilable. Management did not know that the workers wanted 
a union until after it had already been organized. The company , how­
ever, has found the leaders of the association to be respons ible offi­
cials. Only one strike has occurred , a one- day affair in December 1973. 
In April 1976, ·the company and union successfully negotiated a detailed 
labor agreement , perhaps the most complete of its kind in all of Thai­
land, without a strike. The
.
agreement is  to - last until 1979 , and pro­
vides procedures for amendment. A check off of dues is maintained by
the company and cost-of-living increases are provided. L eave p.rovi­
s ions are detailed and under the grievance procedure , arbitration by
the legal section of the Labor Department i s  provided at the third 
step .n. Time limits for speedy processing of grievances are specified. 
Transfer and promotion clauses are included, but seniority rights are 
not recognized.  
1'he company has a grievance pr6cedure as required by law , but it 
has found that workers personally use it on -ly with their immediate 
supervinsor. Appeals to higher supervisors are handled through the 
union. A special kind of supervisor is needed, one who can talk to 
the workers and find out their problems. Workers will not talk with 
their supervisors if management is  not willing to listen. Workers may 
not complain openly , but they do gripe among themselves and keep their 
grievances bottled up inside. Hence, a supervisor sensitive to em­
ployeesn' reactions is desnired. "Thais have the same sentiments as 
other people , "  observed the industrial relations manager ;  "they j ust 
react differently, and supervisors must understand , as our refinery 
manager did not, their reactions.n' '  The company expends much effort in 
training its supervisors in labor relations skills. It encourages them 
to report promptly to a labor relations officer the development of even 
minor personnel problems and to seek his  counsel on issues involving
grievances. An employees '  council exists to represent transport
employees at the barge terminal where refined petroleum products are 
transported from the refinery to Bangkok for distribution. The coun­
cil meets monthly with the industrial relations staff to consult about 
job problems and personnel practices. No union exists among these 
workers nor among office or sales personnel. 
Wages and Benefits 
I 
The company pays the prevailing wage for Western-type firms , which 
is substantially above that paid in comparable Thai firms but is  also 
about 30 percent less than the Siam Building Materials Company. Month­
ly wages at the refinery in 1976 varied from a minimum of 1 , 660 baht 
to a maximum of 5, 805 b.aht. The company does not regard itself as the 
wage leader , al though it tries to be amo·ng the leaders. It conducts 
it.s own wage surveys and believes the surveys of· the American Chamber 
of Commerce, of which it i s  a member , are too.. general. Positions in 
the company are class if ied and have _rate ranges ,  and salary advancement 
is largely based on merit, although there are seniority increanses. For 
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refinery workers, shift premiums, incentive bonuses, housing subsidies, 
and meal and transportation allowances are paid . Overtime, call-out 
pay, and holiday pay are giveni. The company gives fourteen paid holi­
days and a worker may take an unpaid holiday on his birthday . Paid 
vacations vary from one to three weeks annually, the latter applying
to those with ten or more years of servicei. The employee has the 
option of selecting either a pension plan or a combination plan provid­
ing (a) savings that are matched up to onei-half of the employeei' s  
amount, which cannot be more than 10 percent of his wage or salary,
(b) a group life insurance plan, (c) a death and permanent disability 
plani. Most workers have chosen the first optioni. Although the civil 
service in the past and some companies still pay the employee's income 
tax, Thai-American Energy does not . Both a sicknes s  and accident and 
a hospital insurance plan are provided. There is a company cafeteria 
in the modern Bangkok office building, which consists of beautifully 
decorated and spacious officesi. 
Comments 
The industrial relations director expressed a number of opinions 
regarding the development of Thai management as a profession and the 
changing character of the Thai labor forcei. In his view, as Thai in­
dustry develops, management of necessity must improve its skills if it 
is to meet the challenges of the future . In-service seminars are seen 
by lower and middle executives as an opportunity to acquire new skills,
and there is much interest and competition to be selected as partici­
pantsi. The fruits of such seminars are more rapid advancement within 
the firmi. The Thai labor force is also changingi. More ethnic Thais 
are entering the work force . Their willingness to seek jobs in indus­
try does not imply that they are any more materialistici. Rather, it 
means that Thais are now more aware of alternatives to an agricultural
life-style, which has lost some of its appeal as the countryside be­
comes more crowded and it becomes more difficult to subsist. Subsist­
ence in a rural environment was easier thirty to fifty years ago when 
the absence of communication and transportation facilities limited 
knowledge of urban life . He noted t hat some ethnic conflicts persist 
among Thai and Chinese workersi. Thais believe themselves to be super­
ior to the Chinese, and the Chinese tend to think of Thais as lazy and 
primitive . Finally, he noted the difference between personnel practices 
in a typical Chinese family firm and the organization which he repre­
sentsi. Employee relations in his company are patterned after the 
American style, whereas the Chinese firm treats workers as members of 
the family . Food, accommodations, education for workers' children, and 
medical care are provided within limits by the Chinese firm, although
it also pays low wagesi. As firms grow and become subject to the 
nationi' s  labor laws, the welfare benefits and minimum wages required
by these laws will cause the traditional firms to adapt more to the 
Western style of employment. 
Between 1973 and 1976 the industrial relations department has 
greatly expanded its labor relations staffi. Many have been sent to 
the United States for additional trainingi. The company is making in­
tensive efforts to maintain good employee relations, and a labor rela­
tions officer confided that he frequently takes the side of employees 
in is sues with supervisors when the latter are in the wrongi. Only in 
this way can he establish his credibility with the employees, so that 
they will acknowledge his decision when they are in the wrong . 
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I I I. The Rockefeller Foundation ' s  Thailand Program 
The Rockefeller Foundation, a major , prestigious American philan­
thropic organization has intermittently since 1916 provided technical 
aid to Thailand as a part of its overall commitment "to serve mankind.n" 
In the period 1923-33 it provided support to develop medical teaching
facilities at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. In 1961 the founda­
tion agreed to participate with the Thai government in an agricultural 
improvement program , oriented to corn, sorghum , and rice research. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has contributed experimental station and 
field research equipment and has assigned members of its
.
agricultural
staff to the research project. In 1963, the foundation through its 
University Development Program committed substantial resources and 
medical staff to the development of a medical science university in 
Thailand. In 1964 , the University Development Program entered into a 
long-term commitment with Thammasat University to develop the univer­
sity ' s  teaching staff by providing visiting professors to its faculty 
and scholarships to qualified Thai academicians , and to upgrade the 
university ' s  library facilities , partincularly in the Faculty of Econom­
ics. Of these three programs� agrincultural assistance is a continuing
commitment , the medical science project was completed in 1975n, and by
1980 the Thammasat University project will have achieved its objectives.
From 1965 through 1975n, the foundation has contributed in excess of 
20 million dollars to these Thai programs. 5n. 
The Rockefeller Foundation has maintained a field office.in Bang­
kok to administer its assistance program? and to service the needs of 
its staff and visiting , sponsored technical personnel , which in the 
early 1970s numbered about thirty-five American scholars and scientists. 
The field office is headed by a Rockefeller staff officer , himself a 
scientist , with an American administrative assistant who also is assign­
ed personnel m·anagement responsibilities. About forty- five Thai per­
sonnel were employed at the peak of the foundat1onn' s  programs as secre­
taries , clerks , messengers , drivers , customs clearing agents , and j ani­
tors. Occasionally ,  temporary employees are used in these positions.
Because the foundation is a nonprofit organization ,  the standards of 
the Thai labor laws do not apply to it as an employer. Neverthelessn, 
the foundation , as a matter of policy , provides wages and working con­
ditions equivalent or superior to those required of private enterprises 
by law , and in fact these inducements are , in most cases , equal to 
those provided by other Western firms in Bangkok. Because the founda­
tion ' s  program commitment is not permanent , its employees are aware 
that .ntheir employment relationship will expire when the programs are 
completed. Lifetime employment, then , does not characterize this rela­
tionship. ·  
Thai office personnel are recruited through newspaper advertise­
ments in which the position i� described , but the employer is not 
identified . Interested applicants are requested to submit their appli­
cation ·to an anonymous box number. On occasionn, private employment 
agencies have been requested to refer qualified applicants to the · 
foundation ' s  Bangkok office .n. For other personnel, personal referrals 
are most widely used, although a few walk-in applicnations are received 
5"The Rockefeller Foundation Contributes to liann' s Wellbeing in 
Thailand, '' ThaiZand-Ameriaan Business (September-Octobern, 1975)n, ppn. 
42-43. 
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from time to timei. The selection procedure begins with a personal 
interviewi. All applicants must possess an ability to read and write 
English, and fluency is required of all office personneli. Skills are 
then tested and references are checkedi. All appointments are condition­
al upon the successful passing of a medical examination, made at 
foundation expense by the medical staff of the university hospital with 
which the foundation has been associated, and annual medical examina­
tions are required of all continuing employees, also paid for by the 
foundationi. A letter of appointment stating the terms, hours, and 
conditions of employment is given the new employee to complete the 
hiring processi. All employees serve a 1 2 0-day probationary period. 
Induction is informal and training is oni-the-jobi. All applicants, how­
ever, already possess the basic skills of their occupation, and the 
training consists essentially in learning the routine and procedures 
through which the skills are applied to the assigned tasksi. 
Wages are on a monthly basis, although the pay period is twice­
monthlyi. Salaries in 1973 for stenographers varied upward from 4,000 
to 7, 000 baht per month, and drivers received from 1,200 to 2, 500 baht . 
Office employees work forty-four hours per week over a five and one­
half day period, although normally work on the sixth day is not schedul­
ed. Drivers work a fifty-four hour week, also over a five and one-half 
day weeki. Office personnel, drivers and messengers arei·ipaid time and 
one- half the hourly rate for hours of overtime ; the hourly rate is 
calculated as one-eighth of one-twentieth of the monthly wage . A lunch 
hour is scheduledi. A paid vacation of twelve days a year is provided
and may be accumulated up to thirty daysi. Paid sick leave up to thirty 
days annually is allowed but it may not be accumulated if unusedi. Ab­
sences due to illness in excess of five days requires a physiciani' s  
statement explaining the nature of the illnessi. For illnesses in ex­
cess of thirty working days, employees are permitted to use accumulat­
ed vacation timei. A female is entitled to sixty days of maternity
leave, with pay for thirty days in each two-year period. However, 
notification of pregnancy is required as soon as it is known, and for­
mal application must be made for maternity leavei. Uniforms are not 
provided to any personneli. Hospital insurance is provided to all 
employees by the foundation, which also pays for out-patient care for 
employees earning less than 3,500 baht per month. All employees re­
ceive life insurance at foundation expense, with benefits equal to 
two times the employee's annual salary .  Thirteen designated paid 
holidays are given annually . There are no pensions, and income tax 
is withheld from the wages of all employeesi. -Meals are not normally 
provided, except that compensation is given to drivers who are asked 
to work before or after normal working hours. Travel expenses of em­
ployees on foundation business are fully reimbursedi. 
Although annual increments are normally given in salaries, there 
is no automatic wage progression schedulei. Increments are based pri­
marily upon merit, although a small increase is usually allowed for 
tenure .  Merit is judged informally by the superior, and his approval 
or disapproval of the employee's performance is also communicated in­
formallyi. 
The rules of the foundation in written form are given to the em­
ployee, and their meaning is verbally communicated to him at the time 
of initial employmenti. Punctuality, regular attendance at work, noti­
fication of absences, honesty, and satisfactory performance are condi­
tions for continued employment .  The foundation also requires that it 
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be notified of changes in marital status, changes in name, pregnancy, 
or of other information pertinent to the worker ' s  employment. Disci­
plinary action involves verbal warnings and discharge. Discharge for 
cause may be immediate, with or without one month ' s  separation pay,
depending upon the severity of the infraction. Termination notice is 
normally given thirty days prior to separation once the probationary
period has been completed, and the same period is required for notice 
of resignation if separation pay is to be given. Separation pay equals 
one monthn' s  pay for less than one year of service, three monthsn' salary
for from one to three yearsn' service, six monthsn' pay for from three 
to six yearsn' service, and one additional month ' s  pa. y for each addition­
al year of service beyond six years � Drivers are responsible for their 
own .traffic violations, and full- time personnel may not take second 
jobs without permission from the foundation. Unauthorized absences 
lead to loss of pay and those exceeding five days .result in automatic 
discharge. 
The relationship between the American staff and Thai employees is 
personal and friendly. The Thais defer �o the �tatus of the scholars 
and scientists, but retain their individualism. Mild complaints may
be communicated to immediate supervisors, and major grievances become 
apparent because it is obvious that the Thai employees are distressed. 
The working conditions are pleasantn; offices and automobiles are air­
coriditioned. The work load is not heavy, and the Thais cooperate in 
meeting emergency deadlines. Employment with the foundation carries 
great status among the Thais, for the Rockefeller Foundation is highly 
regarded as an institution by the government and the people, and it 
is considered to be a good employer. The foundation, however, follows 
the· policy of maintaining a low profile and it does not seek nor en­
courage publicity about its activities in Thailand. It avoids issues 
with political overtones and it reminds its visiting staff that they 
are the guests of Thailand. 
IV. Case Studies in Labor Relations 
A. Textilesn6 
The textile industry has been one of the fastest growing in Thai­
land, and it unde_rwent major expansion in the 1969-73 period when it 
was granted Investment Promotion Act privileges. Between 1960 and 
1970 it grew at an �nnual rate of almost 19 percent. Exports expanded 
until early 1974, when they experienced a sharp decline in the world 
recession. Nevertheless, in 1975, the industry employed over 100,000
workers in 1, 137 firms. Ninety-five percent of the promoted firms 
are located in the six provincesn·nthat comprise the Greater Bangkok
metropolitan area. Two-thirds of the output. is consumed domestically
and one-third is exported. Thailand imports large quantities of raw 
materials and textile machinery, and. so its balance of payments in 
textiles has been unfavorable. In 1975, mills operated at about 75 
percent of capacity. The number of unioris has increased from three in 
1973, to six in 1975 and to twenty-three in 1976. Four large employer 
associations also exist among weaving (84 firms),  silk producers ( 175 
firms) ,  manufacturers (41 firms),  and dress-making (unspecified). 
6For an expanded discussion ·of the textile industry ' s  personnel 
problems, see Vichai Thosuwonnchinda, The Eaonomia Impact of the 
Minimum Wage and Tr-ade Unions in the Texti le  Indus try, (M.A. Tl1esis, 
Thammasat University, 1975). 
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As recently as 1 972, employment tended to be seasonali, as workers 
left their factory jobs and returned to the farm to assist in planting 
and harvesting . With the decline in vacancies coinciding with the 
1 974 recession, monthly turnover has fallen from 8 percent to less 
than 2 percenti, and absenteeism during harvest seasons has declined 
from 20 percent to less than 5 percenti. Three- fourths of surveyed 
workers indicated they had no plans to change jobs and felt that their 
current j obs were the best they could get. Two-thirds of the employees 
were femalei, unskilled, usually with only a lower primary educationi. 
Skills are acquired from on-the-job training during a probationary 
period, during which less than the minimum wage is paid. Typically,
dormitory accommodations contiguous to the factory are provided to 
single femalesi, and meals are normally giveni. A majority of employees 
are from rural areas with no previous work experiencei. 
In a study of six textile factories varying in emp�oyees from 
about 200 to over 3 , 000, Vichai Thosuwonchinda found that three were 
Japanese managed, two were Chinese owned, and the smallest was owned 
by a Thai .i7 Workers in the older firms tend to have more seniorityi. 
Although female employees are more numerousi, male wages tend to be 
higher on the average by 10 baht per dayi. With ten years of service, 
the range of female daily wages in 1 975 was between 20 and S O baht and 
the range for males was between 30 and 60 bahti. Four firms have per­
sonnel managers and in two firms, the personnel functions are performed
by the general managersi. All six firms keep personnel records with 
the employment contract of each workeri. Workers tended to _fall into 
two groups with respect to union sentiments . Most supported the union, 
although a majority did not pay duesi. Others were strongly antiunion 
and neither belonged nor paid dues . Where unions were absent, it was 
because no one was available to organize the workers . 
Three textile unions were also surveyed.i8 Two of them had members 
in several firms, although in the two strongest unions membership was 
concentrated in one or in only a few firmsi. The leadership had origi­
nated in the larger firms and was malei. A registration fee up to 1 0  
baht was charged, and monthly dues varied from 3 to 1 0  baht . The mem­
bers viewed union functions as (1) protection of members against unjust
acts of employers, ( 2 )  education of members with respect to their 
rights, (3) distribution of rice at government supported pricesi, (4)
provision of funeral and sickness benefits, and (5) operation of a 
small employee commissary .  Up to 1 975 , one firm had had four strikes, 
another had experienced three strikesi, two firms had experienced two 
strikes, and two had had only one strikei. All but one strike occurred 
after 1 973; only two occurred in the 1 974-75 period . Most strikes 
were over wages and cost-of-living adjustments , and some occurred be­
fore a union had been organizedi. All three unions participated in the 
June 1 974 textile workers demonstration in Bangkok . Some characteris­
tics of the unions are presented in Table A-1i. 
One of the most dramatic examples of labor protest in Thailand 
occurred when up to 30,000 workers gathered in Bangkok in June 1 974 _to.
protest initially the layoff of workers in the textile industry .i9 The 
7Ibid . ,  pp. 68-80i. 
8Ibid .  , pp . 8 0-9 2 .  
9An excellent description of the events in this strike are given
in "The Keys to Industrial Accord,i" The Investor (August 1 975), pp . 25-
28 . 
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TABLE A -1  
Selected Characteri stic s of Three 
Textile Unions ,  1975i. 
Characteriistic Union 1 Union 2 Union 3 
Date Established January 1 ,  1973 February 1 ,  1 973 September 1 , 1973 
Initial Member ship 30 5 0  25 
Membership , 1975 2 ,200  78 0 1 , 000  
Percent of firms '  total 
employees in union 10 %  70 %  4 0 %  
Number of firm s 
with membe rs 25 1 6 
Initiation Fee (in Baht ) 10  5 10  
Monthly Due s (in Baht) 5 3 1 0  
Percent who regularly 
pay due s 4 0 %  65 % 45% 
Number of Committees 
in Union 21 10 2 0  
Sou rce: Vichai Thosuwonchinda , The Economic Impact of the Minimum 
Wage and Trade Unions in. the Textile Industrya, lM.A. The sis, 
Thammasat U niver sity , 1975). 
Textile Manufacturers Association, in response to a sharp decline in 
exports, had compelled its member s to reduce output by 25 percenti. 
Under the leader ship of two allegedly radical labor leade rs , and with 
the cooperation of students who commandeered bu se s to transport workers 
into Bangkok , factorie s were succe ssfully cl osed on June 2 ,  1 974 , in
a campaign to secure j ob security for employees. Agreement on j ob 
security was reached on June 4 ,  but under mushrooming support from the 
labor union community, demand s were broadened f or minimum wage increa se s, 
larger separation pay f or laid-off employee s ,  continued payment of wage s 
to strikers, and a variety of union security issues. Leaders of the 
activist National Students Center of Thailand (NSCT) harangued the 
growing crowd s , and among tho se vilified were the American ,  Japanese, 
and Thai _goveirnment s. The issue s became clouded as  conservative union 
leaders f ought to retain control of their participating membership. 
Radical union leader s sought to expand their control by allegedly 
threatening violence to conservative leader s if they appeared at the 
rally. Compromi se s regarding the maj or demand s of the demonstrators 
that had been accepted by the maj ority of participating unions were
somehow not communicated to the crowds. Rad-ical s sought to impo se 
additional demands and planned to involve farmer.group s by bu sing 
them into Bangkok from di stant province s . . Had the dispute broadened, 
a leftist coup was a distinct possibility. However, the appearance of
the Prime Mini ster on televi sion and the insi stence of p rominent labor 
leaders finally forced the organi zers  to announce the re sults of the 
compromise and to call of the strike. 
A s  a result of the strike the bulk of the textile worker s located 
in the Greater Bangkok area received an average increase in the mini ­
mum wage of from 1 to 5 baht per day f or unskilled worker s and from 3 
to 6 baht per day f or skilled workers. Firms reported that they accom­
modated the increase by (a) eliminating waste, (b) installing new 
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machinery, or (c) by otherwise increasing labor productivityi. Incen­
tive rate standards were raised, product lines were shifted, and ini­
frequently some firms reduced outputi. A survey commissioned by the 
Central Bank of Thailand found that wages overall increased by 12 . 5  
percent and that total costs increased only by 1 . 9 percent . In the 
firms surveyed by Vichai Thosuwonchinda, costs increased by only 1 . 5  
percent.i1 0  
Strikes continued in 1975 and 1976, and in June 1976 a strike 
over higher wages at Thailand's largest artificial fibre plant involv­
ing 1,000 workers threatened to drive the financially hardpressed com­
pany into bankruptcyi. After two weeks of the work stoppage, the govern­
ment ordered the workers to return to their j obs while negotiations 
continued on the fifteen points demanded by the union .i1 1  Although some 
observers feel that the government's suppression of the strike repre­
sented unwarranted interference in private collective bargaining, the 
financial community convinced the government that collapse of the 
company would generate a chain reaction throughout the textile indus­
try, j ust as it appeared to be experiencing economic recovery . 
B .  The Airline Industry 
Bangkok is a majior hub of international airline traffic, and the 
rate of growth in traffic in the 1970s has increased annually at about 
18 percent .i1 2  The industry employs a wide variety of personnel, who 
comprise on the average the best-educated and one of the best- paid 
groups of unionized employees in Thailand. Maintenance and repair
engineers, cargo handlers, ticket clerks, sales representatives, ground 
hosts and hostesses, traffic officers, catering personnel, clerical 
workers, storekeepers, and accountants are only some of the occupations 
represented. Most airline workers like their jobs, which carry high 
prestige, and most have positive sentiments about their employersi. 
These workers are organized into four unions, the oldest (1973) of 
which is the Bangkok Air Transportation Workers Unioni. Until May 1976 
this union was also the largest, with 1,431 registered members, but it 
divested itself of 450 World Travel Service employees after they engag­
ed in an illegal strikei. The largest airline union now is that com­
prising the ground engineering staff of the domestic airline, which 
also provides maintenance and repair services to other international 
airlinesi. It  had 1,130 registered members in 1976i. Of the two inter­
national Thai airlines,1 3  Thai International, which is affiliated with 
lOThosuwonchinda, Economic Impact ,  p .  100. 
11"Textiles : The Future Hangs in the Balance," Bangkok Post 
MidyeaP Economic Revie�a, June 1976, (July 2, 1976), pp . 4 8-49 .  There 
is even skepticism that the company is really in financial troublei. 
Such government interference tends to support the belief of unionists 
that the government is promanagementi. 
1211Aviation and Air Rights," Ibid . ,  p .  36 . 
13of all the international airlines, Thai International and Air 
Siam paid the low.est wagesi. Although turnover is low among their em­
ployees, those employees who do change jobs tend to transfer to a high­
er payi�g European airlinei. Most of the airline employees speak English 
or another foreign language . In late 1976, Air Siam terminated its 
unprofitable operations, leaving Thailand with only one international 
airlinei. 
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SAS, was by far the larger. In 1976 it had a fleet of eleven jets, two 
of which werei·i"jumbo jets,i" w·ith daily flights to Europe, Africa,
throughout Asia to Japan, and to Australiai. In  1976 it had abbut the 
same seat capacity as had the major European airlines of the mid-1960si. 
Its ground employees are organized exclusively into a separate union 
of about 300 membersi. Finally, office personnel are organized into 
the Aeronautic Thai Staff Union, which consists of 233 registered mem­
bersi. 
Membership in the Air Transportation Workers Union was unevenly
distributed among the ten international airlines with which it bargain­
ed, varying from a high of 99 percent of the employees of the now de­
funct Air Siam to a low of 4 percent among Cathay Pacific ground per-
sonneli. In addition to Air Siam, a majority of the employees were from 
the following airlinesi: British Airways, Japan Airlines, KLM, Air 
France, and Pan Am . Although other airlines had labor agreements with 
the Air Transportation Workers Union, most Western airlines have openly 
declared that they prefer not to deal with a unioni. Union members 
employed b y  the World Travel Service, a supplier of certain types of 
ground services, struck Air France and Lufthansa illegally over increas­
ed wage demands, despite the existence of a valid contract. The two 
airlines promptly canceled their contracts with the union and with 
the World Travel Service and moved to Thai I nternational for ground
servicei. Hence, the strike resulted in a loss both of jobs for the 
affected workers and .iof a lucrative service contract for their Thai 
company . The latter was forced to reduce wages by 25 percent in order 
to survive. This has been a bitter but valuable lesson to unions 
concerning their responsibility to honor existing labor agreementsi. 
Nevertheless, members of the airline union remained convinced 
that strike action was the proper means to obtain their ends, since 
for the most part strikes had succeeded in winning them their demandsi. 
They willingly supported the unioni' s  call for strike actioni. Although
all knew their wages and hours of work, few members had seen their 
labor agreement or were informed about the rights provided them by it . 
The employees of each of the ten airlines with contracts with the Air 
Transportation Union usually elected a committee to represent them, 
and from the committee, a representative was chosen to serve on the 
unioni' s  executive councili. However, no shop stewards were appointed
and grievances were not routinely processed .  Nor did employers dis­
tribute written work rulesi. Although the union maintained an office 
across the street from the international airport, meetings were rarely
called and attendance was even less reliable . In  part this was due to 
the odd work hours made necessary by the round-the-clock nature of 
airport o·perationsi. Most airline personnel are normally not at any 
one time of the day in the vicinity of the suburban location of the 
airport, situated some twenty .imiles north of Bangkok .i· The members' 
lack of involvement in union affairs also extended to the regularity 
with which they paid their duesi. 
Observers of the labor scene in Thailand in 1976 were disturbed 
at the chaotic condition into which airline unionization had deterior­
atedi. Most felt that only one airline union was needed for strong 
and effective bargaining representation and _that four were certainly
too many. There was internal dissension among the leadership of the 
Air Transportation Workers Union in 1975 as a youthful rival tried to 
splinter the union by wooing support from a number of the elected 
committeesi. Unsuccessful in this ploy, he then resorted to discredit­
ing the secretary-general of the union by attempting to portray him 
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as a philanderer, and rumour has it that personal threats were made 
against his life . Whatever the cause , ·the secretary -general resigned, 
and for six months the union was without effective leadershipi. Cynics
have also hypothesized that the rival leader had been paid by employer 
groups to break up the unioni. Only the strategic  services supplied by 
the employees and the vulnerability of the airlines to interruptions 
in these services permitted the union to survive . However, .its member ­
ship did decline, rival unions appeared, and alternative sources of 
supply of these essential services have developed . Unless effective 
leadership .is forthcoming and a merger movement . is begun , the superior
bargaining power inherent among the airline unions may continue to be 
erodedi. 
